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Reconsidering the role of nominal monetary policy variables: 
evidence from four major economies  
  
By Min Zhu 
 
This thesis aims to contribute to monetary policy studies by conducting fundamental research and 
gathering empirical evidence on the effectiveness of monetary policy in the U.S., U.K., Germany 
and Japan. The financial crisis in 2007/08 highlighted the weakness of using nominal interest rates 
as the main monetary policy instrument. Before the financial crisis in 2007/08, the new monetary 
consensus (Bernanke 1992, 1995, and 1996, Woodford, 2003) that interest rates could be the 
effective intermediate instrument to influence the economy was widely accepted by central banks. 
It had developed since the failure of monetarism in the late 1970s. Some central banks (BOE, ECB, 
and RBNZ) have adopted specific inflation targeting, and approach it through the short-term 
interest rate. However, as the short-term interest rate has approached zero in a number of countries, 
it has become apparent that new monetary policy instruments are needed. Quantitative variables 
(including measures of money and credit) have since become of greater concern again, especially 
since a policy of “quantitative easing (QE)” was adopted by the Bank of England in 2009.  
 
The main goal of this research is to provide empirical evidence on the interaction between 
financial variables (interest rates, money and credit) and economic variables (nominal GDP). 
Three main questions are being dealt with:  
(1) Are financial variables (interest rates, money and credit) appropriate to target nominal 
GDP? 
(2) Do quantitative variables (money and credit) have superior predictive abilities to the price 
variable (interest rate) in predicting nominal GDP?  
(3) Do credit variables perform better than money aggregates in explaining nominal GDP?  
 
The empirical analysis employs simple regressions, Granger causality tests, the general-to-specific 
modelling methodology and VARs model. The empirical results suggest that quantitative variables 
(money aggregates and GDP-circulation credit) have more predictive power for nominal GDP than 
price variables (interest rates). Meanwhile the GDP-circulation credit displays more accurate 
features than money aggregates to target nominal GDP. Overall the outcomes not only enrich the 
literature regarding the monetary policy in the U.S., U.K., Germany and Japan but also provide 
further empirical support for a modified ‘credit view’ of the transmission of monetary policy. They 
also have implications for the design of a successful monetary policy implementation regime. 4 
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national currency) 
RGDP  Real Gross Domestic Product 
RBNZ  Reserve Bank of New Zealand 
PGR  Annual Growth Rate of Consumer Price Index 
R-90  3-month Treasury bill 
R -10YR  Treasury bonds with constant ten-year maturity 
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1  Introduction  
“The tool cannot be the interest rate. It is too imperfect for that. There 
was a need for direct controls on the supply of credit to prevent the 
build-up of dangerous asset price bubbles. Policy makers needed more 
than interest rates to tame asset price booms and urged the setting of a 
new macro-prudential body in the UK able to take preemptive action. ” 
 
Lord. A. Turner at Davos, 27th Jan. 2010   
 
 
1.1  Motivation 
As stated at the beginning, there has been a call for new monetary policy rules 
following the 2007/08 financial crisis, because this crisis revealed the weakness of 
interest rate as the monetary policy instrument.  Before the financial crisis of 2007/08, 
the new popular monetary consensus (Bernanke, 1992, 1995, and 1996),  that interest 
rate was the effective intermediate tool to influence the real economy, had dominated 
central banks’ operations since the failure of money aggregates as the intermediate 
target to the real economy in the 1970s. The public also accepted this notion that the 
interest rate has a real effect on economic conditions; thus, the financial markets would 
respond after the minutes of the central banks’ committee had been 
published.(Dominguez, 1991, Eijffinger and Geraats, 2006) However, the use of only 
short-term interest rate to target inflation failed to predict or prevent the financial crisis, 
and this has provoked the debate. In addition, the interest rate has been cut to almost 
zero in the main developed countries following the financial crisis of 2007/08, but 
economies are still suffering from lacklustre performance, especially in the U.S. and the 
U.K.  Therefore, at this point, the monetary authorities have demanded a search for a 
new monetary policy rule.  
 
Response to the crisis  
 19The monetary authorities have realize the mistake in the assumption that price stability 
will lead the financial stability, thus they propose the new monetary policy tools. Some 
suggest that we need stricter capital adequacy requirements and accounting standards. 
But it does not recognize the core problems that cause the financial crisis, because it is 
hard to see that bank crisis could avoid by raising the ratio of capital adequacy from 8 
percent to 12 percent. Someone suggest that restructured pay, more competition, greater 
monitoring, some type of a Volcker rule, and counter-cyclical capital adequacy rule, 
even further step to implementation of macro-prudential policy over the cycle.  There 
are many new thoughts on monetary policy tools. My study also attempts to propose a 
possible way to keep financial stability and help promote prudential banking system, 
and basically the idea is that we might pay more attention on other tool-credit, besides 
the focus on interest rate.   
 
Given the uncertain effect of monetary policy on the economy, it is not surprising that 
there are also extensive debates in academic circles on the ultimate target of monetary 
policy and the rules upon which it is based. The more recent natural experiment in 
monetary policy covering three episodes of growth and decline in the economy and the 
stock market carried out by Friedman (2005) confirmed that the quantity of money has a 
determinative effect on what happens to national income and to stock prices. The results 
strongly support Anna Schwartz's and Friedman’s 1963 conjecture about the role of 
monetary policy in the Great Contraction. The noticeable feature of the experiment was 
that Friedman used nominal GDP instead of real GDP to represent the economic 
conditions; thus, the researcher regards this as an indication that the academics are 
starting to re-emphasise nominal GDP rather than real GDP as the monetary policy 
target.  
 
A number of  researchers have previously advocated nominal income targeting in theory 
(Tobin,1980; Meade, 1984; Hall,1984; Frankel,1995; Gordon,1985; Taylor, 1985; 
McCallum, 1990;  Pecchenino and Rasche, 1990;  Hess et al., 1993;  Feldstein and 
Stock,1993; and Hall, 1993), but few empirical works have examined it (Judd and 
Motley,1992; Feldstein and Stock,1993; Werner,1997, 2003, 2005). Consequently there 
is a big gap in the literature concerning empirical work on the use of interest rate, 
money aggregates and credit to target nominal income or nominal GDP. Meanwhile, 
considering the need to find a new monetary policy tool besides the interest rate 
 20following the financial crisis of 2007/08, it will be constructive to explore the effect of 
quantitative variables (money, credit) or price variable (interest rate) on the nominal 
output. This research intends to provide the empirical evidence on using interest rate, 
money aggregates and GDP-circulation credit to target nominal output in the context of 
a developed economy. 
 
Before a discussion in this introductory chapter of what the research intends to achieve, 
the researcher will firstly review the ultimate and the intermediate monetary policy 
target to achieve the economic goals of the central banks of the U.S., U.K., Germany 
and Japan in the time before the financial crisis of 2007, and then summarise what the 
central banks have actually done following the recent financial crisis. The study 
indicates the change in monetary policy instruments in the monetary policy process of 
central banks before and after the financial crisis and points out that the different 
notions about monetary policy signal the need to find a new monetary policy 
instruments-credit supply control; furthermore, it also suggests the possibility of using 
another ultimate monetary policy target - nominal GDP.   
 
1.2  The world before the financial crisis of 2007/08  
1.2.1  The relationship between interest rate and real economy in theory  
After the collapse of monetarism in the late 1970s and early 1980s, many researchers 
advocated the use of interest rate as the monetary policy. Taylor (1993) also argues that, 
since it is the interest rate that directly affects spending, the central banks should think 
in terms of choosing interest rate rather than a rate of nominal money growth. He 
proposed a simple monetary policy, where the Federal Reserve puts the same weight on 
both inflation and output gap. The central banks can rely on the output gap and inflation 
gap to adjust the interest rate, although the empirical work has not always fully 
supported the Taylor rule (Svensson, 2003). The “ Interest and Prices” (Woodford, 2003) 
shows how interest rate policy can be used to achieve an inflation target in the absence 
of either commodity backing or control of a monetary aggregate. Woodford dropped the 
word “money” from the name of the famous economics book “Money, interest rate, and 
prices: an integration of monetary and value theory” by Don Patinkin (1965), which 
 21points to Woodford’s contention that money is not important. 
1 Although there is a 
disconnection between theory and practice, the central banks in industrialised countries 
started to target inflation based on an interest rate approach from the late 1980s. The 
summaries of the monetary policy statements of the Federal Reserve, Bank of England 
(BOE), Bank of European (ECB) and Bank of Japan (JOB) in the following part will 
confirm the interest rate approach that central banks have been using until now.  
 
1.2.2  Monetary policy target in the U.S., U.K., Germany and Japan  
 
Federal Reserve Board  
 The goals of monetary policy are laid down in the Federal Reserve Act, which specifies 
that the Board of Governors and the Federal Open Market Committee should seek “to 
promote effectively the goals of maximum employment, stable prices, and moderate 
long-term interest rates.” The consensus is that stable prices are a precondition for 
maximum sustainable output growth and employment as well as moderate long-term 
interest rates in the long run  
 
In the implementation of monetary policy, the Federal Reserve influences the conditions 
in the market for balances that depository institutions hold at the Federal Reserve Banks.  
 
The operating objectives or targets that it has used to affect desired conditions in this 
market have varied over the years. Now the FOMC sets a target for the federal funds 
rate that are balances traded between depository institutions but, in the past, the FOMC 
sought to achieve a specific volume of those balances.  
 
“By the means of open market operations, imposing reserve 
requirements, permitting depository institutions to hold contractual 
clearing balances, and extending credit through its discount window 
facility, the Federal Reserve exercises considerable control over the 
demand for and supply of Federal Reserve balances and the federal 
                                                 
1
  Marcus Miller suggested that Woodford’s intention to drop the word “money” indicated Woodford’s 
attitude to the money in monetary policy.  
 
 22funds rate. Through its control of the federal funds rate, the Federal 
Reserve is able to foster financial and monetary conditions 
consistent with its monetary policy objectives. ”
2  
 
Bank of England  
 
The Bank of England explains the monetary policy framework as follows: 
 
“The Bank’s monetary policy objective is to deliver price stability – low inflation – and, 
subject to that, to support the Government’s economic objectives including those for 
growth and employment. Price stability is defined by the Government’s inflation target 
of 2%”
3 
 
The Bank of England announces the interest rate, which is used to control the inflation 
target, and explicates that the changes in interest rate will influence market rates, asset 
prices, expectations and exchange rates, which are crucial factors affecting the total 
demand. The interest rate influence on the overall demand, and then the inflation 
pressure is the result. Therefore, in brief, the change in interest rate is intended to 
control the inflation.  
 
European Central Bank  
The European Central Bank declaims a similar framework and points out that the 
maintenance of price stability is the primary and single monetary policy objective. This 
is spelled out in the Treaty establishing the European Community, in Article 105 (1). 
  
"Without prejudice to the objective of price stability", the Eurosystem will also "support 
the general economic policies in the Community with a view to contributing to the 
achievement of the objectives of the Community". These include a "high level of 
employment" and "sustainable and non-inflationary growth". 
 
                                                 
2  The source: Chapter of The Implementation of Monetary Policy, The Federal Reserve System: 
Purposes Function  
3 Source: Bank of England  
 23The ECB’s Governing Council has specified price stability as "a year-on-year increase 
in the Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices (HICP) for the Euro area of below 2%. 
Price stability is to be maintained over the medium term". 
 
The operational framework of the Eurosystem consists of three instruments: open 
market operations, standing facilities, and minimum reserve. Open market operations 
have the significant role of steering the interest rate, while standing facilities bind the 
overnight market interest rate, signalling the general monetary policy; the intention of 
the minimum reserve system is to stabilise the market interest rate, and create a 
structural liquidity shortage.  
 
Overall, this set of instruments is the middle process in achieving the ultimate growth 
goal, and the three instruments mentioned above are all relevant to interest rate. In 
conclusion, the interest rate is the technique used by the European Central Bank to reach 
the price stability.  
 
Bank of Japan  
The Bank of Japan, as the central bank of Japan, also states that, because the price 
stability provides the foundation for the nation’s economic activity, maintaining price 
stability is the aim of monetary policy in Japan.  
“The Bank controls the amount of funds in the money market mainly 
through money market operations, thereby bringing the 
uncollateralized overnight call rate to the target level specified in the 
guideline for money market operations. Money market rates, in turn, 
affect interest rates in other financial markets and the lending rates 
that financial institutions apply on loans to firms and individuals.  In 
this way, the Bank's monetary policy influences economic activity 
overall.” 
4 
 
By interpreting the statements made by these most important central banks in the world, 
one can discern the fact that the price stability is the main target for these central banks 
                                                 
4 Source:  The outline of monetary policy, Bank of Japan  
 24nowadays, as they assume that the price stability is a precondition for high and stable 
levels of growth and employment, which will in turn assist in creating the conditions for 
price stability on a sustainable basis. The way the central banks exert their influence in 
general is to control the interest rate through the open market operation, the volume of 
money, and minimum reserve requirement.  As the goal is economic growth, common 
sense would suggest that there is a certain negative correlation between the nominal 
interest rate and economic growth. The central banks intend to control the interest rate, 
combined with inflation-targeting, to influence the economic activity. 
 
However, since the 2007 financial crisis, using the interest rate as the instrument with 
which to achieve the effect on the economy that the central banks expected has been in 
doubt.  The high economic growth rate accompanied by low inflation in the last three 
decades demonstrates the interest rate’s effect on the real economy, but the academic 
world has realized the necessity of re-examining the limitations of the interest rate in 
affecting the real economy, as the current macroeconomic theory has been put under 
strain since the financial crisis of 2007/08 and the subsequent recession. The theories of 
both New Classical and New Keynesian economics were undermined after the financial 
crisis; thus the academics have started to acknowledge the problem with interest rate as 
the monetary policy. It was a complex matter to distinguish movements of real interest 
rate versus nominal rate when inflation became the problem. Before this financial crisis, 
the central banks had been proud of themselves, as it seems they had found the key to 
mordant monetary economics, which is inflation-targeting. However, they now know 
that, although the inflation includes certain information, this information might not 
reflect what is happening in the current financial market.  
 
When the researcher started to review the monetary policy tools and goals in these four 
countries at the beginning of the research, the financial crisis of 2007/08 had not yet 
occurred. If one looks through the statement of the monetary policy tools in the central 
banks of these four countries after the financial crisis of 2007/08, the interesting change 
is that there is more emphasis on the tools being relative to credit, especially in the U.S. 
and the U.K. 
5 The innovations in the financial market, the boom in developing 
countries’ economies, and the trend of free global capital flow after the 1990s made the 
                                                 
5 The terms are Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility in the U.S.,  Quantitative Easing in the U.K 
 25monetary policy transmission mechanism more complex. As Lord Turner said, we need 
a new instrument: credit control.  
  
1.3  The world after the financial crisis of 2007/08 
After the initial downturn of the financial crisis in 2008, the immediate action taken by 
the central banks was to reduce the short-term interest rate. The Federal Reserve carried 
out a number of significant actions, which included cutting the target federal funds rate 
by 325 basis points from the second half of 2007 to the first four months of 2008, in 
response to the steep increase in commodity prices boosting consumer price inflation 
and the deteriorating financial market conditions threatening economic growth. 
6 The 
central banks around the world also took the extraordinary, co-ordinated step of cutting 
interest rates amid slumping world stock markets in 2008. Remarkably, six central 
banks took this action in concert, including the Bank of England, the US Federal 
Reserve, and the central banks of Canada, Sweden and Switzerland, cutting interest 
rates by half a percentage point in an effort to steady the faltering global economy in 
October 2008. 
7  
 
1.3.1  The actions of central banks in the liquidity trap  
When the central banks found that the reduction of interest rate alone could not prevent 
the collapse of financial markets and the weakening of real economic conditions, they 
began to inject billions of pounds into the market to avoid the continuing drop in prices. 
The central banks started to employ “Quantitative easing”
8, which made the public at 
last realize that the “helicopter drop” of money had become a reality in order to fight 
                                                 
6 Source: Monetary policy of the Federal Reserve report to Congress published on July 15
th, 2008.  
7 “Six central banks, including the Bank of England, have cut interest rates by half a percentage point in 
an effort to steady the faltering global economy. No decision on UK rates had been expected until 
Thursday - and the move puts the interest rate at 4.5% from 5%. The US Federal Reserve has cut rates 
from 2% to 1.5% and the European Central Bank (ECB) trimmed its rate from 4.25% to 3.75%. The 
central banks of Canada and Sweden and Switzerland all took similar action in the co-ordinated move. 
China also cut its rate, but by 0.27 percentage points.” BBC News “Central Banks cut interest rates” 8 
October 2008  
8 When the Bank is concerned about the risks of very low inflation, it cuts bank rate – that is, it reduces 
the price of central bank money. But monetary policy- nominal short-term interest rates cannot 
significantly fall below zero. So if they are almost at zero, and there is still a significant risk of very low 
inflation, the Bank can increase the quantity of money – in other words, inject money directly into the 
economy. That process is sometimes known as ‘quantitative easing- source: Bank of England  
 26deflation. Actually, the use of “Quantitative easing” acknowledges that interest rate as 
the monetary policy tool is not sufficient.  
 
Quantitative easing has been acknowledged as the next logical policy step by the central 
banks as the base rate approaches zero. In the U.S., the Federal Reserve has bought 
$1.7trillion (£1.1trillion) in bonds to shore up its recovery from recession. In the same 
time period, the Bank of England was driven to inject 200bn pounds into the economy. 
The ECB has implemented a process that led to bonds being “structured for ECB”, 
which is a form of quantitative easing without it being referred to as such. The ECB 
expanded the assets that banks can use as collateral which can be posted to the ECB in 
return for Euros in the long term. In Japan, the BOJ has flooded commercial banks with 
excess liquidity to promote private lending, accomplished by buying more government 
bonds than would be required to set the interest rate to zero. Basically, to conclude, 
quantitative easing is the practice of loosening the loan supply by expanding the 
liquidity in the financial market with the expectation of boosting the economic 
conditions.  
 
1.3.2  A rule based on credit  
Green (2009), the chairman of HSBC, stated the necessity of directing the supply of 
credit because, in the current global open financial market, the ability of central banks to 
influence national economies through the control of interest rate has been weakened.
9 
As he pointed out, although the interest rate could be used to influence the banks’ 
demand for credit, global capital flow makes the monetary policy dynamic path more 
complex, and the irony exists that the central banks could increase interest rate and end 
up with looser monetary conditions. The increase in interest rate has not reduced the 
quantity of credit in the market, and has instead attracted more international capital 
inflow. Monetary policy works efficiently if the policy can be transmitted smoothly 
through the banking system, but this process is distorted by the global capital flows. 
Therefore, Green points out that it is time to give the central banks two weapons. One is 
interest rate, while the other is credit. The direct control of supply of credit is, to his 
mind, an effective policy. Actually he is not the only person who believes this, and his 
thoughts are in line with proposals by Lord Turner, the chairman of FAS.  
                                                 
9 “Let central banks direct the supply of credit”, Stephen Green, Financial Times, on April 26
th 2009. 
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Turner (2010)
10 said, in Davos, that interest rate could not be the only monetary policy 
tool - it is far too imperfect for that. He called for efforts to do something about this 
situation, because the bubble could not be pricked with the monetary policy used 
nowadays. As he pointed out, the massive expansion of credit made the property bubble 
of 2004-2007 far more serious than the dotcom bubble of the late 1990s and more 
dangerous to the real economy, because high levels of lending for property had led to 
instability of macro-economic and self-reinforcing processes involving both borrowers 
and lenders, and had made the situation worse.  Turner said the committee should be 
able to target both borrowers and lenders; furthermore, it could monitor the supply of 
credit flowing into those parts of the economy most likely to experience bubbles. 
 
Turner (2010) suggested that this had already happened in countries like China and 
India, and both countries had used the direct control of credit to prevent the build-up of 
asset price bubbles earlier in the decade. He added that the idea he was promoting is not 
new to academia. The importance of credit has been discussed by academics for a long 
time, but had been forgotten due to the dominant school of thought which assumed that 
economic management could be left to a combination of free-market forces and 
manipulation of interest rate, as in the past three decades.  
 
GDP-circulation credit  
In introducing the Federal Reserve's response to the 2007/08 financial crisis, Fed 
Chairman Ben Bernanke (2009) used the term “credit easing” to distinguish it from the 
“quantitative easing” in Japan during the period 2001 to 2006. He emphasised, “in 
contrast to a pure QE regime- gauged primarily in terms of target for bank reserves, the 
Federal Reserves’ credit easing approach focuses on the mix of loans and securities that 
it holds and on how this composition of assets affects credit conditions for households 
and businesses.” 
11The difference reflects the economic circumstances. “Credit spreads 
are much wider and credit markets more dysfunctional in the U.S. today than was the 
case during the Japanese experiment with quantitative easing,” Bernanke said.  
                                                 
10  Speaking in Davos, Lord Turner, FSA chairman, calls for direct controls on the supply of credit 27
th 
January 2010  
 
11 The speech “The Crisis and the Policy Response” by Chairman Ben S. Bernanke, at the Stamp Lecture, 
London School of Economics, London, England January 13, 2009  
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The announcement made by Bernanke reveals that various types of lending have 
heterogeneous effects due to the recent fundamental change in the financial markets, 
which require a more sophisticated credit policy. Turner (2010) also said, “We need 
new macro-prudential tools that directly focus on the supply of credit to those parts of 
the economy most likely to see bubbles.”  Turner made the point that some streams of 
credit are used to fuel the bubble, not the real economy, so the new monetary policy 
should not only monitor the total amount of credit flow, but also differentiate what the 
credit is used for.    
 
As a result, this research will develop the GDP-circulation credit flow, which is the part 
of credit directed to GDP growth while another part flows into the asset market
12, 
because the control of credit supply seems a useful tool not only to monitor the price 
bubble but also to prevent the economic downturns The GDP-circulation credit reflects 
the complex credit flow transmission in the market nowadays, and it is also an 
innovation in empirical research that uses the GDP-circulation credit to explore the link 
between credit and economic conditions. A number of earlier studies during the 1980s 
focused on monetarism. As the most important paper, “the role of monetary policy” by 
Friedman (1968), pointed out, the quantity of money could be the control target to 
influence the real economic conditions. The subsequent researchers (Sims, 1972; 
Davidson, 1972; Litterman and Weiss, 1985; Bernanke and Blinder, 1988; Hayo, 1999; 
Amato and Swanson, 2001; Meyer, 2001)  mainly explored the link between money 
aggregates and real GDP or GNP. However, due to the failure of monetarism in 1970s 
and the leading position subsequently taken by the New Classical economics, a limited 
number of studies have since paid attention to the effect of quantitative variables on the 
real economy. Research on credit has mainly emphasized the credit channel in the 
framework of the monetary transmission mechanism.  Most empirical studies (Bernanke 
and Blinder, 1988, 1992; Kashyap, Stein and Wilcox, 1993) aimed to find supporting 
evidence that credit has an effect on the real economy, but this empirical test is still part 
of the New Classical economic theory.  This research will examine the effect of GDP-
circulation credit on the economy in a framework that is different from the New 
                                                 
12 The concept of credit to real transaction was firstly provided by Werner (1997). He suggested that the 
credit flow could be divided into two groups. One flows into the real economy sector and the other flows 
into the financial sector.   
 29Classical economic theory. The most remarkable feature is the notion of targeting 
nominal GDP in that framework. 
13 
 
1.3.3  Goal of monetary policy: targeting nominal GDP  
Although academics have mainly focused on the real GDP, we actually live in the 
nominal world. In daily life, when companies make investments, or households 
calculate their expenditure, they not only weigh the quantity of real goods but also 
consider how much they will pay and how much they will have in nominal terms. The 
tendency of people to consider currency in nominal terms, rather than real terms, is 
called money illusion. 
14 If the fundamental process of the economy is in nominal terms, 
it should attract research that emphasises the nominal variables.  Furthermore, to ensure 
value in the statistical quality of research, it would be better to couple real GDP with 
real interest rate, or nominal interest rate with nominal GDP. Otherwise, there is a 
mismatch problem. Thus, this study uses the aggregate nominal GDP to provide a new 
insight into the effectiveness of the monetary policy.  
Targets for nominal GDP, as it is maintained, would help policy-makers balance the 
policy goals of sustainable economic growth and price stability. With a good target 
variable, keeping the variable on target should help stabilize real GDP in the short term 
and also yield inflation consistent with the long-term objective of price stability.   
Advocates of rules for nominal GDP-targeting have proposed a number of specific rules. 
Typically, these rules call for the adjusting of short-term interest rate. Some analysts 
argue for rules that adjust another instrument of monetary policy, the monetary base, to 
keep nominal GNP on target (McCallum 1987, 1988; Judd and Motley 1993), and 
Werner (1997, 2003, and 2005) supported the use of GDP-circulation credit to target 
nominal GDP.  
Our research advocates the targeting of nominal GDP, because nominal GDP-targeting 
contains the economic growth and price information, which would help to stabilize the 
economy. In addition, the financial crisis of 2007 has heightened interest in the effect of 
                                                 
13 More details about the framework provided by Werner (1997, 2003, 2005) will be discussed in chapter 
6 
14   An economic theory stating that many people have an illusory picture of their wealth and 
income based on nominal dollar terms, rather than real terms. Real prices and income take into account 
the level of inflation in an economy.  
 30quantitative variables on economic conditions, while the lack of empirical studies in this 
area since the 1980s reveals the gap therein. As a result, using quantitative variables - 
money aggregates or credit aggregate - to target the nominal GDP is the main focus of 
this thesis. The research will employ empirical tests to target nominal GDP using the 
interest rates, money aggregates and GDP-circulation credit through simple regression, 
“causality” test and VARs model.  
 
There have been two important innovations in the empirical research. First, most 
empirical studies used the credit data that are published directly by central banks or 
commercial banks, but these credit data have not been classified according to the 
distinction underlying credit flow, one part of which  flows into the asset market, and 
other part of which flows into the real economy sector. In our research, the credit data 
used have been classified as credit flow into real economic transactions or financial 
speculation.  Second, most studies investigate the effect of financial variables on real 
GDP, but this research considers the nominal GDP as containing more information than 
real GDP; thus, it is used instead of real GDP to represent the economic conditions.  
 
1.4  The structure of thesis   
The study seeks to provide the empirical results of using interest rates, money 
aggregates and GDP-circulation credit to target nominal GDP in a world of instant 
communications and ever more efficient financial markets. The effectiveness of 
financial variables (interest rates, money aggregates and GDP-circulation credit) on 
output is tested on data from the U.S., U.K., Germany and Japan during the period 1960 
to 2008, using several approaches that are thought to be suitable for the task. First, the 
empirical evidence will seek to clarify whether the financial quantities variables, such as 
money or credit, are stable variables to target nominal GDP; second, it will try to 
establish whether they are better than interest rate for targeting nominal GDP. The most 
important feature of the empirical tests is that the research distinguishes between credit 
to the real sector and credit to the financial sector, which reflects the recent 
development of financial markets in the developed countries. Based on the empirical 
results, meaningful conclusions can be drawn concerning the success of money 
aggregates and GDP-circulation credit in affecting nominal GDP.  
 31The thesis begins in chapter 2 with a discussion of the theories on the effectiveness of 
monetary policy and monetary policy rules. As an ongoing debating topic, the literature 
on the intermediate target and the goal of monetary policy development in the U.S., 
U.K., Germany and Japan is presented. In the literature chapter, the empirical works on 
monetary policy transmission in these four countries are also summarised to provide the 
general channels that link financial variables and economic conditions.  
The methodology is presented in chapter 3. As a starting point, the single regression 
demonstrates that money aggregates are better than interest rate for explaining nominal 
GDP. However, simple regression is not sufficient to demonstrate that the quantitative 
variable could be used to target nominal GDP, and that it is better than interest rate, so 
the Granger causality test, General-to-specific models (GETS) and the Vector 
autoregression (VAR) approach are heavily employed and discussed in the 
methodology chapter.   
Interest rates are claimed to be the most important and frequently-used policy to affect 
the economy in the U.S., U.K., Germany and Japan. Therefore, in chapter 4, the 
research first tests the link between interest rate and nominal GDP. In this chapter, the 
Granger causality test is applied to find the “causal” direction between short-term 
interest rate and nominal GDP. In order to supply more information on the relationships 
between interest rates and other economical variables such as inflation and real GDP, 
the research also employs the Granger causality test to explore the link between interest 
rates and real GDP or inflation. The results give a mixed picture, because the interest 
rate does not Granger cause real GDP or nominal GDP as the theory might have 
suggested in some countries. It is certain that using only the Granger causality test is not 
enough, and further empirical tests will be used in the following chapters. 
The abandonment of monetary aggregates as an intermediate target occurred because of 
the development of financial deregulation and innovation. The difficulties in calculating 
money aggregates and the link between money aggregates and real GDP seem to have 
been eased following the innovations in the financial market. It seems that the 
quantitative variables also only affected the price; thus, in chapter 5 the research 
attempts to explore the link between money aggregates and nominal GDP in the short 
term. The research presents the econometric evidence of the strong link between 
nominal GDP and money aggregates by simple regression, also pointing out that money 
 32aggregates is better than interest rate in predicting nominal GDP. The research also 
applies the Granger causality test to find whether money aggregates could provide 
future information for nominal GDP. The VARs model is used to examine the large 
effect of money aggregates on nominal GDP. The empirical results based on Granger 
causality and VARs model suggest a strong link between money aggregates and 
nominal GDP, which is stronger than the effect of interest rate on nominal GDP.  
Due to the financial crisis of 2007/08, the academics and the public have finally had to 
admit the important role of credit in affecting the economic conditions. Therefore, the 
research intends to examine the effect of credit on economic conditions. In chapter 6, 
the analysis of monetary policy focuses on the GDP-circulation credit.  First, the 
discussion on the theoretical framework of using GDP-circulation credit to target 
nominal GDP is presented. Then the statistical analysis will be used to provide the 
empirical evidence on using GDP-circulation credit to target nominal GDP. In this part, 
the general-to-specific model (GETS), Granger causality test, and VARs model are 
employed. The results of the general-to-specific model reveal that GDP-circulation 
credit could be a good explanatory variable to nominal GDP; however, the Granger 
causality test yielded weak causal results between nominal GDP and GDP-circulation 
credit. The VARs model, which included interest rate, money aggregates and GDP-
circulation credit, provided solid evidence for the importance of GDP-circulation credit 
in affecting nominal GDP. The VARs model captures the dynamic consistent positive 
response of nominal GDP to GDP-circulation credit innovation in all four countries. In 
addition, the subsample tests are also implemented in the GETS model, Granger 
causality test, and VARs model, which produces the stability of the link between credit 
to real transaction and nominal GDP.   
Finally, in chapter 7, the study summarises the findings of the research, and evaluates 
the robustness of the findings across the different methodologies. Furthermore, the 
study points out the limitations in the empirical research of using quantitative variables 
to target nominal GDP and suggests that further studies are needed.  
The research aims to introduce the empirical tests on using financial variables -interest 
rate, money aggregates and credit data - to target nominal GDP in the long term, as tests 
conducted during a sufficiently lengthy time period would provide the creditable link 
between these variables. However, the governments (for example: Canada, France, 
 33Australia, etc.) did not provide sufficient and long-term data for nominal GDP and 
credit. The only countries that provided the nominal GDP and credit data over 30 years 
were the U.S., the U.K., Germany and Japan, and data on credit and nominal GDP from 
Canada, France, and Italy were not from a sufficiently lengthy time period. That is the 
reason why only four countries are included in the research.  
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2  General literature review  
A rich wealth of literature has explored whether monetary policy is effective; 
meanwhile, there have been attempts to improve economic models to explain the 
relationships among macroeconomic variables. There has been a degree of divergence 
in monetary policy theories over the last decade so, in the literature review chapter, the 
research firstly provides a brief presentation of the important theories on the 
effectiveness of monetary policy in an attempt to highlight the disagreements on the 
effectiveness of monetary policy in academic circles. Secondly, the literature on the 
discussion of monetary policy targets is provided in section 2.2. Because our study 
intends to provide empirical research on using financial variables (interest rate, 
aggregated money and GDP-circulation credit) to target nominal GDP, a review of the 
theories on monetary policy targets will help us to understand the advantage of each 
monetary policy target. As an ongoing topic for debate, there will be a review of the 
monetary transmission mechanism, and the extensive empirical results on the monetary 
transmission mechanism will enrich an understanding of how financial variables 
(interest rate, money and credit) affect the economy. Lastly the history of the 
development of monetary policy in the U.S, U.K., Germany and Japan is reassessed.  
 
2.1  A theoretical discussion on the effectiveness of monetary policy  
It is commonly known that there are persistent disagreements between competing camps 
in macroeconomics. One frequently discussed divergence is the distance between the 
sticky-price models of the Neoclassical Synthesis, Monetarism, and New Neoclassical 
Synthesis, in which monetary policy is regarded as essential to real activities, and the 
flexible price models of real-business-cycle (RBC) economics, in which monetary 
policy is viewed as unimportant for real activities. After the introduction of the 
neoclassical synthesis, monetarism, new neoclassical synthesis and real-business-cycle, 
it was realized that there was widespread disagreement on the effect of monetary policy 
on the economy among the macroeconomic school of thought, so our study will 
contribute by providing further empirical results on the effect of monetary policy on the 
economy.  
 352.1.1  The neoclassical synthesis (New Keynesian)  
The neoclassical synthesis was dominant in the 1950s and 1960s, and popularized by 
the mathematical economist Paul Samuelson.
15 Neoclassical synthesis was a post-war 
academic movement in economics that attempted to amalgamate the macroeconomic 
ideas of Keynes with the ideas of neoclassical economics. Because the neoclassical 
synthesis attempted to interpret and formalize Keynes’ writings, and to synthesize them 
with the neoclassical models of economics, neoclassical synthesis is also known as the 
New-Keynesian model. The literature has only described the role of monetary policy in 
the neoclassical synthesis.  
 
The standard IS-LM model is basically a static disequilibrium in the neoclassical 
synthesis. In the assumption of sticky prices, an increase in the money aggregate will 
shift the LM curve outwards, while the IS curve holds firm; thus, interest rate will 
decrease, resulting in a real output rise. In this process, the IS curve links with real 
output and the short-term nominal interest rate.  
 
At first, the nominal price and wages were supposed to be constant in econometric 
models in the neoclassical synthesis, and practical policies also followed this 
assumption. However, economists soon found that fluctuations in inflation increased, 
and the assumption that price was independent of real economic activities was no longer 
maintained. Consequently, the inflation associated with economic growth is a serious 
concern of monetary policy. The Phillips curve
16 thus became the central part of 
monetary policy analysis. Although the neoclassical synthesis admits that monetary 
policy can control inflation, the neoclassical synthesis regards monetary policy as 
playing the supporting role in fiscal policy because, according to the neoclassical 
synthesis, monetary policy will increase the instability in those sectors that are most 
dependent on financial intermediaries: small businesses and individuals. Economists 
consider that direct credit control is better than interest rate in affecting the aggregate 
demand. They believe that credit control can have an effect on the economy by affecting 
                                                 
15 An early description of the neoclassical synthesis is presented in Samuelson’s Economics (1955 
edition), and the mature synthesis is discussed in the 1967 edition (Samuelson, 1967)  
16 In economics, the Phillips curve is a historical inverse relationship between the rate of unemployment 
and the rate of inflation in an economy. Stated simply, the lower the unemployment in an economy, the 
higher the rate of inflation.   
 36the availability of financial intermediary credit through the spread between market rates 
and the regulated deposit rates.   
 
Neoclassical synthesis dominated mainstream economics in the post-war period through 
the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s. However, in the 1970s, the recession shocked the 
neoclassical synthesis. The beginning of stagflation and monetarism cast doubts on the 
neoclassical synthesis theory.  
 
2.1.2  Monetarism paradigm  
The tendency for high inflation following the end of the Bretton Woods system of 
fixed-but-adjustable exchange rate and the first oil price shocks between 1973 and 1974 
indicated that something was seriously wrong with the assumption of a stable 
unemployment-inflation trade-off. In the same period, academic ideas developed into a 
new framework.  
 
Friedman and Schwartz (1963) were the first to model the idea that there was a positive 
correlation between money aggregates and economic fluctuations; then the well-known 
paper “The role of monetary policy” by Friedman (1968) was published, and their 
empirical evidence is probably still the most important proof that money does matter for 
real economic conditions. They interpreted the evidence as showing that the change in 
money growth rate leads the change in real economic activities as money causes output 
movements.  Tobin (1970) was another leading economist who supported the idea of a 
positive relationship between money aggregates and income.   
 
Friedman’s paper led to the flourishing of monetarism during the period 1970-1980. 
According to the ideas of monetarism, inflation was correspondingly related to the 
money supply, and monetarist economists proposed that the direct control of money 
supply through the reserve requirement could manage inflation. The idea of using the 
money aggregate as the control target to influence the real economic conditions in the 
short term was accepted and implemented by the central banks for decades.  
 
In fact, monetarism and neoclassical synthesis have totally different views on the 
effectiveness of monetary policy; as a result, the monetary transmission mechanism in 
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channel working through the interest rate as the main monetary transmission mechanism, 
while monetarism emphasises money supply’s influence rather than credit’s influence 
on the real economic conditions.  
 
However, the implementation of money supply as the monetary policy failed in practice. 
The relationship between money supply and inflation has been proved unstable in 
reality. At the end of the 1970s, inflation could not be controlled through management 
of the money supply when the second oil price crisis occurred, and serious damage was 
caused to the real economic conditions. The problem with the quantity of money theory 
is that conventional monetary aggregates are hard to identify one-on-one with the 
economic activities. Economists have tried to identify which money aggregate variable -
,  or   - is more significant in relating to the real economic conditions, but the 
size of money supply actually changes with the economic activities.   
1 M 2 M 3 M
 
The idea that money aggregates are the intermediate target to control real economic 
conditions was abandoned by monetarist economists after the failure of the 
implementation of money supply control in the early 1980s. Academic ideas gradually 
gathered around the new monetary consensus, which was developed after decades of 
intellectual work by numerous monetary economists represented by Bernanke since the 
1980s. However, before the literature review turns to the new monetary consensus, the 
real business school should not be ignored, as it is an important school that believes that 
monetary policy has not had much effect on the real economic conditions.  
 
2.1.3  Real-business-cycle school  
 Researchers’ view on the value of monetary policy has been divided since the failure of 
monetarism and the abandonment of the quantity theory of money at the end of the 
1970s. The RBC (Real Business Cycle) school represented by Sims (1980) advocated 
that the predictive power of interest rates is due to real, rather than monetary, factors; on 
the other hand, the new monetary consensus represented by Bernanke (1992) regarded 
the Fed fund rate as a measure of monetary policy and, if short-term interest rate affects 
the real economy, then the effectiveness of monetary policy should be recognized.  
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According to the model, the economy only responds to exogenous shock, such as 
technological innovation. In other words, the economy will experience a boom when 
technological shocks are above average, and will go into recession when the shocks are 
below average. Thus, in RBC school thought, there is no room for monetary policy or 
fiscal policy.  
 
The explanation for the predictive power of interest rates in the RBC school  
In the early stages, the interest rate was added to the bivariate context of the relationship 
between money and output in RBC. Some researchers found that the predictive power 
of money was reduced when interest rate was added. The most reprehensive paper is 
that by Sims (1980).  
 
Sims (1980) was interested in whether there was supporting evidence for the 
effectiveness of monetary policy and tried to find what percentage of nominal interest 
rate innovation could explain the real output.  He established a vector autoregression 
(VAR) model that includes the industrial production as the real output indictor, 
wholesale price as the inflation indicator, and the M1 money stock, which became the 
standard VAR model in the empirical test of monetary policy. Sims’ (1980) results 
suggested that M1 could account for 37% of the forecast variance of industrial 
production at a horizon of 2 years; however, the explanatory power of money to 
industrial products decreased greatly when interest rate was added in. Money only 
accounted for 4% of forecast variance of industrial production. Sims explained this 
evidence as the interest rate absorbing the explanatory power of money aggregate to real 
output, and interest rate  is a good predictor of real output.  
 
Litterman and Weiss (1985) also investigated the co-movement between money, interest 
rate, inflation and output, with an attempt to find whether the link between money to 
real interest rate to output was compatible with the existing monetary theories of the 
business cycle. Their results showed a negative correlation between nominal interest 
rate and real output, and also revealed that nominal interest rate tended to dominate 
money as the predictive power for output in a vector autoregression model and absorbed 
the forecasting power of money. Litterman and Weiss (1985) proposed an alternative 
 39model in which the money supply does not affect output and the money supply process 
is controlled by policies that aim to achieve short-term price stability.  
 
Sims (1992) estimated the VAR systems for data from France, Germany, Japan, the U.K 
and the U.S from the 1950s and 1960s to 1990. The results showed the persistent 
negative impulse response of money and output to positive interest rate innovation. The 
empirical evidence fits the notion that interest rate as the monetary policy shock lead the 
contraction of money aggregate and decline of real output.  
 
Sims, Litterman and Weiss regarded the evidence that money supply did not have 
predictive power for the future real output when interest rate was added as 
demonstrating the ineffectiveness of monetary policy. However, this view was 
challenged by the new monetary consensus. MaCallum (1995) pointed out that the 
evidence that money supply has not been a forecaster of future real output does not 
inevitably indicate the ineffectiveness of monetary policy, because the interest rate 
might be closer to the indictor of monetary policy. Bernanke and Blinder (1992) have 
advocated the Treasury bill rate as the monetary policy indicator, and revealed that 
nominal interest rate provides the future information on real output. After decades of 
hard work by researchers, the New Monetary Consensus has dominated the economics 
world in recent years. 
 
2.1.4  New neoclassical synthesis  
After the high inflation levels at the end of the 1970s, mainstream economists 
abandoned the use of the monetary aggregate to target inflation, and started to use 
interest rate to target inflation. This phenomenon reflected the fact that macroeconomics 
has been moving toward the New Consensus Macroeconomics since the 1990s. The 
New Monetary Consensus is rooted in the new neoclassical synthesis; thus, the study 
firstly reviews the New Neoclassical Synthesis (NNS), and then discusses the New 
Monetary Consensus.  
 
The principal view of the New Neoclassical Synthesis does not change, and inherits the 
spirit of the old ideas. NNS models proposed that aggregate demand is the key 
determinant for the real economy in the short term, based on the idea that prices are 
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elements of Classical and RBC models. Moreover, it also embodies the insights of 
monetarists, recognizing the effectiveness of monetary policy. In terms of methodology, 
rational expectation and optimization are applied in the new synthesis. The new 
neoclassical synthesis has a dynamic microeconomics foundation, as it involves the 
application of the pricing and output decision, which is the core of Keynesian models, 
and of the consumption, investment, and factor supply decisions, which are at the heart 
of classical and RBC models.(Goodfriend and King, 1997)  
 
The new monetary consensus (NMC) embedded in the new neoclassical synthesis 
proposes several conclusions on monetary policies. First, NMC recognize the effect of 
monetary policy on the future real economic conditions through the gradual price 
adjustment. Secondly, there is little evidence to support the existence of a trade-off 
between inflation and real activities in the long run. Thirdly, there are obvious gains 
from keeping prices stable, as the stable price increases the efficiency of monetary 
transmission. Lastly, the creditability of central banks took on the central role in the 
transparency of monetary policy, which would lead rational expectations.  
 
The literature review only focuses on the monetary policy role in the new consensus. As 
with monetarism, the New Consensus acknowledges the possible effectiveness of 
monetary policy rather than fiscal policy on real economic conditions in the short term 
in the conventional IS framework, but there is no effect on the real economy in the long 
term. However, the central difference between the New Consensus and monetarism is 
that interest rate is regarded as the instrument to adjust in the New Consensus while the 
money supply is the central instrument of control in monetarism. Furthermore, although 
interest rate had been used as the intermediate target in the 1960s, the underlying theory 
is different.  
   
The central banks try to set a natural interest rate as the monetary policy instrument, 
meanwhile allowing the public to anticipate the movement of future interest rate, which 
influences the real economy as the central banks expected. As a result, the transparency 
of the monetary policy-making process, the predictability of monetary policy and 
communication with the public became important. Based on this idea, the central banks 
in practice target inflation through interest rate in most developed countries.  
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Figure 1 illustrates the process of NMC monetary transmission process, which is the 
central idea of NMC, modified from Palley (2005) 
Monetary Transmission in the NMC 
Instruments                          Intermediate Target                   Ultimate target 
Overnight interest rate →   market nominal interest rate → inflation real GDP  
Communication                    (‘neutral’) 
Source: adapted from Palley (2005) 
  
The underlying logic of monetary transmission in NMC is that market interest rate 
directly responds to monetary policy interest rate
17  and the variation of interest rate 
influences the real economy by adjusting the demand of consumption, investment, and 
book value of assets. Moreover, the prediction of inflation based on the central banks’ 
communications will also influence the economy.  
 
After reviewing the most important theories on the role of monetary policy, the next 
step is to inspect the monetary policy rules under the assumption that monetary policies 
have an effect on the economic activities.  Even if the role of monetary policies in the 
economy is conceded, there is less agreement about how the different instruments of 
policy achieve the ultimate economic goals.  
 
2.2  Monetary policy rules  
The objective of monetary policy  
The objective of monetary policy generally is to affect the economic conditions as 
reflected in aspects such as output, inflation, and employment. The aggregated demand 
of people and firms to spend money on services and goods will be influenced by 
monetary policy.  Against this background, the main intention of monetary policy is to 
maintain stability in the market, because proper stability will help the market operate 
with greater confidence. According to Mishkin (1998), six concepts are broadly 
mentioned by central banks when they talk about the goal of monetary policy:  
Economic growth 
High employment level 
                                                 
17 Monetary policy interest rate:  the Federal Reserve rate in the U.S., Bank Rate in the U.K. 
 42Price stability  
Stability of financial markets  
Interest rate stability  
Stability in foreign exchange rate market  
 
As mentioned above, the central banks have conducted monetary policy to achieve the 
final goal, which could be the GDP, inflation and others. Mishkin (1998) has explained 
that the central banks’ strategy is to set a number of variables as the intermediate targets 
to reflect the final goals that have been decided. The intermediate targets are normally 
the variables such as interest rates, money aggregates, and even nominal GDP etc, 
which have a direct effect on the final goals. The central banks do not use the policy to 
directly influence these intermediate targets; besides this, they select a series of 
variables to target, named as instruments variables or operating targets. Mishkin 
suggested that the reason the central banks attempt to use intermediate targets rather 
than aim at final targets is so they can judge whether their policies are on the proper 
path, and make changes immediately if necessary; otherwise they would have to wait 
until the final effects of policies.  
 
The central banks use the monetary policy tool to aim for the operating targets, 
subsequently affecting the intermediate targets; lastly, the final targets are achieved.  In 
academia, or in practice, there are certain criteria for selecting the intermediate targets. 
The study summarises three points provided by Mishkin (1997) as follows: 
Measurability: The central banks must be able to measure the intermediate target 
quickly and accurately. This is because intermediate targets are only useful when they 
indicate more quickly than the final goals that the policy is off track.  
Controllability: Easy and effective control over the intermediate target by the central 
banks is important.   
Predictability: The intermediate target must have a predictable effect on the final goals.  
Similar criteria are useful for choosing the operating targets. A good operating target 
should have a closer link with the decided intermediate target. In the following part, the 
 43study will firstly summarise the intermediate target proposed by academics, and then 
review the operating targets.  
2.2.1  Money supply targeting   
The concept of using money aggregate as the intermediate target is supported by 
monetarist theory. Monetarists believe that the fluctuation in the money aggregate is 
responsible for the output in the short term, although it does not have much effect on the 
economy in the long term. This view argues that money demand is a function of 
nominal income or nominal GDP, while the elasticity of the interest rate of money 
demand is very steady; therefore, money aggregate is better than interest rate as the 
intermediate target.  They proposed that the steady growth of money supply would 
contribute to the stable output and price growth. This view can be expressed in the 
Cambridge equation:   
MV=PY 
Where M represents the money supply, V represents velocity of money, P represents the 
price level and Y represents the real output level.  
The term on the right of the equation is therefore nominal output or nominal income. As 
a result, the nominal output is closely linked to the money supply. The quantity theory 
has certain assumptions about the causes and effects. The assumptions are as follows:  
- Velocity is assumed to be constant 
- Money supply is considered as the exogenous variable and can be fully controlled by 
the central banks  
- The aggregate demand component is supposed to effect changes in nominal output 
(causal relationship is from MV to PY)  
- Real Output Y is set at the full level of employment.  
However, in practice, these assumptions do not hold. For example, the assumption of 
constant velocity is not proved by the empirical results. The empirical evidence showed 
 44that the velocity of money aggregate has become unstable and unpredictable in the last 
few decades. Therefore, the policy is not practical if the velocity is not stable.  
In addition, the money multiplier
18  is also assumed to be stable; however, this 
traditional view on the controlling ability of central banks over money supply has been 
challenged, as financial products innovation and deregulation in the financial market 
have made the money supply hard to measure and control.  Mankiw (2000) suggested 
that, although monetary policy has been used to prevent fluctuation in the economy 
many times in history, it may not be the best policy rule. Sometimes, shocks to the 
economy cause a shift in money supply demand, and then the velocity becomes   
unstable; however, the money supply has a stabilising effect on the economy only if the 
velocity of money is steady. Thus some economists believe that, if money supply were 
allowed to change in response to numerous shocks, the effect of monetary policy would 
be better.  More specific literature review on the empirical relationship between nominal 
GDP and money aggregates are presented in chapter 5.  
2.2.2  A nominal GDP targeting 
The one principal goal of monetary policy is to aim to stabilize nominal quantity. 
Monetarists have sought to stabilize the growth of nominal money stock, but the failure 
of reliability of monetary supply as a policy rule has caused researchers to look for 
better rules. Traditionally, policy has been committed to fixing the nominal price of 
gold, as the development of the financial market, and economists have proposed the rule 
in targeting nominal income.  
Nominal GDP targeting has two options: growth targeting and level targeting. This 
thesis has discussed nominal GDP growth targeting; however, this is simply adapted to 
nominal GDP-level targeting. A significant number of macroeconomists support the 
nominal GDP growth rate target because they think it better reflects the objectives of 
government policy. Tobin (1980), Bean (1983), Meade (1984), Hall (1984), Gordon 
(1985), Taylor (1985), McCallum (1990),  Pecchenino and Rasche (1990),  Judd and 
Motley (1991), Hess et al. (1993), Feldstein and Stock (1993), Hall (1993) and Frankel 
(1995), have examined and supported nominal GDP targeting. 
                                                 
18 In monetary economics, a money multiplier is one of various closely related ratios of commercial bank 
money to central bank money under a fractional-reserve banking system. 
 45Tobin (1983), an early advocator of nominal GDP targeting, pointed out the short-run 
relationship between nominal GDP growth and real GDP growth in 1980. Bean (1983) 
developed a formal analysis of the implication of nominal income stabilization in a 
general equilibrium macro model. In the model, nominal income targeting minimizes 
the variance of the deviation of real output from its equilibrium value.  The extensive 
academic support for nominal income targets has been advocated since the 1980s 
(McCallum, 1999).   
How to achieve the nominal GDP target rule  
Two essential approaches have been proposed in the literature on nominal output 
targeting. The first approach includes financial variables with the concern of nominal 
output targeting. In practice, policy-makers will determine the appropriate indeterminate 
targets to achieve the potential level of nominal output targeting (Gordon, 1985).   
Researchers suggest various nominal indictors, which include interest rates, money 
aggregates, consumer price index and exchange rate, to aim at nominal output (or 
nominal income) as the final target. Mankiw (2000) proposed that the nominal GDP 
targeting rule works as follows: the central banks declare a target of nominal GDP 
growth rate and, if nominal GDP is higher than the target, the central banks can reduce 
the money growth to limit aggregate demand. If nominal GDP is lower than the target, 
the central banks will increase the money aggregate growth to stimulate aggregate target. 
 
The second approach, in contrast to the first approach, uses nominal output (nominal 
income) itself as the intermediate target. The nominal output (or nominal income) 
becomes the only target of monetary policy. The central banks can set the nominal 
output target in line with monetary policy goals (Hall, 1983). When nominal output is 
below the target, the expansionary monetary policy will be conducted, and vice versa.  
 
The advantage of nominal GDP targeting  
There are several advantages in adopting nominal income targeting. Firstly, monetary 
policy will balance the disturbances in aggregate demand. For example, a decrease in 
the demand from a downturn in the foreign trading economy would lead to a slowdown 
in the real GDP growth rate and, accordingly, nominal GDP growth. In response to a 
fall in nominal GDP growth due to the disturbance of aggregated demand, the monetary 
 46policy-makers will normally adopt an easing policy, which causes the nominal GDP 
growth to return to the target level.  
 
Secondly, nominal GDP growth targeting will help to balance the goals of stable price 
and growth rate. Judd and Motley (1993) explained a straightforward way to calculate 
the influence of nominal GDP growth on inflation and also pointed out why nominal 
GDP may have some appeal as an intermediate target of monetary policy, especially as 
an alternative to the monetary aggregates when their velocities become unstable. They 
explained that inflation is equal to the difference between growth in nominal and real 
GDP. Real GDP growth rate generally is affected by the real factors such as the growth 
in labour, capital and productivity in the long run; thus, the nominal GDP growth rate 
could be simply translated into inflation rate. Meanwhile they also pointed out that the 
growth in nominal GDP is equal to the growth of money aggregate, if the growth of 
velocity of money aggregate is stable. Thus, the money aggregate target could be 
regarded as an indirect way of nominal GDP target. However, the relationship between 
money aggregate, price and output has deteriorated due to financial innovation and 
deregulation, which is the reason why the money aggregate target is less reliable. The 
velocity of money aggregates is unstable, so the direct nominal GDP target has the 
advantage that it will not be affected by the unpredictable deviation in velocity. Actually, 
nominal GDP targeting is a good policy to avoid problems with velocity of money 
aggregates in conducting monetary policy.   
 
Svensson (1999) argued that nominal GDP targeting was inappropriate because 
monetary policy can only determine nominal GDP growth, but not the decomposition of 
nominal GDP growth into inflation and real GDP growth. In addition, the nominal 
aggregate demand does not play any role in the transmission of monetary policy by 
itself. Svensson’s view represents those who are most critical of nominal GDP targeting, 
but Jensen (2002) argued that, although inflation targeting is preferable when the 
economy is primarily subject to shocks which do not result in a monetary policy trade-
off, nominal income targeting might be better because it involves inertial policy-making, 
which improves the inflation-output-gap trade-off in society. Furthermore, when 
considering the economic conditions, the mainstream view greatly emphasises the 
nominal variable. Friedman (2005) advised that, although it is important to consider 
how changes in nominal GDP are divided into real GDP and inflation, the money 
 47aggregate is the nominal variable; thus, using nominal GDP is more relevant to the 
experiment. Werner (1997, 2005) has provided the concept of credit creation, in which 
the credit to real activities aims to target nominal GDP.
19 Nominal GDP might play an 
important role in the monetary transmission mechanism.  
 
A further review of nominal GDP targeting will be discussed in chapters 4, 5 and 6. In 
each chapter, the researcher will attempt to revise the previous researches on the 
relationship between nominal GDP and the financial variables (short-term interest rates, 
money aggregates and GDP-circulation credit).  
 
2.2.3  Inflation targeting  
There has been increasing interest in price stability in recent years after the adoption of 
inflation targeting by the central banks of New Zealand.
20 Rather than applying money 
supply as the intermediate target, the inflation target has been used as the intermediate 
target in several countries, especially in developed countries such as New Zealand, 
Canada, the UK, Sweden and Australia over the last decade. 
21 In general, the process 
of inflation targeting involves central banks deciding on an inflation target rate 
(normally a low one) and then adjusting the money supply or interest rate to influence 
inflation when it deviates from the target at a particular horizon (Mankiw, 2000). 
                                                
It is generally believed that the most important aim of any central banks is to keep 
prices stable. The reason for this is basically that monetary policy’s principal and final 
goal is price stability, which will lead to sustainable economic growth (Mishkin and 
Posen, 1997). 
Inflation targeting as the intermediate target has some advantages in practice and in 
principle (Svensson, 1997, 1999 and 2000). Firstly, under this framework the central 
 
19 “Enhancing Monetary Analysis”, published by the European Central Bank in 2010, mentioned that 
Werner’s method of disaggregated credit is easy to use to target nominal GDP.  
20 For discussions of inflation targeting see Mishkin and Posen (1997), McCallum(1997), and individual 
papers in the volumes edited by Haldane (1995) and Leiderman and Svensson (1995)  
21 Svensson (1998) stated that the inflation targeting in these countries is characterized by (1) a policy-
announced numerical inflation target (either in the from of a target range, a point target, or a point target 
with a tolerance interval, (2) a framework for policy decisions which involves comparing an inflation 
forecast to the announced target, thus providing an inflation-forecast targeting regime for policy where 
the forecast serves as an intermediate target and (3) a higher-than-average degree of transparency and 
accountability  
 48banks can achieve the final goal of price stability by focusing on the monetary policy. 
Secondly, setting the inflation target has a political advantage: the precise figure or 
range of inflation is easy for the public to understand, and it can provide a transparent 
ex post measurement of monetary policy. This is because, after the central banks have 
announced a clear inflation target, the public can easily judge whether or not this target 
has been met by comparing it to other variables, such as money supply. Thus, this 
action will increase the central banks’ accountability (Mankiw, 2000). Thirdly, the 
increasing accountability of central banks and the low level of inflation has made the 
process self-enhancing. The process is likely to be a potential commitment mechanism, 
which could stabilize the inflation expectation (Svensson, 1997). A further feature of 
inflation targeting that is easily overlooked is that it avoids the velocity instability 
problem better than the money aggregate (Bernanke and Woodford, 1997).  
Based on the advantages of inflation targeting set out above, its success can be well-
summarised. However, it also has some disadvantages, as Mishkin (2000) argued: 
Firstly, the central banks hardly have complete control over inflation due to the 
uncertain effects of monetary policy on inflation. Mishkin also stated that the inflation 
target is harder for policy-makers to attain than the money aggregate target or the 
exchange rate. Cecchetti (1995) suggested that the relationship between monetary 
policy instruments, such as the U.S. Federal Funds Rate, and inflation differs 
considerably over time and cannot be precisely ascertained. 
Secondly, the time lag of the effect of monetary policy on inflation is another negative 
aspect. According to the empirical results, the time lag is estimated at around two years 
in the developed countries.  Thus, in practice, the implementation of inflation targeting 
becomes hard, because the effect of the initial shock has still not shown that it will lead 
to a radical monetary policy.  
The last point is that inflation is affected not only by the monetary policy but also by 
many other factors, which are sometimes disturbances in the economy.  Although it has 
been acknowledged that there are problems with the inflation target and, in practice, 
inflation targeting in the developed countries has been successful over the last decade, 
the financial crisis of 2007-2008 has challenged the inflation target, because the 
inflation targeting did not reflect the disorder in the market, and did not include enough 
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of a false boom in the market.  
2.2.4  The Taylor rule: a rule for an operating target 
The Taylor rule was originally provided by the economist John Taylor, and it is simply 
known as an interest rate rule. The Taylor rule is an easy regulation that central banks 
could follow to achieve stable prices while avoiding the significant fluctuations in 
employment and output (Mankiw, 2000).  
 
Taylor (1993) advised that most central banks take action on monetary policy based on 
the particular rule that guides the short-term interest rate, considering the process of 
monetary transmission channels transmits the monetary policy decision according to 
changes in real GDP and inflation. In other words, the Taylor rule argued that the 
central banks should change the short-run interest rate according to real GDP and 
inflation in the economy. The Taylor rule suggested simply that the federal fund rate 
reacts to two factors: the deviation of inflation growth rate from a target inflation rate, 
and the departure from real GDP growth rate to potential GDP growth rate.  
 
Over the years following the formulation of the Taylor rule, there has been considerable 
interest in testing whether the Taylor rule is a good description of the central banks’ 
monetary policy rule. Mankiw (2000) has shown that Taylor’s rule has a reasonable 
resemblance to the Federal Reserve’s behaviour in conducting monetary policy. 
However, other empirical studies criticized the usefulness of the Taylor rule, and their 
results did not support it. Orphanides (2003) suggested that, although the Taylor rule is 
a systematic and prudent guide to describe monetary policy behaviour, developments 
seem to indicate that it is not enough to certify that monetary policy will follow a stable 
course. Taylor (2007) has examined Federal Reserve policy decisions - in terms of the 
federal funds interest rate - from 2000 to 2006, and found that the actual interest rate fell 
below what the Taylor rule suggests it should be. This empirical result also argued that 
the monetary policy was too loose during this period, and it may have caused the recent 
financial crisis. So, the empirical research did not fully support the Taylor rule.  
 
The problem with the Taylor rule is that, firstly, it is too restrictive: it is assumed to 
respond to limited variables, but it is probably not reasonable to assume that the central 
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in pursuit of price stability. Secondly, the Taylor rule might be not robust over the 
period, especially after the structure of economic change. Further, the central banks are 
reluctant to accept the simple instrument rules, as it is necessary to be flexible in 
response to changes in the economy.  
2.2.5  Exchange rate rule 
The exchange rate regime is considered to play a strong role in influencing monetary 
policy in the small, open countries. The exchange rate means the price of one country’s 
currency compared with that of another currency. Mishkin (1997) advised that, if the 
central banks do not like to see the value of their currency fall, they will conduct a 
contractionary monetary policy by reducing the money supply or increasing the interest 
rate in the country; thus the value of the currency will strengthen. In a similar way, if 
the currency in one country experiences an appreciation, the central banks may increase 
the money aggregate supply to lower the exchange rate.  
 
Exchange rate targeting was practised by a number of European countries prior to 
Monetary Union in the term of the exchange rate mechanism of the European Monetary 
System. Production and consumption largely depend on the international trade in the 
small, open economies, and therefore a change in exchange rate will have a significant 
effect on the price level, and further influence consumption and investment. However, 
exchange rate targeting is not regarded as appropriate for large and closed economies, 
because the exchange rate only has a modest impact on the economic conditions in these 
countries.  
 
An overall assessment of the different monetary regimes  
In the light of the different monetary policy rules mentioned above, it is not easy to 
apply a simple monetary policy rule to achieve economic performance. Five basic types 
of framework have been reviewed: 1) money supply targeting, 2) a nominal GDP rule, 3) 
inflation targeting, 4) the Taylor rule, and 5) exchange rate targeting. Generally 
speaking, every rule has its own disadvantages in comparison with all the others, but 
one monetary regime might be more efficient in producing the desirable economic 
performance than the rest. Exchange rate targeting is problematic in the emerging 
market countries due to financial fragility and the cost of losing the independent 
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monetary aggregate largely depends on the stable relationship between money supply 
and inflation, which has become unstable in most countries (Estrella and Mishkin, 
1997). More recent empirical results have suggested that the central banks’ behaviour is 
no longer consistent with the Taylor rules (Taylor, 2007).  The critique to inflation 
targeting has become wide after the financial crisis. Because low inflation in the 
developed countries did not indicate all the price information in the market, even more 
disregard the boom of asset price, which make the central banks undermine excessive 
economic fluctuations. For these reasons, some economists have argued that nominal 
GDP growth rate rather than inflation could be the target for the central banks (Taylor, 
1985; Hall and Mankiw, 1994). The advantage of nominal GDP growth rate is that it 
does put some weight on output in monetary policy-making (Mishkin, 1999). In the 
framework of nominal GDP targeting, it automatically increases the inflation target 
when there is a decline in proposed real GDP growth rate, which tends to stabilize the 
economic conditions because the monetary policy would automatically be loosened. 
Cecchetti (1995) argued that, because of the difficulty of forecasting and controlling 
inflation, the nominal GDP growth rate would be better than the inflation target for 
delivering a better economic outcome.  
 
There have not been many studies on targeting nominal GDP using quantitative 
variables, especially in recent years; it seems that most emphasis has been placed on 
inflation targeting, but nominal GDP targeting has come back into focus since the 
2007/08 financial crisis.  This study contributes to the empirical research on targeting 
nominal GDP by presenting the empirical results on using financial variables - interest 
rates, money aggregates, and credit data - to target nominal GDP. Our study also 
extends the time period and sample countries and involves more complex econometric 
models compared to previous research. Our results enhance the understanding of the 
effect of using monetary policy instruments to target nominal GDP in major developed 
countries.  
 
2.3  The monetary policy transmission mechanism  
The intermediate target is important and, in the meantime, how to achieve the 
intermediate target raises the question of the monetary transmission mechanism. The 
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certainly interested in discovering the black box of the monetary transmission 
mechanism if the monetary target is determined. Mishkin (1995) and Taylor (1995) 
have given good summaries of monetary transmission.
22  The literature review explores 
the up-to-date studies on the monetary transmission channels in order to gain an 
understanding of monetary policy instruments’ influence on the economy. On the other 
hand, the most widely-discussed channels are not the main focus of our study; thus, we 
only briefly introduce them, and more attention will be paid to the credit channels in 
chapter 6. Some of these channels are commonly discussed, namely the interest rate 
channel, monetarist channel, asset price channel, wealth effect channel, exchange rate 
channel, and credit channel.  
 
2.3.1  The interest rate channel  
Interest rate is an important variable in the monetary transmission mechanism: in 
practice, due to the stickiness of price, the interest rate will be changed according to 
when to the central banks adjust the bank reserve in the banking system. Then 
investment will respond negatively to the change in interest rate, which is eventually 
reflected in the economic output. At first, the focus on the interest rate channel was 
concerned with the effect on investment; later, however, many economists recognized 
that the change in interest rate will also influence consumer spending on housing and 
durable goods.  
 
The essential issue in the interest rate channel is the liquidity effect.
 23  A considerable 
amount of literature has focused on the liquidity effects, but mixed evidence was found. 
Early studies (Cagan,1972) found some evidence of liquidity effects, but later there was 
much disagreement on the liquidity effect.  Melvin (1983) claimed there was a 
vanishing liquidity effect, and Leeper et al. (1991) also suggested that a successful 
search for the liquidity effect required careful identification of private and policy 
behaviour in the U.S. In our study, the results from the VAR model will show whether 
there is a liquidity effect in the U.S., U.K, Germany and Japan. Further literature review 
                                                 
22 The summaries of monetary transmission by  Mishkin (1995) are shown in the Appendix 6.A 
23 The  liquidity  effect -a  decrease  in nominal  interest rates accompanying monetary expansion - is  an 
important feature in many theories of the monetary  transmission  mechanism  
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be discussed in detail in chapter 4.  
 
2.3.2  The asset price channel  
The asset price channel implies that the monetary policy could impact on the real 
economy through the asset price, such as the stock market, real estate and bond prices.  
 
Tobin’s q effect 
There are only two kinds of asset in Tobin’s portfolio theory of the economy: money 
and physical capital. People will change the portfolio according to the return and risk of 
different assets.  Tobin’s q was the ratio between the market value and replacement 
value of the same physical asset, which could be desirable for comparing the prices of 
two assets.  If q>1, it implies that the market value of a firm is greater than the 
substitute price of capital, and the recorded asset price of a firm is cheaper than the 
market price of the company, which suggests that companies take advantage of the high 
equity by issuing more shares and using the capital raised in the market to buy 
equipment. If q<1, it means that the value of a company is undervalued; thus, the 
companies might issue fewer shares and decrease investment, which would have a 
negative effect on the real economy. This underlying process illustrates the asset price 
channel.  
 
2.3.3  The wealth effect channel  
The life cycle hypothesis (LCH) is an economic concept of individual consumption 
patterns, and was advocated by Ando and Modigliani (1963). Unlike the Keynesian 
consumption function, LCH assumes a pattern of individual consumption spending 
based on the long-run income, and individuals consume a constant percentage of the 
present value of lifelong income. The consumption in LCH is constrained by 
consumers’ human capital, real capital and financial wealth. The monetary constriction 
will reduce share prices, and also influence the property market. The reduction of 
individual personal asset price will lead to a decline in consumption spending, and the 
real economic output will decrease.   
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More and more attention has been focused on the exchange rate channel because of 
economic globalization. In the exchange rate channel, the policy-introduced change in 
interest rate will lead to fluctuations of in the exchange rate in an open economy. In the 
globalized economy, a higher interest rate in one country attracts the free flow of capital 
with the instinct of arbitrage; thus the exchange rate will change. The difference 
between the exchange rate channel and interest rate channel is that the interest rate will 
effect investment and output, while the exchange rate channel will change net exports 
and finally influence income.  
 
2.3.5  The credit channel  
The credit channel is another important channel in the monetary transmission. As it is 
the central point of discussion in our study, a deep discussion of the credit channel will 
be conducted in the literature review section of chapter 6.  
 
2.4  Empirical research on monetary policy transmission mechanism  
The purpose of a rich empirical study is to find evidence to support the monetary policy 
transmission channel. Empirical research usually establishes a model that includes 
macroeconomic variables: interest rate, price, money, credit and output. The Vector 
Autoregression (VAR) model became the standard model for exploring the relationship 
between these variables since the work of Sims (1980). This study will review the 
empirical research on monetary policy transmission in the U.S., the Euro area and Japan 
with an attempt to reveal the evidence to support the monetary policy transmission 
channels. The study reviews the empirical work based on the different regions because 
our study will investigate the use of financial variables (interest rate, money and credit) 
to target nominal GDP in the U.S, U.K, Germany and Japan; so, a detailed discussion of 
monetary policy transmission in each country will provide a better practical 
understanding of monetary policy channels in each country.   
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Sims (1980) began to use a standard VARs model to investigate the monetary policy, 
and Bernanke (1992) developed the effectiveness of monetary policy further, while 
Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (1999)  have reviewed different monetary policy 
regimes from widespread studies on the monetary policy transmission in the U.S.  
 
Bernanke and Blinder (1992) published an important paper, in which they established 
the new monetary consensus. In their paper, they claimed that short-term interest rate 
could be regarded as the measurement of monetary policy. Their results showed that 
interest rate has an effect on real output through credit using the structural vector 
autoregression approach and the Granger causality test. They interpreted the empirical 
results that interest rate has a negative effect on output as the effectiveness of monetary 
policy. However, Bernanke’s (1992) findings also revealed a puzzle. In the textbook 
theoretical model, the long-term real interest rate is linked to output. For that reason, it 
is assumed that there is an imperfect link between long-term real interest rate and short-
term nominal interest rates.  
 
Under the classical interest rate channel, interest rate influences the real economy; 
however, interest rate will affect the economy in various ways, and is fairly broad in 
scope. The availability of credit for firms and the relative price of capital are both linked 
to the interest rate. Bernanke and Gertler (1995) proposed that the credit channel also 
played a key role in monetary transmission. They argued that demand for investment is 
as sensitive to the cost of funds as it is to the availability of funds; therefore, the 
external finance premium
24 improves the predictive power of monetary policy on 
durable goods spending.  
 
Fuhrer and Moore (1995) presented a structural model that captures the dynamic 
negative correlation between real output and the short-term interest rate. At the same 
time, they conducted the vector autoregression model to find that the behaviour of long-
term interest rate is similar to that of short-term interest rate, and long-term interest rate 
also predicts the future output well.   
                                                 
24 The external finance premium is the different cost between internal funds and external funds. Internal 
funds include funds raised by retaining profits and external funds include issuing shares and debt to raise 
funds.  
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The interest rate channel is important because it represents a big challenge to the 
traditional view that money leads output in the short run. However, some empirical 
studies have revealed the fact that money aggregate has a stronger predictive power than 
interest rate of output. Stock and Watson (1999) have produced empirical findings 
showing that money has a statistically significant predictive power for industrial 
production, even with the presence of a short-term interest rate over the period, 
including the break in 1985.  Furthermore, Stock and Watson pointed out that interest 
rate is negatively countercyclical leading with output.  
 
Some empirical studies have pointed out that the link between interest rate and real 
economic activities is not as strong as experts thought. King and Levine (1993) 
constructed an endogenous model to find whether the better financial systems enhance 
the prospect of innovation success and improve the acceleration of economic growth; 
however, they did not find any evidence to support the relationship between real interest 
rate and economic growth in a cross-section of countries. Taylor (1999) reviewed the 
empirical investigation into the link between real interest rate and real economic 
activities. The empirical evidence suggests that the link between real interest rates and 
macroeconomic aggregates such as consumption and investment is, in fact, somewhat 
tenuous.   
 
Friedman (2000) assessed the development of the monetary policy target, and suggested 
that there is a debate on the use of interest rate as the monetary policy. In his paper, he 
proposed that the Federal funds rate indicates highly important information for 
subsequent output and inflation, while pointing out the question of interest rate as the 
monetary policy in three aspects. However, he also realized that there is no better choice 
than interest rate.  
 
Some researchers have pointed out that the trend in interest rate follows the change in 
real output rather than leads the future output. Kuttner and Mosser (2002) summarised 
the conclusion of papers presented at the conference on Financial Innovation and 
Monetary Transmission. They pointed out that financial innovation does not have a 
strong effect on the economy through the monetary transmission as expected, and 
spotted the simple correlations between real GDP and interest rate over the period of 
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the Fed might raise interest rate in response to extraordinarily rapid economic growth.  
They also pointed out that the effect on output of increasing interest rate is apparent 
after a lag of two quarters. Moreover, the subsample test showed that the link between 
monetary policy and economic change is not stable over time and, in the subsample of 
1984-2000, the link is weaker. Dotsey, Lantz and Scholl (2003) examined the behaviour 
of real interest rate. Their results disclosed that the real interest rate series is 
contemporaneously positively correlated with lagged cyclical output. Gurkaynak, Sack 
and Swanson (2005) provided evidence that long-term interest rate also reacts 
significantly to various macroeconomic variables shocks that were only expected to 
have an effect on the short-term interest rate in the conventional macroeconomic models.  
 
From the review of empirical studies in the U.S., it seems that there are conflicting 
views on the effect of interest rate on the real economy. It is not surprising that the brief 
of a strong link between short-term interest rate and real macroeconomic activity is 
imbued in the minds of economists and policy-makers. However, the weak empirical 
evidence for this link highlights the need to search the alternative monetary policy 
transmission channels, such as the credit channel.  
  
2.4.2  Empirical evidence from the Euro area   
A large amount of empirical literature on the Euro area has focused on two points. 
Firstly, it enquired whether the empirical results found in the U.S. could also be found 
in the Euro area. Secondly, the researchers attempted to find the different monetary 
policy transmissions across countries. While there are some real problems with the data, 
such as from the period before 1999, the researchers in this area have still reached some 
practical conclusions and confirmed that the widely accepted facts are also valid in the 
Euro area. In these studies, the vector autoregression (VAR) model is the standard 
methodology to investigate the differences between individual countries in the Euro 
area, and the effect of the main monetary policy variables on the major macroeconomic 
variables is compared.  
 
Gerlach and Smets (1995) applied a structural vector autoregression (SVAR) model 
with restrictions in the short term and long term for the G-7 countries. Only output, the 
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disappeared in their SVAR model, and they found that the effect of monetary policy is 
similar in these countries.  
 
Barran, Coudert and Mojon (1996)  used a VAR model to show that the impact on 
output from monetary policy shock is quite similar in time and in scale across countries. 
Their research also suggested that the credit channel could be effective in these 
European countries, because credit supply tends to contract more after a negative 
monetary policy shock  although the empirical results found in Germany and France do 
not support the hypothesis. Their results also showed that the GDP significantly 
declines in Germany, Austria and the Netherlands when long-term interest rate is 
introduced into the VARs model, although this effect is not as strong as that found in 
the U.K. and Italy. They interpreted this result as indicating that the credit supply 
mainly depends on the short-term interest rate in the U.K. and Italy.  
 
Ramaswamy and Sloek (1997) established the three-variable VARs model (output, price 
level and interest rate) for 12 European Union (EU) countries. The main findings of the 
paper are that the EU countries roughly fall into two groups according to the response of 
output to monetary policy shock.  The total effects of a negative monetary policy 
innovation on output in one group (Austria, Belgium, Finland, Germany, the 
Netherlands, and the United Kingdom) are approximately twice as long, but roughly 
twice as deep as in the other group (Denmark, France, Italy, Portugal, Spain and 
Sweden). They also discussed the implication of this result for the monetary policy-
makers. There are also some other empirical studies
25, but we do not discuss them in 
detail here.  
 
In addition, more disaggregated analyses are needed to complement the aggregated 
investigation. The researchers started to stress the importance of analysing the impact of 
monetary policy on investment, consumption and other components. A number of 
researchers also take the national monetary policy regimes into account, and recent 
work in this respect has been undertaken by Dedola and Lippi (2000), Sala (2001), 
                                                 
25 Barran, Coudert and Mojon (1997) estimate several VARs including combinations of GDP, prices, DM 
exchange rate, world price index, money, credit and the long-term interest rate for nine European 
countries. Peersman and Smets (1999) simulate the effects of a German monetary policy shock while 
allowing for the interaction effects among the countries. 
 59Benedict, Kontolemis and Levy (2001), Rebucci and Ciccarelli (2002), Peersman and 
Smets (2003) and Peersman (2004).   
 
Dedola and Lippi (2000) used disaggregated industry data for five industrialized 
countries to investigate the effects of short-term interest rate on industrial production. 
Their research attempted to find whether monetary policy has different effects across 
industries, and to relate the effects with underlying microeconomic determinants at 
firm-level.  Their findings confirm that the effects of monetary policy depend on the 
industry output-durability, borrowing capacity, financing requirement and firm size. 
Moreover, they suggested the essential role of the credit channel.  
 
Commercial investments are more sensitive to changes in the cost of capital, which is 
more likely to be linked with short-term interest rate. It is also influenced by the 
liquidity condition (the credit supply for firms) in the market. The empirical research 
suggested that the exchange rate channel could be important in the Euro area because 
the change in consumer prices following an interest rate shock will depend on the effect 
of interest rates on the exchange rate as well. For example, the appreciation of the Euro 
currency following an increase in interest rate will trigger a larger and faster decline in 
inflation.  
 
Peersman and Smets (2003) established the standard VAR model for the Euro area from 
1980 to 1998 to investigate the impulse response of the main macroeconomic variables 
to an unexpected monetary policy shock. A temporary increase in the short-term 
nominal interest rate and real interest rate is likely to be followed by a fall in output and 
a real appreciation of the exchange rate.  Prices are stickier and only start to decline 
several quarters later. Their results are similar to those found in the U.S using similar 
methods. Moreover, the impulse response appears to be stable over the long sample 
periods.  
 
They also explored the reaction of components of GDP and other macroeconomic 
variables to a monetary policy shock. The most significant contribution to GDP decline 
is accounted for by investment. The magnitude of impulse response of investment is 
three times as that of GDP, but private consumption is less extent to the response of 
GDP. Their findings revealed the immediate response of M1, but a slower effect on M3 
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with the expectation of term structure theory. In addition, they also pointed out that the 
share price responds more quickly and deeply after the impact, although house prices 
are more sluggish.  
 
Benoit Mojon and Gert Peersman (2001) established a VAR model to investigate the 
effect of monetary policy in each country in the Euro area over the pre-EMU period. 
Their results confirm that the qualitative effect of monetary policy on output in the Euro 
area is similar to that described in a large body of literature in the U.S. and by Peersman 
and Smets (2001). The contractionary monetary policy innovation leads the fall of GDP 
after the four quarters of initial shock.  
 
Boivin, Giannoni and Mojon (2008) used the factor-augmented VAR (FAVAR) 
framework to investigate the transmission. They show how the monetary transmissions 
changed after the launch of the Euro, and attempt to explain the changes.  They found 
different effects of monetary shocks across countries before the introduction of the Euro. 
An interest rate shock was more significant in Germany and the response of 
consumption in Italy and Spain was stronger than that in Germany. They conclude that 
the launch of the Euro has contributed to the homogeneity of the transmission 
mechanism in the Euro area and, in general, it reduces the effect of monetary policy 
shock. They also thought that the change of monetary policy reaction function and the 
elimination of exchange rate risk have contributed to the evolution of monetary 
transmission in the Euro area.  
 
2.4.3  Empirical evidence from Japan 
In contrast to the extensive empirical research that has been carried out in the U.S. and 
Euro area, there is only a small body of monetary policy literature for Japan, based in 
particular on the VAR model. Sims (1992) used a recursive structural model to identify 
the impulse response to short-term interest rate shock in numerous countries including 
Japan. Kim (1999) extended Sims’ (1992) work by incorporating a non-recursive model 
and also applied it to G-7 countries. West (1993) adopted M2 as the monetary policy 
indicator in Japan following Blanchard and Watson’s (1986) non-recursive framework. 
Bayoumi (2001) regarded real short-term interest rates as the monetary policy shock in 
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including high power money and loans. James and Tamim (2001) demonstrated that 
banks’ balance sheets play an important role in transmitting monetary shocks to the 
economy, as households and corporations largely depend on bank loans, and business 
investment is particularly sensitive to bank loan shocks. They concluded that policy 
measures to strengthen banks might be a precondition for restoring the efficiency of 
monetary transmission mechanism. Ryuzo (2002) tried to provide a credible VAR 
analysis of the effect of monetary policy in Japan, and the main finding was that 
monetary policy shock, which is assumed as a call rate innovation, has a constant effect 
on real output in Japan, especially in the late 1980s. However, these researchers only 
selected their particular monetary policy indicator, and barely discussed the features of 
the Bank of Japan’s operating procedure and the underlying monetary policy strategy in 
practice in Japan. 
 
A discussion on the limits of methodology in the empirical work  
Most empirical studies on the monetary policy transmission area have followed Sims 
(1972, 1980, 1986), and analysed the core question with the vector autoregression 
model. The most notable papers are those by Bernanke and Blinder (1992), Eichenbaum 
(1992), Sims (1992), Leeper and Gordon (1992), Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992), 
Strongin (1995), Gordon and Leeper (1994), Christiano et al. (1996, 1997, 1999) and 
Kim (1999) in the earlier period. In these studies, the common feature is to use vector 
autoregression, and they differ by including certain other variables; for example, the 
commodity price index is included to avoid the price puzzle
26, and non-borrowed 
reserves are involved to investigate the credit channel. Bernanke and Mihov (1998a, b) 
have attempted to organise the different approaches into one framework, and Leeper et 
al. (1996) have also introduced new directions to the current literature. This extensive 
literature reviews points out that those robust studies have provided a list of facts into 
which further investigations are required.  
 
The most important step in using a VAR model is to identify the monetary policy shock. 
While the information order is normally chosen based on the arrival of the shock, the 
negative side of this subjective choice is that researchers are likely to make the results 
                                                 
26 The positive relationship between inflation and interest rate is named as the price puzzle.  
 62look reasonable through an appealing order. The conventional wisdom holds that a rise 
in short-term interest rate will lower prices and reduce future output. If the empirical 
results show otherwise, then a puzzle will emerge, while a good identification should 
deliver results identical to the conventional wisdom.  Thus there is an a priori problem. 
The results have often already been narrowed down by the a priori theories.  There is a 
danger here, and the empirical studies only seek what has been assumed, so it is hard to 
distinguish between assumption and conclusion. As a result, it might be essential to 
undertake further work searching for a more theoretically and econometrically 
sophisticated link between macroeconomic variables. The current studies have 
highlighted the need for further empirical work.   
 
2.5  The development of intermediate targets in the U.S., U.K., Euro area and 
Japan 
The collapse of the Bretton Woods system during 1971-1973 meant that the central 
banks, for the first time, faced a new situation: they found themselves in charge of 
carrying out monetary policy without an externally-imposed monetary standard. Then 
the central banks made it clear that monetary policy was pursuing two broad goals: 
economic growth and price stability; and the process to achieve these objectives has 
been determined by intermediate targets (they are monetary aggregates and interest rates 
most of the time). The world’s central banks have experienced several stages of 
different monetary targeting, because the good intermediate target variables should be 
readily observable and capable of being managed by monetary authorities. Moreover, 
the most important feature is a predictable link between intermediate target and the 
policy goals. In this part, the study briefly reviews the intermediate target histories in 
the U.S., U.K, Euro area and Japan with the intention of describing the progress of 
intermediate targeting in the real world.  
 
2.5.1  The development of monetary policy targets in the U.S.  
Conducting monetary policy in most central banks in the world will depend on the 
action of Federal Reserve, so the development of the monetary policy regime in the U.S 
reflects the main progress of monetary policy regimes around the world. Therefore, the 
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example. 
27 
 
The market participants can normally sell and buy a large amount of securities in well-
developed financial markets like that of the U.S., even more than the Federal Reserve’s 
daily operation. However, the market participants find it hard to move the market, and 
have less influence on the economic conditions. In contrast, the central banks can have a 
more powerful influence on economic activities. These days, the Federal Open Market 
Committee (FOMC) makes monetary policy decisions by setting a short-term interest 
rate and, in 1968, FOMC also made monetary policy decisions by setting a short-term 
interest rate. It seems that the policy-making process is still based on the somewhat 
arbitrary beginning and end points; however, in reality there has been an extremely rich 
set of developments during this period. (Friedman 2000).  
 
Interest rates as Federal Reserve intermediate target since 1968 
The committee decided to use the short-term interest rate as the intermediate target in 
1968. Although, in the following year, the Federal Reserve focused on controlling the 
net free reserves in the banking system, most participants in the market understood that 
the net free reserve is closely linked with the interest rate. The central banks’ use of the 
net free reserve as the intermediate target has the political advantage of avoiding the 
responsibility for manipulating the market rate. However, the inflation problem that it is 
difficult to distinguish movements of nominal versus real interest rates make to against 
the interest rate strategy. Later, the monetary aggregate backed by monetarism was to 
become the Federal Reserve intermediate target.  
 
In the light of the empirical work by Friedman and Schwartz (1963), Poole (1970) and 
others, the Federal Reserve adopted the money aggregate as the intermediate target in 
1975 under Concurrent Resolution 133. The U.S. Congress required the Federal 
Reserve to specify an explicit money aggregate target growth rate.  For a short period, 
the FOMC even gave up direct control of interest rates, and they used the non-borrowed 
reserve to hit the money growth rate. However, a reversal soon occurred with high 
inflation spiralling out of control. The Federal Reserve declared that it had reduced 
                                                 
27 Some of the literature review focused on the monetary policy development in the U.S. Belongia and 
Batten (1992), Goodfriend (1991,1993, 1997, 1999, 2007), Friedman (2000)  
 64money growth targets in October 1982 and, during the following seasons, the public 
realized that the monetary aggregate was less important as the monetary policy. In 1987, 
the committee publicly announced that it was abandoning the narrow money stock (M1) 
as the target, but continued to publish information on broad money (M2 and M3). 2000 
was the first time that the Federal Reserve submitted the monetary policy report to 
Congress without the mention of money growth rates.  
 
After experiencing the failure of the monetarist experiment, the Fed resorted to using 
the Federal funds rates as its instrument to contain inflation and achieve the target. 
During the period when Alan Greenspan served as Chairman of the Federal Reserve 
Broad, the Fed’s implicit inflation target demonstrated the principle of the new 
consensus. Bernanke (1997, 2001, and 2005) has shown that inflation targeting 
significantly lowers inflation in most industrial countries. An inflation target has been 
the solution to the unpredictable link between money growth rate and inflation. In the 
recession of 2001, the Fed demonstrated another principle of the new consensus: that 
low inflation provides credibility for central banks, thus giving central banks the power 
to counteract recession. In contrast, the recession of 2007-2009 illustrated that inflation 
targeting might not reflect what has happened in the asset market, thus leading to 
fluctuations in economic conditions. The need to reconsider inflation targeting was 
raised after the financial crisis of 2007/2008; thus there is still a long way to go before a 
consensus on the appropriate monetary policy targeting is reached.  
 
2.5.2  The development of monetary policy targets in the U.K.  
Monetary policy emphasised the direct control of credit flows throughout the 1950s and 
most of the 1960s in the U.K. The special deposit has been used as the instrument 
variables to influence liquidity. Towards the end of the 1960s, the government began a 
new arrangement for the rule of the monetary system, identified in 1971 as Competition 
and Credit Control. The new regulation was intended to encourage competition among 
credit institutions, which led to less dependency on the direct control of credit, and 
greater reliance on the interest rates. The Bank of England implied that the special 
deposits and the minimum reserve ratio were designed to indirectly control credit 
supply; furthermore, these regulations were intended to strengthen the effect of the 
interest rate on liquidity.  
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Because of the problem of high inflation, the Bank of England introduced the monetary 
aggregate (M3) as the intermediate target in 1973, although the monetary aggregate 
target was realized by the public in 1976. However, the M3 target in practice was 
generally missed due to the unstable link between M3 and nominal income; 
consequently the central banks used M1 instead between 1983 and 1987. But the 
monetary aggregate never met the target, so it was clear that the central banks no longer 
used the monetary aggregate target in any meaningful sense from around 1986.  
 
Between 1987 and1989, the Bank of England engaged in a brief episode of exchange 
rate targeting. In order to benefit from the low inflation level in Germany, the monetary 
authority started to shadow the Deutschmark with the pound against the 3 DM level 
(Bowen 1995). The U.K. remained in the Exchange Rate Mechanism until 1993. During 
this period, the exchange rate was officially the intermediate target, but this target was 
abandoned when the U.K. dropped out of the Exchange Rate Mechanism.  Early 
inflation targeting was started in October 1992. After the inflation target was adopted as 
the intermediate target, a greater emphasis on transparency, independence of central 
banks, and price stability began to represent the final goal.  
 
2.5.3  The development of monetary policy targets in the Euro area  
German monetary policy  
The basic responsibility of German monetary policy is indeed to maintain the stability 
of the currency based on the Bundesbank Act of 1957. In practice, it has been 
interpreted as the requirement to ensure price stability in the domestic economy and 
stabilise exchange rates against other currencies. It is hard for the Bundesbank to insist 
on price stability having declared money growth rate targeting under the fixed exchange 
rate; however, after dropping out of the fixed exchange rate regime, the Bundesbank 
shifted towards the money growth rate target, which highlights the dispute about the 
design of monetary policy in 1974. Actually, the Bundesbank was the first central bank 
to announce a monetary target, in December 1974, and the money growth target was 8 
per cent between December 1974 and December 1975. In 1979, the Bundesbank 
specified a range of suitable rates rather than a single rate. Because the rate was 
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adopted it as the formal intermediate target in 1988.  
 
The empirical evidence (Kole and Meade, 1995) pointed out that the demand for M3 in 
Germany remained stable over the past two decades even with the unification of East 
and West Germany in 1990. The Bundesbank supposed that M3 targeting is the most 
reliable measurement to achieve the final goal, and therefore the Bundesbank continues 
to use M3 as its main intermediate target to pursue price stability while the other central 
banks have started to abandon the money aggregates as the intermediate target. The 
Bundesbank Council described the monetary policy at its meeting on December 22nd 
1994 as follows (Deutsche Bundesbank, Monthly Report January 1995. P.23):  
  
“The deutsche Bundesbank will conduct its monetary policy in such a way 
as to ensure that inflation continues to decline and, at the same time,  that 
the monetary conditions for sustained economic growth remain in place. To 
this end, the bank regards it as appropriate for the money stock M3 to 
expand by 4 per cent to 6 per cent between the fourth quarter of 1994 and 
the fourth quarter of 1995…” 
 
The process of monetary policy determined in Germany is very transparent, because the 
Bundesbank will estimate a potential economical growth rate and determine a long-term 
inflation target; then the corresponding monetary aggregate growth rate is calculated 
based on the quantity equation. The Bundesbank will strictly target the monetary 
aggregate growth rate, although the target will be adjusted with changes in economic 
conditions.  
  
After EMU introduced the Euro on January 1
st 1999, the Bundesbank’s monetary policy 
has been affected by the European Central bank, and M3 targeting is not as important in 
the European Central Banks as it is in the Bundesbank.  
 
European Union  
The major progress is that the emergence of the European Monetary Union outside the 
U.S. and the inflation targeting has formed the core of a new framework of monetary 
policy.  
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The study only reviews the latest strategy of monetary policy in the European Monetary 
Union. In contrast to Federal Reserve monetary policy strategy and other central banks 
which have adopted the inflation target, the European Central bank has kept a separate 
and essential role for money aggregate in its two-pillar strategy. (Gerlach, 2004, Beck 
and Wieland, 2007, Beck and Wieland, Issing, 2008)  
 
The two pillars 
The ECB’s strategy for classifying, assessing and cross-checking the information about 
price stability is based on two perspectives, known as the two pillars (the term “two 
pillars” was officially adopted by the ECB in 2000). This approach was first adopted by 
the Government Council in October 1998, and explained in detail in the Monthly 
Bulletin of January 1999 (ECB, 1999); it was confirmed and further explained by the 
ECB in May 2003.  There are three elements in the strategy shown as follows:  
- A quantitative definition of price stability; 
- A prominent role for money; 
- A broadly-based assessment of the outlook for future price developments. 
 
The ECB’s monetary policy strategy is based on the broad analysis of the risk to price 
stability. The strategy is based on two complementary perspectives. The first 
perspective aims to assess the price development in the short-to-medium term with the 
focus on the real economic activities and financial conditions, because the price 
development in the short-to-medium term is affected by supply and demand in the 
goods, services and factor markets. The ECB regards the first perspective as the 
economic analysis. The second perspective is known as the monetary analysis, 
emphasising the link between money and price in the long term. The monetary analysis 
is always regarded as a way of cross-checking, which is an indication of monetary 
policy in the medium-to-long term.  
 
The ECB consider the money aggregate targeting is not only the fact that money growth 
is closely linked to  inflation, but also a recognition of the fact that monetary targeting is 
a key element of the Bundesbank’s monetary policy strategy. The policy-makers of the 
European Central bank believe that a strategy including the monetary aggregate 
elements in the monetary policy will enable them to inherit the spirit and credibility of 
 68the Bundesbank (Mishkin 1999). The European Monetary Institute (1997, p11) 
expressed this view as follows:  
 
“the adoption of monetary targeting in Stage Three (of the unification 
process) would offer the advantage of ensuring continuity with the 
strategy of the EU central bank which has performed an anchor function 
in the ERM, in view of its long-term track record of fighting inflation. 
Following a monetary targeting strategy might therefore help the ESCB 
(European System of Central Banks) to inherit credibility from the start of 
its operation.” 
 
2.5.4  The development of monetary policy targets in Japan  
The credit supply was the intermediate target during the first two decades after the war, 
because banks were the main external financial resource for companies during that time. 
At the same time, the interest rates were determined by the central banks. In the 1970s, 
when the monetary aggregate began its role in monetary policy, the Bank of Japan (BoJ) 
also started its monetarism experiments, and monetary aggregate was employed as the 
intermediate target. From 1978, the BoJ published the quarterly M2 information, and 
then changed to M2+CD. However, the same situation that had occurred elsewhere 
happened in Japan as well, and the M2+CD gradually lost its efficiency in indicating 
inflation during the 1980s.  
 
Mikitani and Posen (2000) suggested that the BOJ may have adopted the implicit 
inflation target after the 1970s based on the empirical evidence. However, Werner (2005) 
proposed that, in actual fact, bank lending was used as the intermediate target before the 
1990s, and central banks could manipulate economic activities through window 
guidance. Nowadays, Japan’s monetary policy is at a crossroads. The overnight call rate 
has been close to zero for years, although it is still the instrument variable. Monetary 
easing was used by the BOJ as well, when the interest rate lost its efficiency.  
 
After summarising the objectives of monetary policy in each country, it has been found 
that the inflation target is still the primary target in each country, and price stability is an 
important aim for each central bank. The review of monetary policy targeting in the 
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U.S., U.K., Germany and Japan helps us to gain a good understanding of the aim of 
monetary policy in practice.  
  
 Chapter 3 
3  The methodology  
As this empirical research concerns the behaviour of macroeconomic variables, 
econometric models are largely employed.  This section will describe the main 
econometric methods used to explore the links between those macroeconomic variables 
in the research. Firstly, unit root and cointegration tests will be employed to examine 
the features of the data, as all data are time series data. Furthermore, vector 
autoregression (VAR) and vector error correction autoregression (VECM) models will 
be utilized to inspect the dynamic behaviour between macroeconomic variables. 
Regarding the Granger causality test, the study employed two methods. One is to use 
the VECM model and the other is to apply a structural break test on the simple 
regression to test “causality” between nominal GDP and financial variables (interest 
rates, money aggregates and GDP-circulation credit). The econometric software Eviews 
6.0 is applied to analyse the data.   
 
Econometric methods  
Before choosing the appropriate econometric models to analyse, it is necessary to know 
the features of the data. The data used in the research are macroeconomic time series 
data, such as interest rates, CPI, money aggregates, GDP-circulation credit and nominal 
GDP. 
28  In order to avoid the spurious regression problem, the first step is to test the 
stationarity.  
 
3.1  Unit-root test for stationarity  
Nelson and Plosser (1982) sparked the most important implication of the unit root 
hypothesis and argued that almost all macroeconomic time series have a unit root. If a 
series is stationary (absence of unit root), the variance of the time series is not time-
dependent and has the tendency to return a long-run mean. Conversely, a series with a 
variance does depend on time, and fluctuates away from a long-run deterministic path. 
A non-stationary series endures a lasting effect from random shocks. The identification 
of the absence or presence of unit root helps us to recognize the features of the series.  
 
                                                 
28 See Appendix 4.A for data resource 
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Fuller (ADF), Phillips and Perron (PP), and Zivot and Andrews test. The latter 
principally takes into account the structural break in the testing of the unit root. In the 
following parts, three types of unit root tests will be discussed in detail.  
 
In general, the basic unit root test method is the Augmented Dickey and Fuller (ADF) 
but, in order to avoid the autocorrelation in the error term, the Phillips-Perron (PP) test 
is applied. The PP test still uses the original Dickey-Fuller regressions, but modifies the 
DF-statistic with consideration of the possible autoregression in the errors.  
 
ADF Test  
Dickey and Fuller (1979) developed their ADF test as in the following equation:  

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Where  =1-L,   is macroeconomic variable at time period t, t =trend variable, and   t a  
a white noise term. The null hypothesis is  : 0
 t y
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Perron (1989) challenged the standard ADF test, because he argued that the ADF tests 
would be biased towards the non-rejection of the null hypothesis, if a structural break is 
considered. Perron (1989) also pointed out that almost all macroeconomic time series 
are not characterized by the presence of a unit root, because the persistence arises only 
from infrequent and large shocks and, following the fluctuations, the economy returns 
to its deterministic path after the small and frequent shocks.   
 
Perron (1989) applied the new method by supposing or visually determining a particular 
year as the structural break point. However, the hypothesis of a known break endures 
some criticisms, because one could resort to pre-testing and manipulating data by 
selecting a particular date. Furthermore, a particular event happens in a particular year, 
but its effect might be shown in the following years.  
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ratio of the    coefficient so that serial correlation does not affect the asymptotic 
distribution of the test statistic. The PP test is based on the statistic: 
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Where  ˆ is the estimate, and   the -ratio of  t  , se ( ˆ ) is coefficient standard error, and 
s is the standard error of the test regression. In addition,  0  i a consistent estimate of the 
error variance (calculated as   T (  here k is the number of regressors). The 
remaining term  0 f is an estimator of the residual spectrum at frequency zero (Eviews 
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When implementing the PP test in Eviews, one needs to make two choices. Firstly, one 
has to choose whether to include a constant, a constant and a linear time trend, or 
neither, in the test regression. Secondly, one must choose an estimated method. The 
study assumes a constant and linear time trend for the interest rates and annual growth 
rates and applies the default (Bartlett-Kernel) method to estimate them. Eviews reports 
the p-value for the PP test.  
 
Zivot and Andrews Unit root test  
As has been mentioned in regard to the PP test, the assumption of a known break is 
subject to criticism. Christiano (1992) is most famous critic, pointing out that the known 
break could constitute data mining. Subsequently, some studies have emphasized the 
different methodologies used to detect the break date endogenously. These include 
Banerjee, Lumsdaine and Stock (1992), Zivot and Andrews (1992), Perron and 
Vogelsang (1992), Perron (1997) and Lumsdaine and Papell (2003). These researchers 
have demonstrated that an endogenously-determined structural break could reduce the 
bias under the usual unit root tests. The most heavily-used test in empirical research is 
the Zivot and Andrews test. In our research, the Zivot and Andrews (ZA) unit root test 
is also employed, so we will discuss the ZA test in detail.  
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utilized and different dummy variables are used for each possible break date. The 
endogenous structural break date is selected at the point where the t-statistic from the 
ADF test is at a minimum (most negative). As a result, the beak date will be chosen 
where the evidence is least favourable for the unit-root null. The critical values in Zivot 
and Andrews (1992) are different from those in the PP test, because the selection of the 
break date depends on the outcome of an estimated procedure in the ZA test, unlike in 
the PP where it is exogenously predetermined. (Stock, 1994)  
 
Consequently, the significant difference between the ZA (1992) test and PP (1989) 
method is that the former endogenously estimates the structural break, while the latter 
assumes a known timing break. Moreover, the null hypothesis in the PP test is that the 
investigated series contains a unit-root with a drift that excludes any structural break, 
while the null hypothesis in the ZA method states that variables constitute a trend 
stationary process, with one break at an unknown point in time. Hence, the ZA approach 
is more general, allowing for the shift in the level of growth rate of data.  
 
ZA test model  
The TB (time of the break) is chosen to minimize the one-side t-statistic of   =1 in the 
ZA test in equations 2 to 4. The ZA model incorporates one structural break in a series 
(such as  ) as follows:   t y
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Model C: 
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 is the first difference operator,  t   is a white noise disturbance term with variance  , 
and t=1,…,T is an index of time. The 
2 
j t y    terms on the right-hand side of equations 
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noise. Finally,   is an indicator dummy variable for a main shift occurring at time 
TB and   is the corresponding trend shift variable, where  =1 and  =t-Tb if 
t>TB or zero otherwise. The null hypothesis here is that the series  is an integrated 
process without a structural break, against the alternative hypothesis that  is trend 
stationary with a structural break in the trend function which occurs at an unknown time. 
(Zivot and Andrews 1992)   
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Model A is used to test the structural break in the intercept. Model B allows for the 
change in the trend, and Model C is employed to test the one-time change in both 
intercept and trend, which is the most comprehensive model of the three.   is a 
continued dummy variable capturing a shift in the intercept, and   is another dummy 
variable representing a shift in the trend occurring at time TB. The time of structural 
break could be any time except the first and last years. The optional lag length is 
determined by the BIC, and the most significant t-ratio is determined by the general-to-
specific approach. The alternative hypothesis is that the series y is I(0) with one 
structural break. TB is the break date, and  =1 if t>TB, and zero otherwise,   is 
equal to t-TB if t>TB, and zero otherwise. The null is rejected if the 
t
DT
DU
t
t DU t
  coefficient is 
statistically significant. All three models are adopted in this research, as the ZA test 
provides the most reliable results. 
 
Seasonal Adjustment  
The research usually handles the trend and seasonal effect by measuring the variables in 
logarithms, and then taking seasonal difference variables. In that way, the annual 
growth rate can be obtained. For example: the seasonal difference of nominal GDP then 
becomes the annual nominal GDP growth rate. Because most of the original data used 
in the study are non-seasonally adjusted, the research takes the seasonal difference of 
variables in logarithms to remove the seasonal factor and then obtain the growth rate.  
 
Econometric models adopted in this research  
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find the predictive power of independent variables to dependent variable.  
  
3.2  Advanced single equation models 
3.2.1  Comparison of predictive power of independent variables  
In order to find whether the regression fits the data better, when the given variables are 
included in the simple regression, the statistics 
2 R  and Adjusted 
2 R  are compared.   
   
2 R   
The statistic 
2 R  is the square of the correlation between the values of the dependent 
variable and the corresponding fitted value from the model (Stock and Watson, 2003)). 
2 R  is mostly used for goodness-of-fit statistics, and measures how well the regression 
model actually fits the data.  The equation shows how 
2 R  is calculated  
 
2 R = 
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ESS
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           (3.7) 
 
However, the problem with 
2 R  is that it is never reduced when more regressors are 
added into the regression, and it quite often reaches the value of 0.9 or higher, which 
makes it difficult to distinguish between models, as a large number of models have 
similar 
2 R  values. Hence, the adjusted 
2 R  is introduced.  
 
Adjusted 
2 R   
In order to avoid the problems with
2 R , the loss of freedom degree is considered when 
adding more regressors. As a result, the adjusted
2 R   can be described as: 
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R .  Thus, when the extra variables are added to the model, only 
if 
2 R  increases more than the k decreases will 
2
R  actually fall. Hence, when including 
a given variable, if 
2
R  increases (which means that the given variable increases the 
predictive power to the dependent variable, if 
2
R  does not change much or falls) this 
indicates that the given variable does not have much predictive power for the dependent 
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2
R   can be used as the decision-making tool for determining 
whether a given variable should be included in a regression model or not, with the rule 
being: include the variable if 
2
R  rises and do not include it if 
2
R  falls. The problems, 
however, still exist with 
2
R  as the criterion for model selection. Firstly, it is a flexible 
rule. Under this rule, the results would include more regressors than necessary in the 
regression, containing some unimportant variables. Secondly, there is no distribution 
available for 
2
R  and
2 R ; thus it is impossible to compare the significant level of  
2
R  or 
2 R  in one model with that in other model (Stock and Watson, 2003).  
 
 
3.2.2  General-to-specific (GETS) model 
29 
 
The general unrestricted equation model can be expressed in the following form:  
t kt k t X X t X t Y          ... 2 1 1         (3.8)    
t Y
2
  denotes the dependent or explained variable, while    represent those potential 
independent or explanatory variables. 
kt X
   is the intercept and  k    are coefficients for 
each explanatory variable.  
 
The GETS modelling (Hendry 1984, 1995, 2000) procedure could be specified as 
containing three steps: 1) Establish a general unrestricted model (GUM) which is 
congruent
30; 2) simplify the model sequentially in an attempt to derive a parsimonious 
congruent model while at each step checking that the model remains congruent; and 3) 
test the resulting congruent model against the GUM. (Bauwens et al., 2006)  
 
Through a stepwise regression which aims to find the best final model, the unimportant 
variables are eliminated and only the important explained variables are left; this process 
is designed to test whether the insignificant information is lost.  According to Hendry 
(1984:235), “a model with relatively few independent parameters is not only easily 
                                                 
29 GETS modelling is sometimes referred to as the "LSE methodology" after the institution in which the 
methodology to a large extent originated, or the "Hendry methodology" after the most influential and 
arguably the most important contributor to the development of the methodology, and sometimes even 
"British econometrics", see Gilbert (1986), Gilbert (1989), Mizon (1995) and Hendry (2003). 
30 The term "congruent" is borrowed from geometry: By "analogy with one triangle which matches 
another in all respects, the model matches the evidence in all measured respects." (Hendry 1995, p. 365)  
 
 77understood; but also, it avoids the danger that an excessive number of variables induced 
overfitting”.  
 
A fundamental core of the GETS modelling is that empirical models are derived. GETS 
modelling is generally used as explanatory econometric modelling and is quite popular 
for use among a large scale of econometric models, because it gives a systematic 
framework for statistical economic hypothesis-testing. GETS modelling, however, 
initially contains many explanatory variables, which is still a challenge for researchers.   
 
3.3  Multiple equation models analysis  
3.3.1  Vector Autoregressions (VARs)
31 model  
Economic theory has been used in the design of structural modelling of time series. 
However, the problem is that economic theory is not rich enough to identify all the 
relationships between the variables of interest. Furthermore, the appearance of 
endogenous variables in both sides of the equation would make the inference and 
estimation more complicated; thus, another non-structural approach is required.  
 
One of the structural models - the Cowles Commission approach - is subjective to the 
well-know Lucas critique (Lucas, 1976), though it can trace the feedback response 
between variables by estimating the equations simultaneously. 
32 The famous Lucas 
critique (1976) argued that the problems with the structural approach are the change of 
monetary policy regime and the change in expectation. Therefore, the structural model 
is not quite reliable in terms of the changeable real economy world.  As a result, Sims 
(1980) suggested an alternative econometric framework: the vector autoregressions 
(VARs) model.  
 
The VARs model was first provided by Sims (1980), and was further developed by 
Bernanke (1986), Bernanke and Blinder (1992), and Leeper (1996), etc. The VARs 
model is a theory-free restrictions approach, and there is no requirement to distinguish 
between the endogenous or exogenous variables in the equations. According to the 
                                                 
31 For more detail of the VARs model description, see Hamilton (1994) 
32 Favero (2007) has provided a good comparative analysis among the Cowles Commission approach, 
LSE approach and VARs approach.  
 78concept of the VARs model,  it is an n-equation, n-variable linear model in which each 
variable is in turn explained by its own lagged values, plus current and past values of 
the remaining n-1 variables. (Stock, 1994)  
 
The VARs model can be represented as:  
t t p t p t t Bx y A y A y         ... 1 1              (3.9) 
where   is a vector of endogenous variables,   is a vector of exogenous variables, 
 and 
t y
p A
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A ,..., 1 B  are matrices of the coefficients to be estimated, and  t   is a vector of 
innovations that may be contemporaneously correlated but are uncorrelated with their 
own lagged values and uncorrelated with all of the right-hand side variables. (Hamilton 
1994)  
 
Simultaneity is not a problem and it applies OLS to estimate the VARs model, because 
only lagged values of endogenous variables are in the right-hand side of the equations. 
Moreover, although the innovations  t   could be contemporaneously correlated, OLS is 
still efficient and equivalent to estimate, because the equations include the identical 
regressors. The VARs model is frequently used to forecast the relationships among the 
correlated times series data, and to analyse the dynamic effect of random disturbances 
on the variables in the system.  
 
In the research, a structural analysis based on the VARs model is conducted, in which 
the Granger causality test, impulse response analysis and forecast error variance 
decomposition are included.  
 
3.3.2  Vector Error Correction Model (VECM)     
The vector error correction model can be simply described as adding an error correction 
feature to a vector autoregression model.  
 
The VECM (p) form is written as 
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where  is the differencing operator, such that 1     t t t y y y . 
It has an equivalent VAR(p) representation as described in the preceding section.  
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A Vector Error Correction Model (VECM) can provide a better understanding of the 
features of any non-stationarity among the different series and can also improve 
forecasting over an unconstrained model in the long run.  
3.3.3  Cointegration tests 
The concept of cointegration was first provided by Engle and Granger (1987), and they 
suggested that a linear combination of two or more non-stationary series may be 
stationary. The non-stationary time series are said to be cointegrated, if such a stationary 
linear combination exists.  
 
There are several methods of testing the cointegration. The first one is the Engle-
Granger two-stage procedure (Engle and Yoo, 1987), but the problem with Engle-
Granger is that it cannot provide the number of cointegration vectors when there is more 
than one cointegration relationship. Thus, the Johansen cointegration test was 
introduced by Johansen and Juselius (1990) and Johansen (1991). The Johansen 
cointegration test is more reliable than the Engle-Granger two-stage approach but it 
does not consider the structural break in the test; so, in order to solve this problem, the 
Gregory Hansen cointegration test is proposed.  
 
Gregory Hansen cointegration test  
 
Gregory Hansen (1996) revises the Engle and Granger (1987) model to take account of 
the regime shift via a residual-based cointegration technique. The Gregory and Hansen 
model is also a two-stage estimation procedure of which the first step is to estimate the 
following multiple regression:  
t t t t e y DU t y      2 1 1 ) (                         (3.12) 
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t e
t t y2
 
has the same definition as that in Zivot-Andrew. The second step is to test whether   in 
equation 3 is of I(0) or I(1) via the ADF or Phillips-Perron technique. If   is found to 
be consistent with I (0), one may claim that cointegration exists between y and  . 
(
t e
1
Huang et al., 2000, Gregory and Hansen, 1996) 
3.3.4  Granger causality Tests 
There are several ways to test the causality between time series variables, and the study 
will employ the two main approaches. The first is the Granger causality test, and the 
other is comparison of robustness to structural break to test causality. The Granger 
causality test will be discussed in depth here, as it has been heavily used in the study. 
The comparison of robustness to structural break will be briefly introduced in the 
chapter 6.                       
 
Causality is an essential concept to interpret and understand what is observed in practice; 
however, it is a subject of controversy in econometrics. One widely-accepted definition 
is Granger causality (Granger 1969). According to Granger (1969), a time series X 
could be said to Granger-cause Y, if X values provide statistically significant 
information about future values of Y when adding lagged values of X in the regression 
of lagged value of Y.  Although Granger causality does not imply true cause from X to 
Y, and only provides the generic definition of causality, it still plays an important role in 
econometrics. 
 
After the discussion of the VARs model and VECM model in the previous paragraphs, 
one can more confidently examine the Granger causality test, because Granger causality 
employs the VARs and VECM models in the test. If both X and Y are driven by a 
common third process with different lags, their measure of Granger causality could still 
be statistically significant. Thus the cointegration technique was introduced.  
 
The cointegration techniques of Granger (1986), Hendry (1986), Engle and Granger 
(1987), Johansen (1988) and Johansen and Juselius (1990) have significantly 
contributed to the Granger causality test. If cointegration is found among the variables, 
the error correction term obtained from cointegration regression should be considered in 
 81the causality test to avoid the misspecification problems (Granger 1981). If the variable 
series are cointegrated, it will display the long-term relationship between variables that 
cause at least one Granger causality in unidirectional or bidirectional causality. 
However, the cointegration only shows the existence of causality, not the direction of 
causality among the variables; thus the Granger causality will be tested in the following 
models:  
 
If the cointegration does not exist, the following formulation is needed to test 
hypotheses:  
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In which   and   represent nominal GDP and financial variables (nominal interest 
rates, money aggregates and GDP-circulation credit). Failing to reject the : 
t y1
... 
t y2
0 
0 H
2 22 21  k      implies that financial variables (nominal interest rates, money 
aggregates and GDP-circulation credit) do not Granger cause nominal GDP. Likewise, 
failing to reject  0 ... 1 12 11   : 0  k H     suggests that nominal GDP does not Granger 
cause financial variables. 
 
If cointegration exists between   and  an error correction term is required in testing 
Granger causality, as shown below: 
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In which  1   and  2  denote speeds of adjustment. According to Engle and Granger 
(1987), the existence of the cointegration implies a causality among the set of variables 
 82as manifested by  2 1    >0. Failing to reject :  0 H 0 ... 2 22 21    k    and  1  =0 
implies that financial variables (nominal interest rates, money aggregates and GDP-
circulation credit) do not Granger cause nominal GDP while failing to reject 
0 ... : 1 12 11 0    k H     and  2  =0 indicates that nominal GDP Granger causes 
financial variables.  
 
The essential step in the Granger causality test is to choose the number of lags, since the 
results will mostly depend on the length of lags. Too many or too few lags, in general, 
will present misleading information. Too few lags will miss the important information 
and, furthermore, will usually lead to bias in the estimated coefficient.  On the other 
hand, too many lags will increase the errors in the regression coefficient.  In the 
research, the number of lags is decided based on the smallest AIC in VARs and VECM 
models.  
 
3.3.5  Advantages and disadvantages of VARs model 
Before concluding the methodology section, it is necessary to point out the limits of the 
VARs model as well as its advantages, as the VARs model is heavily used in the 
research.  
 
The Advantages and Disadvantages of the VARs 
 
According to Ramaswamy and Slok (1998:378), Lütkepohl (2005) and Favero (2003), 
the VARs approach has some advantages. Firstly, it is not necessary to specify which 
variables are endogenous and exogenous and, on the other hand, all variables are 
regarded as endogenous variables. Unlike the complicated traditional Cowles 
Commission approach, in which many assumptions are imposed, the VARs model is 
simple and allows the data to “speak”. The VARs model can extract information from 
data without enforcing too many restrictions.  
 
Secondly, the VARs model allows the value of a variable to depend on more than just 
its own lags or combinations of white noise terms, so it is more general than ARMA 
modelling; thus it is more useful when the main goal of empirical research is to find the 
statistical relationship between macroeconomic variables.  
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Thirdly, the simple OLS can be used to estimate the VARs models, on the condition that 
ere are no contemporaneous terms on the right-hand side of equations. In addition, the 
s with any other model, the VARs model has also been subjected to criticism for its 
y, the VARs model is usually criticized for its theory-free 
are the choice of 
ppropriate monetary policy indicator and some impulse response from a VARs model 
th
sensitivity of the VARs model to shocks provides an opportunity for researchers to 
detect the response of macroeconomic variables to monetary policy innovations that are 
unanticipated by the market (Favero, 2003). Lastly, the forecasts obtained from the 
VARs model are often better than traditional structural models; furthermore, in 
empirical work in particular, the VARs approach provides an appropriate framework to 
compare the effect of monetary policy effects across countries.   
 
Problems with VARs 
A
own drawbacks. Firstl
background. However, it is unfair to perceive it in this way, since some assumptions are 
still needed when estimating the VARs model. For example, the order under the 
Cholesky decomposition indicates that the first variable has a contemporaneous effect 
on all other variables and, for the last variable, only its lag can have an effect on other 
variables. In addition, the variables in the models are chosen according to economic 
theories. Moreover, the structural VARs model also imposes some economic 
assumptions on the model in order to make it fit better with the specific economic 
theory.  Secondly, there are many parameters, which consume many degrees of freedom. 
If an equation has g variables and k lags of each of the variables in the equation, then 
(g+kg^2) parameters need to be estimated. When more variables and more lags are 
added to the model, the estimated parameters will dramatically increase. In general, the 
length of lags will be determined by information criteria, such as the Akaike 
information criterion (AIC) and Schwarz information criterion (SIC). 
 
The major problems in the empirical practice of the VARs model 
a
derived from prior theories. An improper choice of monetary policy indicator may lead 
to inappropriate inferences of the VARs-based approach (Leeper et al., 1996). The latter 
problems are found in the “price puzzle” and “liquidity puzzle”. The most important 
issue is that the VARs model is also subject to the Lucas critique, because of implicit 
expectation. However, the advocates of the VARs model argue that the disturbed 
 84variables are the shocks and the estimated parameters are not modified for simulation 
purposes (Favero, 2003). 
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4  Empirical evidence on the relationship between interest rates and nominal 
GDP in the U.S., U.K., Germany and Japan from 1960s to 2008 
 
Abstract: In this chapter, the study largely focuses on the interaction between short-
term interest rates and nominal GDP growth rate. Previous research has advocated using 
the interest rate to target nominal GDP (Judd and Motley, 1993). This research involves 
the application of the Granger causality test to give an empirical correlation between the 
interest rate and nominal GDP growth rate. Additionally, chapter 5 will set out more 
empirical test results of the link between interest rates and nominal GDP in VAR model. 
The results of the Granger causality test suggest that interest rate does not Granger 
cause nominal GDP growth rate, and nominal GDP growth rate does Granger cause 
interest rate. This evidence supports the view that short-term interest rates follow the 
trend of nominal GDP growth rate rather than lead the nominal GDP growth rate.  
 
4.1  Introduction  
A proper monetary policy is always the intention of most monetary authorities across 
the world. Nowadays, inflation targets are used by several developed countries, such as 
the U.K., New Zealand, Canada and Sweden. Although a low inflation target is 
appropriately the main objective of monetary policy, this does not mean that inflation 
target is the best operation target. It is argued that an inflation target only makes sense 
when the level of output is independent of the inflation rate and determined by supply-
side factors. A practical concern is to find the right anchor for monetary policy. Several 
possible anchors have been discussed in the literature part. Nominal output targets in the 
theory have been given considerable attention in the academic literature. With a 
nominal output anchor, the central banks would directly target the nominal output; 
although nominal output itself is not a traditional target variable, it is closely relative to 
two important monetary policy objectives: sustainable economic growth and price 
stability. There has been a considerable amount of work on the theory of nominal 
income targeting, but not many empirical works have focused on it. The research, 
therefore, intends to provide the empirical work on the targeting of nominal output.  
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There are two approaches to targeting nominal output. The first approach is to use 
nominal GDP as the only target of monetary policy. The monetary authority would try 
to keep nominal GDP close to its target; if it were below the potential level, the 
expansionary monetary policy would be employed and vice versa. Some economists 
support the view that simple nominal GDP targeting would help to stabilize the 
economy, because it captures the real GDP and the price level. The second approach is 
to use financial variables, such as interest rate or money aggregates, as the intermediate 
target to advocate a certain nominal GDP growth rate; thus the nominal GDP is the 
ultimate target. In this research, the main concern is to provide the empirical results for 
using financial variables (interest rate, money aggregates, and GDP-circulation credit) 
as the intermediate targets when aiming at nominal output. In chapter 4, the study 
focuses only on the interest rate as the instrument variable to target nominal output.  
 
Previous research has doubted the reliability of the monetary aggregates as intermediate 
targets of monetary policy; in turn, other researchers have advocated using interest rate 
as the intermediate monetary policy to target output. (Bernanke and Blinder, 1988; 
Bernanke and Blinder, 1992; Taylor, 1985; Taylor, 1993; Rotemberg and Woodford, 
1997; Woodford, 2003). Such a rule would try to identify how the central banks should 
adjust policy to affect short-term interest rates in response to deviations of output from 
the target. In such a framework, the essential point is to find the empirical correlation 
between nominal GDP and interest rate, and to answer the question of whether the 
empirical results would support the advocacy of using interest rate as an appropriate 
variable to target nominal GDP.   
 
4.2  Literature review on the relationship between nominal GDP and short-
term interest rate 
The use of short-term interest rate to target nominal GDP 
In the previous literature, nominal output (or nominal income) targeting has been 
recommended by many economists (Tobin, 1983; Hall, 1983; Gordon, 1985; Taylor, 
1985; McCallum, 1988, 1991; Feldstein and Stock, 1994; and Hall and Mankiw, 1994). 
The argument was that the Central Bank should target nominal GDP using one of 
several policy rules. Such a rule would specify how the Central Bank should adjust 
 88policies to affect the short-tem interest rate or money aggregate in response to 
deviations in nominal GDP from the target (Clark, 1994). 
 
As this chapter mainly concentrates on the link between interest rate and nominal GDP, 
it only reviews the literature on using interest rate to target nominal output.  The idea of 
adjusting short-term interest rate to keep nominal output on target is due to the central 
banks typically having no direct control over nominal output. However, they have 
influence over short-term interest rates, such as the federal fund rate. The central issue is 
whether there is a stable relationship between nominal GDP and interest rate, and how 
to use interest rate to target nominal GDP.  
 
The way that policy-makers react to deviations of nominal GDP from the target creates 
two different rules for targeting nominal GDP.  One rule is that monetary policy should 
change when actual nominal GDP deviates from the target. Another rule is that, when 
forecasted nominal GDP deviates from the target, the monetary policy changes.  
 
Lagged adjustment: In the lagged adjustment framework, the policy-makers adjust 
short-term interest rate through open market operations when the nominal GDP is 
observed as deviating from target nominal GDP. The rule would be that the current 
interest rate would change systematically by x per cent if the last quarter’s nominal 
GDP growth deviated from the target by one percentage point. Judd and Motley (1993) 
specified the value rate as 0.2; however, in their previous study, Judd and Motley (1992) 
suggested a lower corresponding adjustment rate x of 0.125.  
 
Forecast adjustment: Under the forecast adjustment rule, policy-makers in central banks 
will increase the interest rate if the forecasted nominal GDP growth rate exceeds the 
target nominal GDP growth rate, and reduce the interest rate if the nominal GDP growth 
rate falls below the target rate. Judd and Motley (1993) describe a monetary policy 
regime in which discretionary changes in short-term interest rate would be oriented 
around a baseline interest-rate path that would be designed to be consistent with a 
disinflation or low-inflation goal. Specifically, under this approach, the baseline option 
would be defined by a policy rule that would like changes in short-term interest rate to a 
nominal GDP target to be designed to be consistent with the inflation goal in the long 
 89run. The forecast adjustment rule might delay the effect of the monetary policy, which 
would be better for the stability of nominal GDP.   
A considerable number of studies have discussed the theory of nominal output targeting, 
but very few have explored the practical features of nominal output targeting by 
conducting counterfactual simulated policies. There is a big gap between theory and 
practical studies that use financial variables to target nominal output, which leaves a 
large space for potential future research. The research intends to fill this gap; it will also 
be especially valuable for monetary policy-making.  
 
4.3  Data and summary statistics  
4.3.1  Description of data  
The short-term interest rate: the interest rates are obtained from the IFS (International 
Financial Statistics). The study uses the 3-month Treasury bill rate to represent the 
short-term interest rate.
33  
 
In order to ensure the preciseness of the data, the study also made a comparison with 
data from a different source. It obtained the monthly 3-month Treasury bill (secondary 
market) from the Federal Reserve, converted it to quarterly data using the average 
method, and found that the two series are the same.  In the U.K., it compared the 3-
month Treasury bill rate from the IFS and the Bank of England; meanwhile, in Japan, it 
compared the 3-month Treasury bill rate with that from Eurostat, and found that the two 
series from different sources are the same in both countries. In Germany, it compared 
the 3-month money market rate with the 3-month Frankfurt Bank middle rate from 
datastream, and the two series show a similar trend.  
   
Price: The study uses the consumer price, all items, and quarterly data from the OECD 
(Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) to indicate the price level. 
                                                 
33 The 3-month Treasury bill rate series code in the U.S., U.K and Japan is 60c...ZF. As the time period 
of the Treasury bill rate in Germany is not long enough in the IFS database, the study chooses the money 
market rate as the short-term interest rate in Germany.  
 
 90The data obtained from the OECD are the growth on the same period from the previous 
year.  
 
The definition of inflation is growth, on the same period from the previous year, in 
consumer prices: all items, quarterly average.  As the consumer price is I (2), so the 
study uses the growth rate. The study also uses the consumer price index data from the 
IFS, and it calculated the seasonal difference logarithm of consumer price index, and 
compared it to the data from the OECD. The result shows no significant difference 
between the two data sets in these four countries.  
 
Nominal GDP:  The American authorities do not provide the non-seasonally-adjusted 
nominal GDP after 2006Q4, so the nominal GDP applied in the research is non-
seasonally-adjusted data until 2006Q4, and seasonally-adjusted data from 2007Q1 to 
2008Q4. There is no significant difference between non-seasonally-adjusted and 
seasonally-adjusted growth rates of nominal GDP, so the combined nominal GDP data 
will not affect the results. The data source is Thomas Datastream  
 
In the U.K., nominal GDP is non-seasonally-adjusted, and was obtained from the Office 
for National Statistics (ONS). The sample period is from 1960Q1 to 2008Q4.  
 
In Germany, the nominal GDP is obtained from the Deutsche Bundesbank, but the 
period only starts from 1970Q1. The nominal GDP is also non-seasonally-adjusted in 
Germany.   
 
In Japan, nominal GDP data are combined from two series. One is from 68SNA, and 
another is from 93SNA. The 1968 System of National Accounts (SNA 68) stands for an 
essential landmark in national accounting, while the SNA 93 represents the "gold 
standard" for national accounts, covering every aspect of economic activity. Because of 
the change of standard, nominal GDP growth rate series in Japan is a combination of the 
two. The study used the non-seasonally-adjusted nominal GDP in Japan as well.   
 
The study plots the 3-month Treasury bill rate and nominal GDP growth rate in the 
graph to view the co-movement of these two variables.  
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Figure   4-2 U.K. 3-month Treasury bill rate and nominal GDP growth rate  
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Figure   4-3 Germany 3-month money market rate and nominal GDP growth rate  
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 92Figure   4-4 Japan 3-month Treasury bill rate and nominal GDP growth rate  
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A visual inspection of these graphs reveals that the rising interest rates follow high 
nominal GDP growth rate, with the lower nominal GDP growth rate decreasing the 
interest rates in U.S., U.K., Germany and Japan. Furthermore, it is revealed from the 
graph that there is a closer co-movement between the nominal GDP growth rate and 
nominal interest rate after the 1980s; before that, the difference between nominal GDP 
growth rate and 3-month Treasury bill rate is wider than that after the 1980s, except in 
Japan, because the short-term interest rate in Japan has been kept at an abnormally low 
level since the 1990s by the Bank of Japan. As we know, the central banks changed the 
monetary policy regime, abandoned the money supply target and changed to the interest 
rate as monetary policy target after the 1980s.
34 Therefore, the difference in the co-
movement between interest rate and nominal GDP growth rate before and after the 
1980s might reflect this regime change.    
 
The short-term correlations of the 3-month Treasury bill rate and economic 
variables  
The figures above show the simple co-movement correlation between the 3-month 
Treasury bill rate and the nominal GDP growth rate. In order to investigate more 
statistical features, cross-correlations are applied.  
 
                                                 
34 In the U.S., the use of monetary aggregate as the monetary policy target was discontinued with the 
selection of Alan Greenspan as Fed chairman.  
In the U.K, the 1998 Bank of England Act made the Bank independent, allowing it to set interest rates. 
The Bank is accountable to Parliament and the wider public. The Bank’s monetary policy objective is to 
deliver price stability – low inflation – and, subject to that, to support the Government’s economic 
objectives including those for growth and employment. Price stability is defined by the Government’s 
inflation target of 2%. Source: Bank of England  
 93The evidence of short-run cross-correlations of the 3-month Treasury bill rate and the 
economic variables for the U.S., U.K., Japan and Germany is provided in the figure4-5. 
The original nominal GDP and CPI index were seasonalized and the log form was taken. 
The Census X12 is used to seasonalize the original data, and the Hodrick-Prescott filter 
is applied to detrend the data.  The figure shows the correlations between the detrended 
log of nominal GDP and 3-month Treasury bill rate.  
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4.3.2  The cross-correlation between nominal GDP and 3-month Treasury bill 
rate  
 
The figure4-5 plots the correlation between nominal GDP and short-term interest rates 
in the U.S., U.K., Germany and Japan. The short-term interest rates show the positive 
correlation with nominal GDP in the current period, and are significantly positively 
correlated with nominal GDP at roughly 5-quarters leads and lags. The positive 
correlation between nominal GDP and interest rate in the current period and 5-quarters 
leads indicates that high nominal GDP tends to lead to a high 3-month Treasury bill rate; 
meanwhile, the positive correlation between nominal GDP and short-term interest rates 
at 5-quarters lags points out that a rising 3-month Treasury bill rate is followed by an 
increase in nominal GDP growth after the initial first 5-quarter shock, which is in 
contrast to the standard theory.  In the figure4-5, the nominal GDP is negatively related 
with the 3-month Treasury bill rate after 6 quarters in the U.S. and Japan, and the 
negative correlation between nominal GDP and the short-term interest rate exist after 
more than 6 quarters in the U.K. and Germany. This implies that the 3-month Treasury 
bill rate negatively impacts on nominal GDP after 6-to-10 quarter lags. 
 
The traditional wisdom indicates that interest rates should negatively lead the nominal 
GDP growth; however, the information from the figure below contradicts this theory: 
 94high nominal GDP in the current period tends to be followed by high interest rate in a 
future period. If we assume that the monetary authorities target nominal GDP, then the 
traditional knowledge does not hold, because the positive correlation between nominal 
GDP  and Interest rate   for j<0 implies that increasing interest rate raises the 
nominal GDP.  
t NGDP t i
 
Figure   4-5 Cross-correlations, nominal GDP and 3-month Treasury bill rate in the U.S. 
and U.K. (1960:1-2008:4), and in Germany and Japan (1970:1-2008:4) 
-0.4
-0.3
-0.2
-0.1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
-10 -5 0 5 10
U.S_3ms Treasury Bill Rate U.K_3ms Treasury Bill Rate
Germany_3month Money Rate Japan_3ms Treasury Bill Rate
  
 
 
4.4  Data and time series trends, and cointegration  
The nominal GDP data are the non-seasonally-adjusted, current value GDP, national 
currency quarterly average data. Because the quarterly data display strong seasonality, 
the study calculated the seasonally differenced logarithms of nominal GDP, 
35 and 
thereby it is able to consider them as the growth rates.  
 
The log nominal GDP growth from t to t+k expressed as a quarterly frequency 
represents the annualized growth rate =   ) ( * 100 4 t t LnNGDP LnNGDP     
 
Real GDP data used is an index number, 2000=100, which is obtained from the IFS.  
The researcher also has real GDP data from datastream, which is volume data, 
seasonally-adjusted, chained, at constant price. The researcher calculated the seasonal 
                                                 
35 As mentioned in the data section, nominal GDP in Germany was obtained from datastream and 
Deutsche Bundesbank. The data from the two sources provided us with overlapping data; consequently 
the study could use the overlapping data to adjust the break point at 1991Q1. 
 95logarithm of real GDP in both data sets for the U.S. and U.K., and found that the growth 
rate calculated from the two data sets is exactly the same. Considering real GDP data is 
I (1), the study needs to use the growth rate of real GDP in the test and, as the data 
period of real GDP in Germany and Japan in datastream is shorter, the research used 
real GDP index number from the IFS with confidence.   
 
10-year Government bond rates are used as an indicator of long-term interest rate, 
which is obtained from the IFS. Both 3-month Treasury bill rates and 10-year 
Government bond rates are monthly average data, and the average method was used to 
convert to quarterly data. The detailed descriptions are shown in the data appendix 
following this chapter.  
 
The time period in the test is generally from 1960s to 2008Q4 in the U.S., U.K., 
Germany and Japan, although some data series have shorter periods; for example, the 
real GDP in the U.K. ends at 2008Q3, 10-year Government bond rate in Japan is from 
1966Q4, and real GDP in Germany is from 1961Q1. A slightly shorter period would not 
influence the empirical results significantly. The researcher believes that the sample 
countries represent a reasonable coverage of the various advantages of different 
economic banking systems.    
 
4.4.1  Unit root test results  
Prior to testing for cointegration and Granger causality, the research firstly examines 
whether the variables are stationary by applying three approaches: ADF, PP test and the 
Zivot and Andrews model. To account for the possibility of a structural break, the 
researcher employs the Zivot and Andrews (1992) sequential test for a unit root with the 
alternative hypothesis of stationarity with a single structural change in the deterministic 
trend.
36  When the results obtained from these three methods conflict, the researcher 
will judge the stationary properties of the data based on the analysis of the data’s natural 
features.   
 
                                                 
36 Other procedure that incorporate the possibility of a break at an unknown time under the alternative 
hypothesis are suggested by Banerjee et al. (1992), and Perron and Vogelsang(1992).   
 96Use of the ADF and PP models to test the nominal GDP, real GDP growth rate, 3-
month Treasury Bill rate, 10-year Government bond rate, and Consumer Price index 
(CPI) growth rate of the previous year is done under the  assumption that there is an 
intercept in the data. The Zivot and Andrews test applies the Bayesian information 
criterion (BIC) to determine the lag and allow the break in both the trend and intercept.  
 
The results illustrated in the appendix reveal that interest rates in both the short-term 
and long-term real GDP and growth rate of consumer price index (CPI) are I (1) in the 
level data respectively in ADF and PP test. The Zivot and Andrews test also confirms 
that the short-term interest rate, long-term interest rate, and real GDP is I (1), although 
growth rate of consumer price index displays the stationary feature trend in the U.S., 
U.K. and Japan. However, as the inflation is normally regarded as I (1), the research 
views the CPI growth rate, short-term interest rate, long-term interest rate, and real GDP 
as I (1).  
  
The nominal GDP growth rate presents the stationary property trend in the Zivot and 
Andrews test but, in the ADF and PP test, nominal GDP growth displays the feature of 
unit root. In order to keep the empirical test results understandable and as, generally, the 
growth rate is I (1), the nominal GDP is regarded as I (1). The results of the Zivot and 
Andrews approach could be especially insightful when the null hypothesis of a unit root 
is not rejected by the conventional tests. When it is rejected by the Zivot and Andrews 
test, this provides an important indication that a stationary feature in fact exists.     
 
Empirical results  
The traditional wisdom implies that central banks nominally intend to lower interest 
rates to trigger economic conditions, and set the base bank rate to target inflation. 
Therefore, the study firstly applies the Granger causality test in an attempt to find the 
“causality” between interest rates, inflation, real GDP and nominal GDP.  
4.4.2  Cointegration test results 
The study starts with the Gregory and Hansen cointegration. The Gregory and Hansen 
(1996) test assumes the null hypothesis of no cointegration against the alternative 
hypothesis of cointegration with one structural break. The time of the structural change 
under the alternative hypothesis is estimated rather than selected. Gregory and Hansen 
 97suggest three alternative model specifications in the spirit of Zivot and Andrews (1992), 
accommodating changes in parameters of the cointegration vector under the alternative. 
Due to space limitations, the detailed results of cointegration are shown in the appendix.  
 
No cointegration is found between the real GDP, nominal GDP and interest rates. It is 
obvious from the graphs that the real GDP and nominal GDP data are a straight line, 
and interest rates fluctuated; thus no cointegration correlation between those two 
variables exists.
37  
 
The outcome of the Gregory and Hansen cointegration tests between growth rate of CPI 
and interest rates are set out in the Appendix 4.C. As revealed, the cointegration tests 
are applied in consideration of whether the break is full, trend, or constant. The results 
of the cointegration tests show a cointegration between the short-term interest rate and 
growth rate of CPI at the 5% significance level in the U.K. and Germany, but no 
cointegration correlation between 3-month Treasury bill rate and growth rate of CPI in 
the U.S. and Japan at 5% significance level. Similar results were found in the 
cointegration test between the 10-year Government bond rate and growth rate of CPI, 
while cointegration exists between the long-term interest rate and growth rate of CPI in 
the U.K. and Germany, but does not exist in the U.S. and Japan.  
 
4.5  Granger causality test  
It is highly possible that the typical F-test mistakenly recognizes spurious Granger 
causality, partially when a non-stationary process and a trend stationary process or a 
random walk with drift are included in the true process (He and Maekawa, 2001). For 
that reason, the study applies a VECM model to test for Granger causality when 
cointegration exists, and a VAR model to test for it if cointegration does not exist.  
 
As we have introduced in the methodology chapter, if the cointegration does not exist, 
the study uses a standard VAR form to test for Granger causality, and the number of 
lags is determined by Akaike information criterion (AIC).  
 
                                                 
37 The results have not been shown in the appendix, but are available on request. 
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in which  1   and    stand for speeds of adjustment.   represents nominal GDP  or 
real GDP and    represents nominal interest rates. Failing to reject the   
2 
t y2
.... 
t y1
: 0 H
0 2 23 22 21    k a     implies that nominal interest rates do not Granger cause 
real GDP or nominal GDP. Otherwise, failing to reject the 
: 0 H .... 2 22 21 0 23     k       implies that real GDP or nominal GDP does not 
Granger cause interest rates.  
 
In the case of cointegration existing, an ECM model is used to test for the Granger 
causality: 
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in which  1   and    stand for speeds of adjustment.   represents inflation and    
represents nominal interest rates. According to Engle and Granger (1987), the existence 
of the cointegration implies a causality among the set of variables as manifested by
2  t y1 t y2
1   
+  2  >0. Failing to reject the  : 0 H 0 2 23 22 21 ....      k a     implies that nominal 
interest rates do not Granger cause inflation. Otherwise, failing to reject the 
: 0 H 0 2 .... 22 21 23      k       implies that inflation does not Grange cause 
interest rates. The table below shows the results from this.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 994.5.1  Granger causality test with the short-term interest rate  
 
Table   4-1 Granger causality test between real GDP, inflation, nominal GDP, and 3-
month rates during 1960Q1-2008Q4  
Countries  
Real GDP does not GC 
3-months Rate    
3-months Rate does not 
GC Real GDP    
   F-statistic  P-value  F-statistic  P-value 
U.S. 2.16983  0.0481**  7.13293  8.00E-07*** 
U.K. 3.80198  0.0007***  3.73638  0.0009*** 
Germany 3.51218  0.0005**  1.54471  0.1363 
Japan 1.82735  0.0679* 1.11966  0.3525 
Countries 
inflation does not GC 3-
months Treasury Bill 
Rate    
3- months Treasury Bill 
Rate does not GC 
inflation    
   F-statistic  P-value  F-statistic  P-value 
U.S. 1.750045  0.0736*  3.478707  0.0004*** 
U.K. 2.013505  0.0228**  2.419798  0.0053*** 
Germany 2.901599  0.0068***  1.796183  0.0907* 
Japan 0.947518  0.4859  3.576735  0.0005*** 
Countries 
nominal GDP  does not 
GC 3-months Treasury 
Bill Rate    
3-months Treasury Bill 
Rate does not GC nominal 
GDP    
   F-statistic  P-value  F-statistic  P-value 
U.S. 3.32686  0.004***  7.02544  1.00E-06*** 
U.K. 2.27238  0.0248**  0.48078  0.8686 
Germany 2.07798  0.0599*  1.42819  0.2084 
Japan 1.20979  0.3069  1.28941  0.271 
 
Note: the abbreviation for GR denotes nominal GDP, and GC denotes Granger Causality. * =10% 
significance level; ** =5% significance level; ***= 1% significance level. Germany test sample is 
from 1970Q1-2008Q4 
 
From the table, it is clear that real GDP has a Granger cause to 3-months rates in four 
countries at the 10% significance level but, at the 5% significance level, the null 
hypothesis is not rejected in Japan, which implies real GDP does not Granger cause the 
3-month Treasury bill rate at the 5% significance level in Japan, although real GDP 
does Granger cause to 3-months rate in U.S., U.K, and Germany at the 5% significance 
level. On the other hand, the null hypothesis that the 3-months rate does not Granger 
cause to real GDP in Germany and Japan is not rejected, although it could be rejected at 
the 5% significance level in the U.S. and U.K  
 
The null hypothesis that inflation rate does not Granger cause 3-month rates in the U.S., 
U.K. and Germany is rejected at the 10% significance level, but it is not rejected in 
Japan. Meanwhile, the null hypothesis that the 3-month rate does not Granger cause 
 100inflation in the U.S., U.K., Germany and Japan at the 10% significance level is rejected, 
which implies that the 3-month Treasury bill rate does Granger cause inflation rate. The 
results show that the null hypothesis that nominal GDP does not Granger cause the 3-
month rate is rejected in the U.S., U.K., and Germany at the 10% significance level, 
while it is accepted in Japan.  
 
However, as to the Granger cause direction from the 3-month Treasury bill rate to 
nominal GDP, the null hypothesis is only rejected in the U.S., which means that short-
term interest rate does not Granger cause to nominal GDP in the U.K., Germany and 
Japan.  
 
In order to better understand the Granger causality results in each country, the 
researcher has constructed a summary table below:  
 
Table   4-2 Summary of Granger causality test between real GDP, inflation, nominal 
GDP, and 3-month rates during 1960Q1-2008Q4  
Countries  3-months Rate does GC 
Real GDP 
3-months Treasury Bill Rate 
does GC inflation 
3-months Treasury Bill 
Rate does GC nominal GDP 
U.S. YES  YES  YES 
U.K. YES  YES  NO 
Germany  NO  NO(5% significance level) 
Yes(10%significance level)  
NO 
Japan NO  YES  NO 
  Real GDP does GC 3-
months Rate 
Inflation does GC 3-months 
Treasury Bill Rate 
nominal GDP does GC 3-
months Treasury Bill Rate 
U.S. YES  NO(5%significance  level) 
Yes(10%significance level) 
YES 
U.K. YES  YES  YES 
Germany  YES  YES  NO(5% significance level) 
Yes(10%significance level) 
Japan NO(5%significance  level) 
Yes(10%significance 
level)  
NO NO 
Note: GC denotes Granger Causality. The results are based on the judgment at 5% significance level. 
Yes means does Granger cause. No means does not Granger cause. Germany test sample is from 
1970Q1-2008Q4 
 
 101 In the summary of each column in the table, the researcher found that, in the U.S., real 
GDP and nominal GDP have a Granger cause to the 3-month Treasury bill rate, but 
inflation does not Granger cause the 3-month Treasury bill rate; meanwhile the 3-month 
Treasury rate does Granger cause real GDP, inflation and nominal GDP at the 5% 
significance level.  As a result, there is a two-way causal direction between real GDP, 
nominal GDP and the 3-month Treasury bill rate, and just a one-way causal direction 
from the 3-month Treasury bill rate to inflation.  
 
In the U.K., real GDP, inflation and nominal GDP does Granger cause the 3-month 
Treasury bill rate, and the 3-month Treasury bill rate does Granger cause real GDP, and 
inflation, but does not Granger cause nominal GDP. There is a puzzle here because, if 
the 3-month Treasury bill rate does Granger cause real GDP and inflation, it would be 
expected that the 3-month treasury rate would Granger cause nominal GDP.  There are 
two-way causal directions between real GDP, inflation and the 3-month Treasury bill 
rate, but only one causality direction from nominal GDP to 3-month Treasury bill rate in 
the U.K., not the other way around.   
 
In Germany, real GDP and inflation does Granger cause the 3-month money market rate, 
while the 3-month money market rate does not Granger cause real GDP. Further 
nominal GDP does Granger cause to 3-month market rate at 10% significance level, but 
the 3-month market rate does not Granger cause to nominal GDP.  
 
In Japan, real GDP, inflation and nominal GDP does not Granger cause the 3-month 
Treasury bill rate, and the 3-month Treasury bill rate does not Granger cause real GDP 
and nominal GDP, but does Granger cause inflation.   
 
Overall, the researcher concludes that real GDP is more likely to provide the future 
information for the 3-month Treasury bill rate in most countries except Japan, while the 
results that real GDP does not Granger cause the 3-month Treasury bill rate in Japan is 
reasonable, since the interest rate has been kept at a very low level for years and has not 
changed much; furthermore the 3-month Treasury bill rate fluctuated very little before 
the 1970s. On the other hand, the 3-month Treasury bill rate could provide the future 
real GDP information in the U.S. and U.K., but not in Germany and Japan.  
 
 102The ability of the 3-month Treasury bill rate to provide future inflation information is 
better than the predictive power of inflation to interest rate. However, it is found that 
nominal GDP does Granger cause to the 3-month Treasury bill rate in more countries 
than the 3-month Treasury bill rate Granger causes the nominal GDP. In the U.S., U.K. 
and Germany, the nominal GDP could provide the future information for the short-term 
interest rate, but the short-term interest rate could not provide future information on 
nominal GDP in the U.K., Germany and Japan. Thus, it seems that the 3-month 
Treasury bill rate follows the nominal GDP and real GDP rather than leading the 
nominal GDP and real GDP as expected, and the 3-month Treasury bill rate could 
provide future inflation information rather than vice versa. 
 
The study also applies the Granger causality test in the subsamples, and the results are 
presented in the Appendix table B4-6. The statistics shown in the table indicate that 
short-term interest rate does not Granger cause to nominal GDP in both subsamples 
with the only exception being the U.S. However, nominal GDP does not Granger cause 
to short-term interest rate in either subsample.  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1034.5.2  Granger causality test with the long-term interest rate  
Table   4-3 Granger causality test between real GDP, inflation rate, nominal GDP, and 
10-year government bond rates during 1960Q1-2008Q4 
Countries 
 Real GDP does not GC 10-years Gov. 
Bond Rate 
10-year Gov. Bond Rate does not GC 
Real GDP 
   F-statistic  P-value  F-statistic  P-value 
U.S. 0.61449  0.6889  3.87017  2.40E-03*** 
U.K. 2.13485  0.0293**  2.88398  0.0035*** 
Germany   2.33163  0.0443**  3.41698  0.0057*** 
Japan   0.78066  0.6345  0.27166  0.9813 
Countries 
inflation does not GC 10-year Gov. 
Rate  10-year Gov. Rate does not GC inflation 
   F-statistic  P-value  F-statistic  P-value 
U.S. 2.723022  0.0017***  2.330819 0.0073*** 
U.K. 2.301767  0.0068***  4.592669 0*** 
Germany   1.230493  0.2884  3.858595  0.0006*** 
Japan   0.818139  0.6559  0.708637  0.7719 
Countries 
nominal GDP  does not GC 10-year 
Gov. Bond Rate  
10-year Gov. Bond Rate does not GC 
nominal GDP  
   F-statistic  P-value  F-statistic  P-value 
U.S. 1.35636  0.2431  2.55709  0.0292** 
U.K. 2.87675  0.001***  1.41481  0.1583 
Germany 1.57913  0.17  2.22141  0.0556* 
Japan   1.09268  0.3669  0.82797  0.5317 
Note: the abbreviation for GR denotes nominal GDP, and GC denotes Granger Causality. * =10% 
significance level; ** =5% significance level; ***= 1% significance level. Germany test sample is 
from 1970Q1 
 
Table   4-4 Summary of Granger causality test between real GDP, inflation rate, nominal 
GDP, and 10-year government bond rates during 1960Q1-2008Q4 
Countries  10-years Bond Rate 
does GC Real GDP 
10-years Bond Rate does GC 
inflation 
10-years Bond Rate does 
GC nominal GDP  
U.S. Yes  Yes  Yes 
U.K. Yes  Yes  No 
Germany Yes  Yes  No 
Japan No  No  No 
  Real GDP does GC 
10-years Bond Rate 
Inflation does GC 10-years 
Bond Rate 
nominal GDP does GC 
10-years Bond Rate 
U.S. No  Yes  No 
U.K. Yes  Yes  Yes 
Germany Yes  No  No 
Japan No  No  No 
Note: GC denotes Granger Causality. The results are based on the judgment at the 5% significance level. 
Yes means does Granger cause, No means does not Granger cause. Germany test sample is from 1970Q1 
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To summarize the table, it concludes that, in the U.S., real GDP and nominal GDP does 
not Granger cause the 10-year government bond rate, but inflation does Granger cause 
the 10-year government bond rate. On the other side, the 10-year government bond rate 
does Granger cause real GDP, inflation and nominal GDP.  
 
In the U.K., real GDP, inflation and nominal GDP all Granger cause the 10-year 
government bond rate, while the 10-year government bond rate does Granger cause real 
GDP and inflation, but does not Granger cause nominal GDP. The results showing that 
the10-year government bond rate does Granger cause real GDP, inflation and nominal 
GDP are similar to those for the short-term interest rate. Combining the real GDP and 
inflation gives nominal GDP so, if the long-term interest rate does Granger cause real 
GDP and inflation, it should Granger cause to nominal GDP.  
 
In Germany, real GDP and inflation does Granger cause the 10-year government bond 
rate, but nominal GDP does not Granger cause the 10-year government bond rate. The 
10-year government bond rate does Granger cause to real GDP, but does not Granger 
cause inflation and nominal GDP.  
   
In Japan, the 10-year government bond rate does not Granger cause real GDP, inflation 
and nominal GDP, while real GDP, inflation and nominal GDP do not Granger cause 
the 10-year government bond rate.  
 
Comparing the Granger causality results of the short-term interest rate and long-term 
interest rate to real GDP, inflation, and nominal GDP, the researcher found that, in the 
U.S., U.K. and Japan, the Granger cause behavior of short-term interest rate and long- 
term interest rate are similar in most situations. Further to this, the researcher identifies 
that, in the graph of short-term interest rate and long-term interest rate, the two interest 
rates fluctuate closely together. As a result, the researcher intends to conclude that long-
term interest rate follows the short-term interest rate.  
 
 
 
 1054.6  Discussion and conclusion  
In this chapter, only the simple Granger causality test is applied to find the link between 
nominal GDP and interest rates, incidentally providing the link between real GDP and 
interest rates, and inflation with interest rates. Although a simple Granger causality test 
only provides us with the “causality” relationship between the interest rates and nominal 
GDP, the more fundamental empirical results of the link between nominal GDP and 
interest rate will be shown in chapters 5 and 6.  
 
The conclusion of this chapter can be divided into three parts. The first part summarises 
the relationship between nominal GDP and interest rate. The second part briefly 
concludes the link between real GDP and interest rate. Furthermore, the researcher 
outlines the results of the Granger causality test between the short-term interest rate and 
inflation.  
 
Nominal GDP does Granger cause the 3-month Treasury bill rate in the U.S., U.K. and 
Germany, but the 3-month Treasury bill only Granger causes nominal GDP in the U.S. 
The Granger causality results imply that nominal GDP could provide future information 
on interest rate better than vice versa. The positive correlation between nominal GDP 
and the 3-month Treasury bill rate also suggests that increasing interest rates follow the 
high nominal GDP trend. Thus, it can be concluded that the short-term interest rate 
follows the trend of nominal GDP rather than leading the trend of nominal GDP. Zhou 
and Sornette (2004) found the strong evidence to support the following causality: Stock 
Market → Fed Reserve (Federal funds rate) → short-term yields → long-term yields. 
Our empirical findings are consistent with their result, as the causality link direction is 
nominal GDP → short-term interest rate → long-term yields.  
 
Real GDP does Granger cause the 3-month Treasury bill rate in the U.S., U.K., 
Germany and Japan, but the 3-month Treasury bill rate Granger causes real GDP in the 
U.S. and U.K. This evidence enhances the notion that the short-term interest rate 
follows the real economic conditions rather than influencing the economic conditions.  
   
The 3-month Treasury bill rate does Granger cause to inflation in the U.S., U.K., 
Germany and Japan, and inflation also Granger causes the 3-month Treasury bill rate in 
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the U.S., U.K. and Germany, which implies that the connection between the 3-month 
Treasury bill rate and inflation is closer than that between short-term interest rate and 
real GDP or nominal GDP. It seems that the 3-month Treasury bill rate predicts the 
future inflation, which supports the view that central banks set the short-term interest 
rates to target inflation, but the short-term interest rate as the predictive variable to 
economic conditions, such as real GDP or nominal GDP, is not as good as the 
conventional theory had suggested.  
 
It is also concluded that the link between the long-term interest rate and real GDP, 
inflation and nominal GDP is not as strong as the link with the short-term interest rate. 
However, the results still reveal that the long-term interest rate displays similar features 
to short-term interest rate in the link between nominal GDP, real GDP and inflation rate. 
Thus the researcher concludes that the long-term interest rate intend to follow the trend 
of short-term interest rate.  
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Appendix 4.A: Data resource 
Countries Variables  Definition  Source 
U.S. Short-term  interest 
rate 
Monthly average 3-month Treasury bill secondary 
market rate   discount basis 
 Long-term  interest 
rate 
Market yield on U.S. Treasury securities at 10-year   
constant maturity, quoted on investment basis, 
monthly average data 
IFS 
 
  inflation  Growth on the same period of the previous year, 
Consumer prices: all items, Quarterly 
OECD 
  Nominal GDP  The nominal GDP at market price, national 
currency, current prices, quarterly data, and non-
seasonal adjustment 
Thomas 
Datastream  
  Real GDP  GDP VOL. 2000=100,Units: Index Number   IFS 
 GDP-circulation 
credit   
The sum of consumer credit, commercial and 
industrial loans from commercial banks and 
Government lending. 
 Total  Domestic 
Credit  
Total Financial Assets of Commercial Banks, Saving 
Institutions and Credit Unions  
The Federal 
Reserve H.8 
G.19 Z1.  
  M2  Broad money (M2) nsa   The Federal 
Reserve H.6 
U.K. Short-term  interest 
rate 
Monthly average rate of discount, 3-month Treasury 
bills. 
 Long-term  interest 
rate 
Quarterly average yield from British Government 
Securities, 10-year Nominal Par Yield 
IFS 
 
  inflation  Growth on the same period of the previous year, 
Consumer prices: all items, Quarterly 
OECD 
  Nominal GDP  The nominal GDP at market price, national 
currency, current prices, quarterly data, and non-
seasonal adjustment 
ONS 
 
  Real GDP  GDP VOL. 2000=100,Units: Index Number  IFS 
 GDP-circulation 
credit 
The sum of credit to householder sector and private 
non-financial corporation, and lending to financial 
transaction is credit to other financial corporation 
 Total  Domestic 
Credit  
quarterly amounts outstanding of M4 lending 
(monetary financial institutions’ sterling net lending 
to private sector) in sterling, non- seasonally 
adjusted 
Bank of 
England 
 
  M4  Quarterly amounts outstanding of M4 (monetary 
financial institutions’ sterling M4 liabilities to 
private sector) in sterling millions seasonally 
adjusted  
Bank of 
England 
Germany Short-term  interest 
rate 
Money Market Rates , Units: Percent per Annum 
 Long-term  interest 
rate 
Federal bond yield (outstanding listed federal 
securities with residual maturities of over 9 to 10 
years). Data refer to unified Germany from July 
1990 and West Germany prior to this date. Only 
bonds deliverable at the DTB (German Financial 
Futures Exchange) is included.  Data refer to unified 
Germany from July 1990 and West Germany prior to 
this date. 
 Quarterly average data 
IFS 
 
  inflation  Growth on the same period of the previous year,  OECD 
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Consumer prices: all items, Quarterly 
  Nominal GDP  The nominal GDP at market price, national 
currency, current prices, quarterly data, and non-
seasonal adjustment 
Thomas 
Datastream/ 
Deutsche 
Bundesbank 
 
  Real GDP  GDP VOL. 2000=100,Units: Index Number  IFS 
 GDP-circulation 
credit 
Total credit minus financial circulation credit. The 
financial circulation credit is the sum of the lending 
to financial institutions, lending to housing 
enterprises, lending to holding companies, and 
mortgage loans to domestic enterprises and resident 
individuals 
 Total  Domestic 
Credit 
loans to domestic enterprises and households 
Deutsche 
Bundesbank 
 
  M3  Money supply-M3(contribution to Euro Basis from 
M0195) cur 
Datastream  
Japan Short-term  interest 
rate 
3-month Treasury bill 
 Long-term  interest 
rate 
Government Benchmarks, Bid, 10-Year, Yield, 
Average 
IFS 
 
  inflation  Growth on the same period of the previous year, 
Consumer prices: all items, Quarterly 
OECD 
  Nominal GDP  The nominal GDP at market price, national 
currency, current prices, quarterly data, and non-
seasonal adjustment 
Bank of 
Japan 
  Real GDP  GDP VOL. 2000=100,Units: Index Number  IFS 
      
    Domestic Credit  Total credit minus financial circulation credit. Loans 
to the real estate sector, construction firms and non-
bank financial institutions is the financial circulation 
credit  
 Total  Domestic 
Credit 
the total credit as outstanding total credit including 
others, banking accounts and trust accounts from 
domestically licensed banks 
Bank of 
Japan 
  Broad money  M2, average quarterly,  sa  Datastream Appendix 4.B: Unit root test  
 
Table B   4-1Unit root test of nominal GDP growth rate  
Countries  Time period  ZA   ADF     PP    
         t-Statistic    Prob.*  Adj. t-Stat    Prob.* 
U.S. 
1960Q1-
2008Q4 
 -7.22383  
at 1981:04  -1.77837  0.3904  -2.49415  0.1184 
U.K. 
1960Q1-
2008Q4 
-6.29006 at 
1980:02 -1.73795  0.4106  -2.35092  0.1573 
Germany 
1970Q1-
2008Q4 
  - 5.71156 at 
1987:04  -2.85102 0.182  -5.1945 0.0002 
Japan 
1960Q1-
2008Q4 
-7.25137 at 
1974:04 -2.03651  0.2711  -1.76632  0.3964 
Assume the intercept in the equation 
 
Table B   4-2Unit root test of real GDP growth rate  
Countries  Time period  ZA   ADF     PP    
         t-Statistic    Prob.*  Adj. t-Stat 
  
Prob.* 
U.S. 
1960Q1-
2008Q4 
-7.15042 at 
1983:01 -3.41658  0.0116  -4.30827  0.0006 
U.K. 
1960Q1-
2008Q3 
-6.58469 at 
1983:01 -3.57768  0.0071  -5.57997  0 
Germany 
1961Q1-
2008Q4 
-5.12460 at 
1973:03 -2.38769  0.1468  -4.82479  0.0001 
Japan 
1960Q1-
2008Q4 
-6.40247 at 
1970:04 -2.56503  0.1021  -3.40195  0.012 
Assume the intercept in the equation 
 
Table B   4-3Unit root test of 3-month Treasury Bill Rate  
Countries  Time period  ZA   ADF     PP    
         t-Statistic    Prob.*  Adj. t-Stat    Prob.* 
U.S. 1960Q1-2008Q4 
-5.10500 at 
1978:03 -1.85407  0.3535  -2.11067  0.2408 
U.K. 1960Q1-2008Q4 
-5.19482 at 
1978:02 -1.98699  0.2925  -1.84213  0.3593 
Germany 1960Q1-2008Q4 
-4.99981 at 
1969:03  -3.15075 0.0247 -3.1296  0.026 
Japan 1960Q1-2008Q4 
-5.41194 at 
1993:01 -0.53583  0.8801  -1.05631  0.7326 
 
Countries  Time period  ADF     PP    
      t-Statistic    Prob.*  Adj. t-Stat    Prob.* 
U.S 1960Q1-1979Q3  -1.41487 0.5704 -0.89546  0.7848 
   1979Q4-2008Q4  -1.22371 0.6625 -1.37018  0.5947 
U.K 1960Q1-1992Q4  -2.14444 0.2279 -2.33001  0.1642 
   1993Q1-2008Q4  -1.25209 0.6466 -1.9079  0.3268 
Germany 1960Q1-1990Q3  -2.21575 0.2019 -2.80501  0.0605 
   1990Q4-2008Q4  -1.55637 0.4996 -1.62165  0.4665 
Japan 1960Q1-1990Q4  -2.27115 0.1831 -2.38393  0.1484 
   1991Q1-2008Q4  -4.08463 0.0019 -4.61102  0.0003 
Assume the intercept in the equation  
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Countries  Time period  ZA   ADF     PP    
         t-Statistic 
  
Prob.* Adj.  t-Stat 
  
Prob.* 
U.S. 
1960Q1-
2008Q4 
-5.35012 at 
1979:04 -1.13335  0.7025  -1.4454 0.5592 
U.K. 
1960Q1-
2008Q4 
-6.13693 at 
1973:03  -1.06832 0.7281  -1.20099  0.6741 
Germany 
1960Q1-
2008Q4 
 -4.23883  at 
1972:02 -0.7617  0.8269  -1.72367  0.4178 
Japan 
1966Q1-
2008Q4 
-4.58496 at 
1973:01 -0.56298  0.8742  -0.91147  0.7827 
Assume the intercept in the equation 
 
Table B   4-5 Unit root of CPI growth rate 
Countries  Time period  ZA   ADF     PP    
         t-Statistic    Prob.*  Adj. t-Stat    Prob.* 
U.S. 
1960Q1-
2008Q4 
-8.01090 at 
1981:04 -1.71197  0.4236  -2.43283  0.1341 
U.K. 
1960Q1-
2008Q4 
-5.84958 at 
1980:03 -2.37662  0.1497  -2.38785  0.1465 
Germany 
1960Q1-
2008Q4 
-4.73977 at 
1970:01  -2.51839 0.1128  -2.29056  0.1761 
Japan 
1960Q1-
2008Q4 
-7.00810 at 
1976:04 -2.00605  0.2841  -2.20643  0.2047 
Assume the intercept in the equation 
Model C Critical values at the 1%, 5% and 10% level are -5.57,-5.08 and -4.82, respectively (Zivot and 
Andrews, 1992) 
 
Table B   4-6 Results of Granger Causality between nominal GDP and short-term interest 
rate in the subsamples 
 
Countries Time   
0 H : nominal GDP 
growth rate does not GC 
3-months 
Treasury Bill Rate    
0 H : 3-months 
Treasury Bill Rate 
does not GC nominal 
GDP growth rate    
      F-statistic  P-value  F-statistic  P-value 
U.S 1960Q1-1979Q3  1.40424  0.2279  2.05104  7.26E-02 
   1979Q4-2008Q4  1.09794  0.3687  3.16758  0.0068 
U.K 1960Q1-1992Q4  1.11252  0.3577  0.36791  0.9198 
   1993Q1-2008Q4  0.46531  0.8017  0.19316  0.9648 
Germany 1960Q1-1990Q3  1.31859  0.263  1.6482  0.1497 
   1990Q4-2008Q4  1.7628  0.1222  2.30485  0.0455 
Japan 1960Q1-1990Q4  0.61415  0.6084  0.58563  0.6267 
   1991Q1-2008Q4  6.08356  0.001  1.39038  0.2536 
 112Appendix 4.C: Cointegration test  
 
Table C   4-1 Results of cointegration test  
 
Countries  treasury on inflation  Null Hypothesis: has a unit root 
U.S. Fullbreak  -3.52144  at  1979:04 
1960Q1-2008Q4  trend   -5.06033 at 1979:04 
   constant  -2.91709 at 2000:02 
U.K. Fullbreak  -5.40384  at  1982:02 
1960Q1-2008Q4 trend  -5.77133  at  1979:02 
   constant  -4.17471 at 1977:02 
Germany  Fullbreak   -5.07216 at 1979:04  
1960Q1-2008Q4  trend   -5.58210 at 1979:04 
   constant   -4.79437 at 1979:04 
Japan  Fullbreak   -5.08307 at 1987:01 
1960Q1-2008Q4 trend  -4.14252  at  1994:02 
   constant  -3.78238 at 1993:02 
 
Countries  bond on inflation  Null Hypothesis: has a unit root 
U.S. Fullbreak  -3.38067  at  1981:03 
1960Q1-2008Q4 trend  -5.31567  at  1981:03 
   constant  -2.73176 at 1982:03 
U.K. Fullbreak  -5.39007  at  1982:02 
1960Q1-2008Q4 trend  -6.35338  at  1980:03 
   constant  -4.65070 at 1999:04 
Germany Fullbreak  -5.09714  at  1997:03 
 1960Q1-2008Q4  trend   -4.93925 at 1999:02 
   constant  -4.93330 at 1999:02 
Japan Fullbreak  -4.11021  at  1987:03 
1960Q1-2008Q4 trend  -3.45905  at  1993:02 
   constant  -3.60699 at 1993:02 
Critical Values are 1% -5.47 and 5% -4.95(fullbreak), Critical Values are 1% -5.45 and 5% -4.99(trend), 
Critical Values are 1% -5.13 and 5% -4.61(constant) 
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 114Chapter 5 
5  Empirical evidence on the relationship between money aggregates and 
nominal GDP in the U.S., U.K., Germany and Japan from 1960s to 2008  
Abstract: In chapter 5, the main concern is to explore the relationship between money 
aggregates and nominal GDP in the short term, and also to provide extra evidence for 
the comparison of predictive power between interest rates and money aggregates for 
nominal GDP. In addition, this section gives empirical evidence of the link between 
money aggregates and real GDP. The money aggregates used in the tests are dependent 
on the intermediary monetary aggregates target in each country and also take account of 
data availability.  The research firstly presents econometric evidence of the strength of 
the link between the nominal GDP and the money aggregate by simple regression, and 
more explicit stability tests point out the strength of this link. Secondly, the study 
employs Granger causality tests with the consideration of the cointegration to find 
whether the money aggregates could provide future information for nominal GDP. 
Moreover, this study applies a Vector Autoregression (VAR) model to discover how 
large the nominal GDP response is to money aggregate shocks, and what percentage of 
money aggregate accounts for nominal GDP variance. In order to remain consistent 
across the different econometric applications, the study selects the subjective structural 
beak data in each country, and tests the models for the entire sample and for the 
subsamples.   
5.1  Introduction  
The breakdown of consensus after the 2007/08 financial crisis  
Monetary aggregates have been central to the conduct of monetary policy when the 
consensus that inflation was a monetary phenomenon was widely accepted after 
Friedman (1963) proposed it: “inflation is always and everywhere a monetary 
phenomenon.” However, the route to using monetary aggregate to control inflation 
proved to be painful. The monetary aggregate did not react kindly to the efforts by 
central banks to control it. As the governor of the Bank of Canada at the time, Gerald 
Bouey, famously remarked, “We didn’t abandon the monetary aggregates, they 
abandoned us”. Therefore, Woodford, in his (2003) book “Interest and prices: 
foundations of a theory of monetary policy”, re-examines the foundations of monetary 
 115economics, and shows how interest-rate policies can be used to achieve an inflation 
target in the absence of either commodity backing or control of a monetary aggregate. 
Furthermore, he shows how the tools of modern macroeconomic theory can be used to 
design an optimal inflation-targeting regime - one that balances stabilization goals with 
the pursuit of price stability in a way that is grounded in an explicit welfare analysis, 
and that takes account of the "New Classical" critique of traditional policy evaluation 
exercises. As we know, the influence emanating from the notion that interest rate is a 
proper intermediate target to control inflation has dominated in the last 20 years, but this 
consensus has been seriously challenged and has possibly declined since the 2007/08 
financial crisis. The Granger causality tests in chapter 4 also show that short-term 
interest rate is not a reliable variable to predict future nominal GDP. As a result, the 
study will explore the link between nominal GDP and money aggregates in this chapter.   
 
The 2007/08 financial crisis and subsequent economic recession has thrown doubt on 
current macroeconomic theory. Few economists predicted the crisis, and now, even after 
the crisis has happened, there is still no agreement among them on how serious the 
crisis could be.  Most economists have joined the consensus that the crisis stems from 
an economic bubble, but neither of the mainstream macroeconomic schools have a 
theory on this bubble. Furthermore, the financial crisis has not only undermined the 
theories of New Classical and New Keynesian economics, but also the consensus that 
bonds them.  
 
Since 2007, a series of banks and insurance companies have fallen into bankruptcy, 
which has caused a crisis of confidence and made banks reluctant to lend money 
amongst themselves. This triggered a financial crisis that almost halted global credit 
markets and needed unprecedented government intervention. The Bank of England had 
to inject £200 billion into the economy to jump-start growth, and prevent the risk of 
very low inflation after the financial crisis.
38 The Federal Reserve also carried out a 
large amount of “quantitative easing” twice in the U.S., referred to as “credit easing”. 
The Bank of Japan had already adopted “quantitative easing” during the period 2001 to 
                                                 
38 When interest rates become close to zero, there is still a risk of very low inflation; banks can increase 
the quantity of money - in other words, inject billions into the economy to jump-start growth. This 
process is sometimes known as ‘quantitative easing’. (BOE)  
 
 1162006. These processes of monetary policy point to the failure of interest rate as the 
intermediate target to influence output, so it spurred economists to rethink the current 
theory of macroeconomics.   
 
The importance of the quantitative aggregate is recognized by the monetary authorities. 
Beck and Wieland (2007) developed a novel characterization of the ECB’s monetary 
policy implement - what they call “monetary cross-checking” - and showed that it could 
generate large stabilization benefits in the event of persistent policy misperceptions 
regarding potential output. They point out that the European Central Bank has kept a 
separate and important role for the growth rate of money aggregates, contrary to the 
monetary policy strategies of the U.S. Federal Reserve and many inflation-targeting 
central banks, which assign no special role to monetary aggregates.  
 
The monetary policy of the ECB 2004:  
“In the ECB’s strategy, monetary policy decisions are based on a comprehensive analysis of 
the risk to price stability. This analysis is organized on the basis of two complementary 
perspectives on the determination of price developments. The first perspective is aimed at 
assessing the short to medium-term determinants of price developments, with a focus on real 
activity and financial conditions in the economy. The second perspective refers to this as the 
monetary analysis, focusing on a longer-term horizon, and exploiting the long-run link 
between money and prices. The monetary analysis mainly serves as a means of cross-checking, 
from medium to long-term indications for monetary policy coming from the economic 
analysis. ” 
 
 
The ECB singles out the monetary aggregate within the set of selected key indicators as 
the close relationship between money and inflation in the medium-to-long term. This 
view is also widely held by most economists: it states that, in the long term, money has 
little effect on real variables and depends mostly on prices, but it also holds that 
monetary disturbances can have large effects on real variables such as real GDP in the 
short term (Kydland and Prescott 1990).  That is the traditional view about the link 
between money aggregates and economic condition variables.   
 
A large number of researchers have studied this ( Makin, 1982; Orphanides and Solow, 
1990; McCandless and Weber, 1995; Gerlach and Svensson, 2003; Gaspar et al., 2001; 
 117Barro and Grossman, 2008).  The first set of studies has concentrated on the correlation 
between money and inflation, using a range of statistical methods. It normally claims 
that a very close co-movement between money growth and the trend in price in the long 
run exists. More recent studies, such as Estrella and Mishkin (1997), Stock and Watson 
(1999), Hendry (2001), Gerlach and Svensson (2000), King (2001), (Benati, 2005, King, 
2001), produce conflicting and unstable regression results for the influence of money 
growth on inflation. A second set of literature has focused on the question of whether 
money could help to predict prices (Altimari, 2001, Neumann and Greiber). By using 
the forecasting technique, the evidence supports the proposal that the growth of money 
aggregate is likely to predict the trend of price. The last set of studies has tried to find 
the link between money and a series of fundamental economic variables such as real 
GDP. The most important was that by Friedman and Schwartz (1963). That is the 
traditional view about the link between money aggregate and economic condition 
variables. Although there is a continuing challenge to beliefs about the effect of money 
aggregates on the real economic conditions, the recent works still find the evidence to 
support the monetarism view. (Hendry and Ericsson, 1991; Meltzer, 1998; Amato and 
Swanson, 2001; Nelson, 2002)  
 
Furthermore, a relatively large body of research focuses on the link between nominal 
GDP and money aggregates. The study in this section will also contribute to the existing 
literature by stressing the link between nominal GDP and other financial variables rather 
than real GDP. Because money, credit and interest rate are nominal variables, and 
nominal GDP is also measured in the nominal level, it is more reasonable to link 
variables through the same measurement. Further, we live in a nominal world and, 
although it is necessary to explore on an academic level the effect of monetary policy 
variables on the real GDP, it is more necessary to find out how the monetary policy 
variables could influence the economic conditions in the nominal measurement. In daily 
economic life, the public is more sensitive to nominal variables, such as price, money, 
and interest rate, and it is easier for the public to understand the nominal GDP growth in 
the current year rather than the real GDP growth. When individual customers or 
business corporations make decisions on consumption or investment, they normally 
base their choice on the current price or future nominal economic growth rather than 
real price or real economic growth. Therefore, although it is also important to divide 
changes in nominal GDP between prices and real output, the point is not relevant in the 
 118research here. The research aims to find the effect of monetary policy variables on the 
overall economic conditions that include price factor.  
 
In this chapter, the study examines the practical feasibility of using monetary aggregate 
to target nominal gross domestic product (NGDP). The study measures the strength and 
stability of the link between the broad monetary aggregates and nominal GDP and 
compares the predictive power of money aggregates and short-term interest rate for 
nominal GDP. In section 5.5.2, the researcher presents the “causality” relationship 
between broad money aggregates and nominal GDP by employing the Granger causality 
test. The causality test also shows us the predictive power of money aggregate to future 
nominal GDP information. In addition, the most important features of how nominal 
GDP responds to money aggregates or short-term interest shock will be discussed with 
the VAR model in section 5.5.3.  
 
5.2  Literature review on the relationship between nominal GDP and money 
The use of money aggregates to target nominal GDP 
Economists have long understood that the money aggregate, or its growth rate, can play 
an important role in the monetary policy process only if the fluctuations of money can 
constantly and reliably respond to the change in nominal income, inflation, or any other 
aspects of economic activity that the monetary authorities seek to influence. The same is 
certainly true for other financial variables (e.g. interest rate, measures of credit), which 
will be discussed in depth in chapters 4 and 6.  In the case of money, a rich body of 
literature has developed to investigate in detail the relationship between money and 
income or prices. Some studies have focused  on the requirement that there be a 
relationship between money and income (Friedman, 1991) and other researchers have 
sought to establish whether these requirements have been satisfied in specific places or 
at specific times. (McCallum, 1985). 
 
The pioneer work by (Friedman and Schwartz, 1963) pointed out the importance of 
money supply to the fluctuation of the economy; furthermore, Sims (1972) suggested 
the unidirectional causality from money to nominal income in the postwar U.S. data. 
Based on quantitative monetary policy theory, McCallum (1988, 1990, and 1997) 
 119proposed a rule that targets nominal GDP directly, instead of separating real GDP and 
inflation. According to the McCallum rule, if the growth rate of nominal GDP does not 
reach the target growth rate of nominal GDP, the expansion of the monetary base will 
support the economy.   
 
Feldstein and Stock (1993) concentrate on whether the link between monetary aggregate 
and nominal GDP is sufficiently stable, and then whether the money aggregate could be 
used as the monetary policy instrument to target nominal GDP. The study applies a 
simple regression to find whether the predictive power of monetary aggregate to 
nominal GDP is more than that of the interest rate. They also test the parameter stability 
with a series of recently developed statistical tests, and the results suggest that there is 
no evidence to indicate instability between M2 and nominal GDP during the period 
1960 to 1992 in the U.S. However, the link between narrow monetary aggregate (M0) 
and nominal GDP is unstable. Feldstein and Stock take the evidence against the link 
between M2 and nominal GDP to show that it is not sufficiently stable to be used as the 
monetary policy.  
 
Ball (1999) used a small closed-economy model to show that nominal GDP targeting 
can lead to instability. Richard Dennis (2001) extends Ball’s model (1999) to find that 
nominal GDP targeting is unlikely to lead to instability if inflation expectation is 
allowed to be formed by the more general mixed expectations process. The instability 
was found to be generated by the specific emphasis on expected inflation; furthermore, 
it was shown that, in Ball's model, where exact targeting causes instability, moving to 
inexact targeting restores stability.  
 
On the other hand, some researchers have found evidence against the stable link 
between money and income (Sims, 1972; Stock and Watson, 1987b; McCallum, 1991; 
Friedman and Kuttner, 1992;Hess et al., 1993; Friedman and Kuttner, 1993). Friedman 
and Kuttner (1992, 1993) showed that, based on the U.S. experience, the evidence did 
not indicate a close or consistent relationship between money and non-financial 
economic activity. They further extended the analysis to include the data from the 1980s, 
and found that the inclusion of the 1980s data roughly weakens the time series evidence 
that a stable relationship existed between money and nominal income in the prior period. 
 120The deterioration of evidence supporting a relationship with either nominal or real 
income, or with price, appears not just for M1 but also for other monetary aggregates.  
 
More recent work by Friedman (2005), however, showed the close relationship between 
money and nominal GDP. The study regarded three similar periods of rapid economic 
growth (the booms of the 1920s in the United States, the 1980s in Japan and the 1990s 
in the United States) as the equivalent of a controlled experiment to test the hypothesis 
of “The Great Contraction”. The quantity of money is the counterpart of the 
experimenter’s input. The performance of the economy and the level of the stock market 
are the counterpart of the experimenter’s output. Results of the experiment showed that 
nominal GDP growth paralleled monetary growth, and the results strongly support the 
view that monetary policy should take much credit for the mildness of the recession 
following the collapse of the U.S. boom in the late 20
th century.  
5.3  Data and summary statistics  
5.3.1  Money aggregates  
U.S.: The Federal Reserve ceased publication of the M3 on 23
rd March 2006, and has 
only published two money measurements, M0 and M2, since the spring of 2006. The 
explanation for this decision is that M3 did not provide any additional information about 
economic activity compared to M2; thus, M2 would be the monetary measurement that 
monetary policy-makers would focus on. M2 includes M1 plus balances that are 
generally similar to transaction accounts and that, for the most part, can be converted 
fairly readily to M1 with little or no loss of principal. Thus we use M2 in this research. 
Data source: The Federal Reserve H.6 Money Stock Measures  
 
U.K.: There are only two official U.K. measures of money supply: M0 and M4.  M0 
denotes the wide monetary base or narrow money, and M4 is referred to as broad money 
or simply the money supply. Because M4 is a measure of the quantity of UK money 
supply, the M4 is the data used in this research.  
M0: Cash outside Bank of England + Banks' operational deposits with Bank of England, 
which was discontinued in April 2006.  
 121M4: Cash outside banks (i.e. in circulation with the public and non-bank firms) + 
private-sector retail bank and building society deposits + private-sector wholesale bank 
and building society deposits and Certificates of Deposit.   
Germany: M3 is a monetary aggregate which the Bundesbank has set since 1970. From 
2010, the Bundesbank began to officially announce a money supply target. M3 
generally refers to the liability of commercial banks to the economy. M3 data are 
obtained from datastream, and are seasonally-adjusted data. We do not use non-
seasonally-adjusted M3 data as the time period of this data is not long enough; thus, this 
research uses seasonally-adjusted data.  
Japan:  The  Bank of Japan influences the volume of money to carry out monetary 
policy and M2 was the main monetary policy target during the 1970s and 1980s. The 
research has obtained M2, non-seasonal data from datastream.  According to the Guide 
to Japan’s Money Stock Statistics,  
M2 = Cash currency in circulation + deposits deposited at domestically licensed banks, 
etc. ("Domestically licensed banks, etc." marks the same range of financial institutions 
stipulated as "M2+CDs depository institutions" in the former statistics)  
 
All data are quarterly. Monthly data were aggregated to the quarterly level by averaging 
the data for the months within the quarter.  
 
The figures contrast movement in money shown as a red line with nominal GDP growth 
rate shown as a blue line. In the U.S., the research displays M2 and M3, because M3 
was the main monetary policy focus in the 1980s in the U.S.     
5.3.2  Description of data  
 
U.S. Four-quarter growth of (a) M2(red line)  and nominal GDP (blue line) (b) M2 and 
real GDP, (c) M2 and CPI 1960:1- 2009:4 
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Figure   5-1  Annual nominal GDP growth rate and M2 growth rate 
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Figure   5-2 Annual real GDP growth rate and M2 growth rate  
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Figure   5-3 Annual CPI growth rate and M2 growth rate  
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M3 and nominal GDP, Real GDP and CPI growth rate is also spotted in the figure in the 
Appendix.  From a simple inspection of the graphs, M2 seems to be closer to nominal 
GDP than M3.  However, the figures also show that there is a strong link between M3 
and nominal GDP than to real GDP and price growth rate.   
 
 123U.K. Four-quarter growth of (a) M4(red line)  and nominal GDP (blue line) (b) M4 and 
real GDP, (c) M4 and CPI 1960:1- 2009:3 
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Figure   5-5 Annual real GDP growth rate and M4 growth rate 
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Figure   5-6 CPI growth rate and M4 growth rate  
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A visual assessment of the figure suggests that there is not a significant link between 
M4 and nominal GDP, real GDP, and price growth rate, which might be because M4 is 
too broad to contain much information that is not specific for estimation of nominal 
 124GDP.  Considering this problem, we also spot M0 with nominal GDP, real GDP and 
price growth rate in the Appendix FigureA5-2. It seems M0 is closer to nominal GDP 
than M4. Moreover, there is a stronger link between M0 and nominal GDP than real 
GDP and price growth rate.  
 
Germany Four-quarter growth of (a) M3(red line)  and nominal GDP (blue line) (b) M3 
and real GDP, (c) M3 and CPI 1970:1- 2008:4 
 
Figure   5-7 Annual nominal GDP growth rate and M3 growth rate  
-4
0
4
8
12
16
20
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
YoY % NGDP YoY% M3
 
Figure   5-8 Annual real GDP growth rate and M3 growth rate  
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Japan Four-quarter growth of (a) M2(red line)  and nominal GDP (blue line) (b) M2 
and real GDP, (c) M2 and CPI 1960:1- 2008:4 
 
Figure   5-10 Annual nominal GDP growth rate and M2 growth rate  
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Figure   5-11 Annual real GDP growth rate and M2 growth rate 
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Figure   5-12 CPI growth rate and M2 growth rate 
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There is a stronger link between Money and nominal GDP than real GDP in Germany 
and Japan. 
5.4  Main results 
As is shown in the figures, the link between the annual growth rates in money aggregate 
and the nominal GDP appears closer than that with either the real GDP growth or CPI 
growth rate. Consequently, the research question proposed in the next section is whether 
money aggregate has more predictive content for future nominal GDP growth than 
interest rate and price growth in the cases of U.S., U.K., Germany and Japan. To answer 
this question, we apply a simple regression, and evaluate the predictive power based on 
the adjusted R square.  
 
5.4.1  Results of single regression test in entire sample and subsamples  
5.4.1.1  Strength of the link from money aggregates to nominal GDP 
In the following tables, the study firstly shows econometric results on the predictive 
content of monetary aggregates for nominal GDP in each country from the entire 
sample. Each row in the tables represents a regression of nominal GDP growth on a 
constant and the explanatory variable at three lags. Nominal GDP, and money aggregate 
in the regression appear in quarterly, two-quarter, and four-quarter growth rate, and 
interest rate and price growth rate appear in first difference. The first column in the 
tables presents the 
2
R  ‘s from the regression of the quarterly growth of nominal GDP 
on the indicated regressors at three lags.  The second and third columns provide the 
2
R  
by using two-quarter and four-quarter growth rate respectively in the regression. 
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Feldstein and Stock (1994) also conducted a similar regression with three lags for the 
U.S. in their paper “The use of monetary aggregate to target nominal GDP”, however, 
the time period in their test is only from 1959:1 to 1992:2 and, furthermore, they carried 
out the test merely for the U.S. Therefore, this study not only extends the sample of 
countries, but also expands the time period. Few empirical works have emphasised the 
relationship between money aggregate and nominal GDP for the U.K., Germany and 
Japan, but this research can compare the relationship after including four countries 
together. Another main contribution is that the research expands the sample period over 
40 years, from 1960 to 2008 (except for Germany, which begins in 1970). There are 
several changes of monetary policy regime and financial crises during this period
39; 
thus, the long time period including several exogenous structural breaks provides us 
with the chance to test the stability of correlation between money aggregates and 
ominal GDP.  
r nominal GDP in the 
gression that includes M2, interest rate, and inflation growth.   
n
 
The results in the tables prove that the money aggregate has statistically significant 
predictive content for nominal GDP growth in all four countries over a long time period 
that includes several business cycles.  This result is consistent with the finding in 
Feldstein and Stock (1994) that M2 is an important predictor fo
re
 
The 
2
R   suggests that money aggregates alone accounts for the large amount of 
predictive content for the nominal GDP. In the U.S. and U.K. the 
2
R  is 0.338 and 0.233 
respectively at four-quarter horizon. The 
2
R  also suggests that money aggregate has 
ore predictive power in Germany and Japan, at 0.51 and 0.812 respectively.   
nominal GDP at the four-quarter horizon than quarterly or two-quarter horizons in all 
                                                
m
 
Generally, money aggregate is capable of predicting a larger amount of movements in 
 
39 Monetarism was popular during the late 1970s to 1980s, and then inflation target was widely accepted 
by most developed countries.  
Financial crisis during this period: 1973 – 1973 oil crisis; 1987 – Black Monday the largest one-day 
percentage decline in stock market history; 1990 – Japanese asset price bubble collapsed ;1992–93 – 
Black Wednesday – speculative attacks on currencies in the European Exchange Rate Mechanism;1997–
98 – 1997 Asian Financial Crisis; 2001 – Bursting of dot-com bubble – speculations concerning internet 
companies crashed ;2007–10 – Financial crisis of 2007–2010 
  
 128four countries. The increase of 
2
R   is substantial:  for example, the improvement of 
2
R  
is from 0.284 to 0.529 in the U.S., 0.124 to 0.302 in the U.K., 0.185 to 0.583 in 
Germany and 0.668 to 0.829 in Japan in the regression which includes money aggregate 
in conjunction with price growth and interest rate.    
 
In contrast, 
2
R  in the regression with interest rate or price growth alone is comparably 
smaller, which indicates that interest rate or price growth has less predictive power than 
money aggregate. The range of 
2
R   is only from 0.01 to 0.05 in four countries.  
 
An additional question that should be considered is whether the inclusion of interest 
rates increases or eliminates the predictive power of money aggregate in the money-
output relationship. (Sims 1972, 1980)  If 
2
R   increases substantially when adding 
interest rate, this suggests that interest rate would be a better variable than money. 
However, the results show that the inclusion of interest rate does not significantly 
increase the 
2
R  in all four countries. From the tables, it can be seen that the inclusion of 
interest rate only raises around 1%-6% 
2
R  in the U.K., Germany and Japan; thus, it 
appears that interest rate does not have predictive content for nominal GDP in these 
three countries, especially in Germany and Japan. In the U.S., interest rate seems be 
more important than in the other countries; for example, 
2
R  increases to 0.530 at the 
four-quarter horizon, and 
2
R  is 0.10 in the regression with interest rate alone at the 
four-quarter horizon. However, M2 in the U.S. is more statistically significant in the 
regression.  
 
Table   5-1 Predictive content of M2 dependent variable: nominal GDP growth in the U.S. 
(1960:1-2006:4 quarterly) 
Eq. Regressors            2
R   ) 2 (
2
R   ) 4 (
2
R  
1 NGDP              
2 NGDP M2        0.219  0.273  0.338 
3 NGDP PGR        0.061  0.074  0.003 
4 NGDP PGR  M2      0.239  0.310  0.412 
5 NGDP R-90        0.041  0.052  0.100 
6 NGDP R-90  M2      0.282  0.372  0.530 
7 NGDP PGR  R-90      0.031  0.050  0.106 
8 NGDP PGR  R-90  M2    0.284  0.376  0.529 
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Table   5-2 Predictive content of M4 dependent variable: nominal GDP growth in the 
U.K. (1960:1-2008:4 quarterly)  
Eq.  Regressors          2
R   ) 2 (
2
R ) 4 (
2
R  
1  NGDP               
2  NGDP  M4        0.092  0.158  0.233 
3  NGDP  PGR        0.025  0.042  0.060 
4 NGDP PGR  M4      0.127  0.221  0.306 
5  NGDP  R-90        0.010  0.015  0.032 
6 NGDP R-90  M4      0.093  0.157  0.234 
7 NGDP  PGR  R-90      0.030  0.047  0.070 
8 NGDP PGR  R-90  M4    0.124  0.216  0.302 
 
 
Table   5-3 Predictive content of M2 dependent variable: nominal GDP growth in 
Germany (1970:1-2008:4 quarterly) 
Eq.  Regressors          2
R   ) 2 (
2
R ) 4 (
2
R  
1  NGDP               
2  NGDP  M3        0.167  0.306  0.510 
3  NGDP  PGR        0.011  0.034  0.061 
4 NGDP PGR  M3      0.185  0.344  0.572 
5  NGDP  R-90        0.001  0.007  0.028 
6 NGDP R-90  M3      0.176  0.328  0.561 
7 NGDP  PGR  R-90      0.006  0.029  0.058 
8 NGDP PGR  R-90  M3    0.185  0.347  0.583 
 
 
Table   5-4 Predictive content of M2 dependent variable: nominal GDP growth in Japan  
(1960:1-2008:4 quarterly) 
Eq.  Regressors          2
R   ) 2 (
2
R ) 4 (
2
R  
1  NGDP               
2  NGDP  M2        0.658  0.760  0.812 
3  NGDP  PGR        0.017  0.029  0.044 
4 NGDP PGR  M2      0.667  0.775  0.829 
5  NGDP  R-90        0.005  0.017  0.024 
6 NGDP R-90  M2      0.660  0.767  0.820 
7 NGDP  PGR  R-90      0.014  0.029  0.042 
8 NGDP PGR  R-90  M2    0.668  0.776  0.829 
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5.4.1.2  Stability of the link between money aggregates and nominal GDP 
 
In this section the study explores the stability of the link between money aggregate and 
nominal GDP. The results of the stability test could point to the strength of the link 
between nominal GDP and money aggregate as well. If the link between money 
aggregate and nominal GDP over the business cycle is stable, this suggests the money 
aggregate could be considered as a control variable to influence the economic 
conditions. If it is not stable, the study aims to test the regression in the subsample to 
discover whether the core findings in the section are robust or not.  
 
If it were assumed that there was a known break date, then the straightforward method 
would be to apply the Chow-type test for the parameter stability. However, the possible 
break is based on historical knowledge and subjective decision. The break date 
occurrence is generally unknown in practice; therefore, the study also provides the 
results of CUSUM (the Cumulative Sum of the Recursive Residuals), and one-step 
forecast tests with the purpose of examining the parameter stability when the break date 
is unknown. The test results are described in the Appendix 5.B and a brief summary will 
be given here.  
 
Although the research uses three types of stability test, the emphasis is on the Chow-
type test. Considering there is not a well-recognized method which can automatically 
select a break date in the VAR model, this study applies the Granger causality test and 
VAR model in the following parts of the thesis. In order to be consistent for the break 
date in the tests, the research decides the break date based on historical events.  
 
Results in the U.S. 
The Federal Reserve came to regard the money aggregate growth target as having a 
dominant role in the monetary policy from October 6, 1979, the date on which the 
monetarist experiment started. This period ended in July 1982. During the period, M1 
growth was first actively pursued and was then replaced by M2 growth, as the Federal 
Reserve found that M2-targeting was more relevant. As a result, this study considers 
1979Q3 as the break quarter. Boivin and Giannoni (2002) also regard 1979Q3 as the 
break date in their VAR model after testing the stability of all the coefficients on the 
 131lags of a given variable using the Wald version of the Quandt likelihood-ratio test.  This 
date is associated with the recessions during 1979 to 1982 and the procedure that the 
Federal Reserve changed, so it is reasonable. The Chow-test also confirms that there is a 
break in 1973Q3, and the resulting graph is shown in the Appendix 5.B.  
 
The following tables show the summary statistics in the two subsamples in the U.S.  
The results suggest that M2 generally has more predictive content in the early sample, 
and the forecasting performance of M2 in the later sample deteriorates. For example, in 
the regression with lagged nominal GDP growth rate and lagged money, 
2
R  falls from 
0.475 to 0.121. On the other hand, it is worth noticing that the 3-month Treasury bill 
rate has increased the predictive content for nominal GDP in the later subsample. For 
instance, 
2
R  rises from 0.029 to 0.179 in the regression model with only the lagged 
nominal GDP growth rate and lagged 3-month Treasury bill rate. In addition, the 3-
month Treasury bill rate is added to the regression with M2 only in the later subsample, 
and 
2
R climbs from 0.121 to 0.402. If we examine the regression with lagged nominal 
GDP growth, 3-month Treasury bill rate, and M2, we will find that the change of 
2
R  is 
modest, from 0.570 to 0.402. Considering M2 has less predictive content in the later 
subsample, it can be seen that the 3-month Treasury bill rate has more predictive power 
in the later subsample. Overall, it can be inferred that the interest rate has predictive 
content to nominal GDP in the later subsample, though it cannot compare with the 
predictive power of M2 and interest rate in the later subsample.  
 
 
Table   5-5 Predictive content of M2 dependent variable: nominal GDP growth in the U.S. 
(1960:1-1979:3 quarterly) 
 
Eq.  Regressors          2
R   ) 2 (
2
R ) 4 (
2
R  
1  NGDP               
2  NGDP  M2        0.306  0.369  0.475 
3  NGDP  PGR        0.024  0.050  0.077 
4 NGDP PGR  M2      0.311  0.403  0.565 
5  NGDP  R-90        0.006  0.010  0.029 
6 NGDP R-90  M2      0.316  0.396  0.570 
7 NGDP  PGR  R-90      0.005  0.012  0.050 
8 NGDP PGR  R-90  M2    0.311  0.404  0.583 
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Table   5-6 Predictive content of M2 dependent variable: nominal GDP growth in the U.S. 
(1979:4-2006:4 quarterly) 
Eq.  Regressors          2
R   ) 2 (
2
R   ) 4 (
2
R  
1  NGDP               
2  NGDP  M2        0.066  0.092  0.121 
3  NGDP  PGR        0.025  0.021  0.015 
4 NGDP PGR  M2      0.074  0.108  0.183 
5  NGDP  R-90        0.051  0.082  0.179 
6 NGDP R-90  M2      0.153  0.236  0.402 
7 NGDP  PGR  R-90      0.041  0.075  0.181 
8 NGDP PGR  R-90  M2    0.148  0.230  0.397 
 
Results in the U.K.  
 
The regime of the U.K. monetary policy changed several times during the period 
between the floating of the exchange rate in 1972 and the beginning of the inflation 
target in 1992.  In the early 1970s, monetary policy was secondary to income policy 
which the government regarded as acting against inflation. In the late 1970s, the 
monetarism experience swept through most developed countries, and money aggregate 
was first considered as a fitting control variable in the U.K. After the failure of the 
monetarism experience, monetary policy moved to the management of the exchange 
rate, and the United Kingdom became a member of the ERM (the Exchange Rate 
Mechanism) between 1990 and 1992.  
 
With the collapse of the pound sterling on 16
th September 1992, which forced Britain to 
leave the ERM, it was necessary to introduce a new monetary target. Following the lead 
of Canada and New Zealand, the inflation target was set up in 1992.  In the meantime, 
the British economy went through a severe recession at the beginning of the 1990s 
which lasted until the end of 1992.  Thus the research regards 1992Q3 as a break date.  
 
If we compare the 
2
R  in both subsamples, we can see that the predictive power of M4 
for nominal GDP does not change much. M4 has the predictive content for nominal 
GDP in both subsamples. However, the predictive power is not as significant as that in 
the previous three countries. The 3-month Treasury bill rate also has little predictive 
power for nominal GDP in the U.K. in both subsamples.  The findings in the subsample 
 133are consistent with those in the entire sample.  M4 has more predictive power for 
nominal GDP than the interest rate does.  
 
Table   5-7 Predictive content of M4 dependent variable: nominal GDP growth in the 
U.K. (1960:1-1992:3 quarterly) 
Eq. Regressors            2
R   ) 2 (
2
R ) 4 (
2
R  
1 NGDP              
2 NGDP M4        0.014  0.031  0.233 
3 NGDP PGR        0.014  0.031  0.038 
4 NGDP PGR  M4      0.055  0.119  0.270 
5 NGDP R-90        0.006  0.009  0.033 
6 NGDP R-90  M4      0.015  0.033  0.234 
7 NGDP PGR  R-90      0.023  0.042  0.065 
8 NGDP PGR  R-90  M4    0.051  0.098  0.0302 
 
 
Table   5-8 Predictive content of M4 dependent variable: nominal GDP growth in the 
U.K. (1992:4-2009:2 quarterly) 
Eq.  Regressors          2
R   ) 2 (
2
R ) 4 (
2
R  
1  NGDP               
2  NGDP  M4        0.033  0.137  0.223 
3  NGDP  PGR        0.100  0.030  0.051 
4 NGDP PGR  M4      0.114  0.183  0.286 
5  NGDP  R-90        0.013  0.015  0.033 
6 NGDP R-90  M4      0.018  0.137  0.225 
7 NGDP  PGR  R-90      0.086  0.036  0.065 
8 NGDP PGR  R-90  M4    0.103  0.178  0.282 
 
Results in Germany  
On October 3, 1990, East and West Germany were officially united. Although the data 
in Germany have been adjusted for the political and economic unification in 1990, there 
is still a question over the stability of relationship between the financial variables. It is 
possible that unification disturbed the operation of the economic system; thus, the study 
takes 1990Q3 as a break date.  
 
The Chow test proves there is a break in 1990Q3, and CUSUM and one-step forecast 
suggest that the link between M3 and nominal GDP is not stable.  
 
The tables present the statistical results in Germany. The results point out that M3 has 
significant predictive content both in the early subsample and later subsample, though 
 134the predictive content in the later subsample is not as notable as that in the early 
subsample.  For example, 
2
R at the four-quarters in the regression with M3 only is 
0.586 and 0.445 respectively.  
 
The inclusion of interest rate does not eliminate the predictive power of M3 in Germany 
and, meanwhile, it increases the predictive content. However, the statistical results 
imply that the 3-month market rate does not provide future information on nominal 
GDP to a large extent. For example, the 
2
R  in the regression with lagged interest rate 
alone is only 0.048 at two-quarter growth rate and 0.107 at four-quarter growth rate in 
the later subsample, which does not show a major difference with the early subsample.  
 
To summarise, the conclusion that M3 has the main predictive content for nominal GDP 
in Germany is robust.  
 
Table   5-9 Predictive content of M3 dependent variable: nominal GDP growth in 
Germany (1970:1-1990:3 quarterly) 
Eq.  Regressors          2
R   ) 2 (
2
R   ) 4 (
2
R  
1  NGDP               
2  NGDP  M3        0.218  0.401  0.586 
3  NGDP  PGR        0.071  0.115  0.171 
4 NGDP PGR  M3      0.333  0.539  0.718 
5  NGDP  R-90        0.070  0.120  0.022 
6 NGDP R-90  M3      0.257  0.443  0.659 
7 NGDP  PGR  R-90      0.061  0.108  0.163 
8 NGDP PGR  R-90  M3    0.325  0.535  0.721 
 
 
Table   5-10 Predictive content of M3 dependent variable: nominal GDP growth in 
Germany (1990:4-2008:4 quarterly) 
Eq.  Regressors          2
R   ) 2 (
2
R   ) 4 (
2
R  
1  NGDP               
2  NGDP  M3        0.146  0.263  0.445 
3  NGDP  PGR        0.026  0.004  0.031 
4 NGDP PGR  M3      0.136  0.270  0.500 
5  NGDP  R-90        0.027  0.048  0.107 
6 NGDP R-90  M3      0.177  0.325  0.574 
7 NGDP  PGR  R-90      0.013  0.037  0.095 
8 NGDP PGR  R-90  M3    0.165  0.317  0.573 
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Results in Japan  
After Japan established its status as the world’s second-largest economy in the 1980s, 
the continuing rise of the stock market index and real estate prices made the Japanese 
economy overheat. The Japanese asset price bubble collapsed in 1989, when the Tokyo 
Stock Exchange also crashed. The period of Japanese asset price bubble normally refers 
to 1986 to 1991, so the sample is divided into two subsamples, which are from 
1960:Q1-1990:Q4 and 1991:Q1 to 2008:Q4, reflecting the observation of a likely 
structural break in early 1991.  
 
M2 still has extremely large predictive content for nominal GDP in Japan from 1961 to 
1990. The range of 
2
R ’s at the four-quarter horizon in the regression with M2 alone, or 
with price growth and the 3-month Treasury bill rate is around 0.6 to 0.65, which 
indicates that inclusion of price growth or the 3-month Treasury bill rate does not 
significantly increase the predictive content for nominal GDP.  In the regression with 
the 3-month Treasury bill alone, it is also revealed that short-term interest rate does not 
have the predictive content for nominal GDP during 1961 to 1990.  The main findings 
in the entire sample are robust for the period during 1961 to 1990. However, the 
predictive power of M2 for nominal GDP in the later subsample decreases. The 
2
R  at 
the four-quarter horizon is just 0.25 which is less than that in the early subsample, 
though 0.25 could not reject the predictive power of M2 in Japan. The 3-month 
Treasury bill rate has more predictive content for nominal GDP which is implied by the 
2
R  in the regression with interest rate only; however, inclusion of the 3-month Treasury 
bill rate in the regression with M2 does not increase the predictive power for nominal 
GDP after 1990, so it cannot be assumed that interest rate is an appropriate control 
variable to predict future nominal GDP.  
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Table   5-11 Predictive content of M2 dependent variable: nominal GDP growth in Japan 
(1961:1-1990:4 quarterly) 
Eq. Regressors            2
R   ) 2 (
2
R   ) 4 (
2
R  
1 NGDP              
2 NGDP M2        0.360  0.520  0.600 
3 NGDP PGR        0.040  0.072  0.0956 
4 NGDP PGR  M2      0.388  0.564  0.647 
5 NGDP R-90        0.003  0.005  0.017 
6 NGDP R-90  M2      0.340  0.529  0.635 
7 NGDP PGR  R-90     0.035  0.059  0.092 
8 NGDP PGR  R-90 M2    0.364  0.549  0.644 
 
 
Table   5-12 Predictive content of M2 dependent variable: nominal GDP growth in Japan 
(1991:1-2008:4 quarterly) 
Eq.  Regressors        2
R   ) 2 (
2
R   ) 4 (
2
R  
1  NGDP             
2  NGDP  M2      0.004  0.059  0.251 
3  NGDP  PGR      0.011  0.014  0.012 
4 NGDP PGR  M2     0.017  0.046  0.248 
5  NGDP  R-90      0.025  0.071  0.171 
6 NGDP R-90  M2     0.012  0.079  0.251 
7 NGDP PGR  R-90     0.014 0.060  0.160 
8 NGDP PGR  R-90  M2   0.000  0.066  0.242 
 
 
5.4.2  Results of Granger causality test in entire sample and subsamples 
It is suggested from the results that money aggregate has more predictive content for 
nominal GDP based on the simple regression, and the study intends to apply the 
Granger causality test to shed light on the question of whether there is proof of 
unidirectional causality running from money aggregate to nominal GDP or whether the 
order is reversed.  
 
Sims (1972) first developed a statistical technique for testing causality between two 
variables, and inferred that there is unidirectional causality from money to income using 
post-war U.S. data. Since then, many empirical researchers have concentrated on the 
causality test between money and income. Here the study focuses on the nominal GDP 
rather than nominal GNP.  
 
 137According to the description of the methodology of the causality test in Chapter 3, the 
study firstly tests the cointegration between nominal GDP and money and finds that 
nominal GDP and money aggregate are cointegrated. The statistical results are 
presented in the Appendix 5.D. Because most researchers (Stock and Watson, 1987a, 
Amato and Swanson, 2001, Patinkin and Technology, 1965, Coenen et al., 2005, Green, 
April 26th 2009) have also been interested in the correlation between money and real 
GDP, or money and inflation, the study tests the hypothesis that there is a causality 
relationship between money and real GDP, or interest rate as well, and presents the 
results in the Appendix5.E.  In the main part, the research only discusses the causality 
between money and nominal GDP, as this is the core interest of the research.  The table 
5-13 shows the statistical results. The hypothesis is that nominal GDP does not Granger 
cause money and vice versa. The hypothesis that nominal GDP does not Granger cause 
money is rejected in all four countries at the 5% significance level, but the hypothesis 
that money does not Granger cause nominal GDP could not be rejected in the U.S., U.K. 
and Japan at the 5% significance level, and also could not be rejected in Germany at the 
10% significance level. Thus, it is found that the causality is unidirectional from money 
aggregate to nominal GDP in the U.S., U.K., Germany and Japan.  
 
Table   5-13 Granger causality between money and nominal GDP  
 
Countries 
Time Period   nominal GDP  does 
not GC40  money    
money does not GC 
nominal GDP     
  
 
F-statistic P-value  F-statistic  P-value 
U.S.  1960Q1-2006Q4  1.8112 0.0993  3.836636  0.0013*** 
U.K.  1960Q1-2008Q4  0.763432 0.5997  6.632155  0*** 
Germany   1970Q1-2008Q4  1.290878 0.2711  2.027122  0.0784 
Japan   1960Q1-2008Q4  1.615487 0.0986  3.375229  0.0003*** 
 
 
Granger Causality Test in subsamples 
Since the time period is more than 30 years in all four countries, it is necessary to test 
the robustness of the Granger causality results. Therefore, this research uses the same 
structural break in each country as that in the simple regression, and tests the Granger 
causality in the subsample.  
 
                                                 
40 GC means Granger Cause  
 
 138This study has conducted the cointegration test between money and nominal GDP in the 
subsamples, and the results suggest that there is a cointegration relationship between 
money and nominal GDP in most of the subsamples across the four countries with only 
one exception - the late subsample in Germany. Detailed figures are shown in appendix 
G.  
 
The summary of the Granger causality results is shown in the following table 5-14. The 
results in the two subsamples reveal that a unidirectional causality from money to 
nominal GDP is robust with only a few exceptions.  The hypothesis that money does not 
Granger cause nominal GDP is rejected at the 5% significance level in all four countries 
in the early period subsample, and is also rejected at the 1% significance level in the 
U.S., U.K. and Germany in the later subsample.  The hypothesis that money does not 
Granger cause nominal GDP is accepted in Japan in the later subsample. This might be 
because monetary policy has had little effect on economic conditions in Japan since the 
economy crashed in the late 1990s.  On the other hand, the hypothesis that nominal 
GDP does not Granger cause money is accepted in most of the countries and both 
subsamples, with the only exception being the U.S. in the early period. As a result, the 
main empirical findings suggest that a stable unidirectional causality is from money to 
nominal GDP even with a structural break.  
 
Table   5-14 Granger causality results 
Subsample 1 
Countries Time  period 
nominal GDP  does 
not GC  money    
money does not GC 
nominal GDP     
     F-statistic  P-value  F-statistic  P-value 
U.S. 1960Q1-1979Q3  2.578038  0.018**  4.197202  0.0005** 
U.K. 1960Q1-1992Q3  1.161107  0.3325  2.513242  0.0205** 
Germany 1970Q1-1990Q3  0.71135  0.5487 3.34945  0.0242** 
Japan 1960Q1-1990Q4  2.143768  0.0546  2.657994  0.0194** 
Subsample 2 
Countries Time  period 
nominal GDP  does 
not GC  money    
money does not GC 
nominal GDP     
     F-statistic  P-value  F-statistic  P-value 
U.S. 1979Q4  -2006Q4  1.168872  0.3266  4.712548  0.0001*** 
U.K. 1992Q4-2008Q4  1.331667  0.2558  4.040096  0.0013*** 
Germany 1990Q4-2008Q4  0.20999  0.9571 5.99453  0.0001*** 
Japan 1991Q1-2008Q4  0.872347  0.5051  0.923123  0.4724 
 
 
 139Discussion of empirical evidence of 4-countries VAR test during the period 1960s-
2008Q4  
The purpose of identifying the monetary shock is to evaluate the effectiveness of 
monetary policy on economic conditions. In general, there are two ways to capture 
money policy shock. The first one is called the historical approach, which was provided 
by Romer and Romer (1989). In their paper, Romer and Romer identify the dates on 
which monetary policy became restrictive, by using the minutes of the Federal Open 
Market Committee meetings. This method has its disadvantages, because only the 
restrictive shocks were chosen, and the expansive shocks were ignored. Besides, these 
dates only reflect a qualitative measurement.  
 
The second method is to identify monetary shocks using the VAR model. The VAR 
model was first used in the works of Sim (1980, 1992) and extended by Bernanke (1986) 
and Bernanke and Blinder (1992).  The VAR model is a linear stochastic system that 
can capture dynamic relationships between time series variables; thus, it is widely used 
in monetary policy analysis. This research applies the VAR model in an attempt to 
discover the effectiveness of money shock on nominal GDP.  
  
In the following section, the research presents the empirical results, which stem from 
the reduced-form VAR model. The purpose of this part is to show the impact of broad 
money on nominal GDP, as previous opinion suggests that the impact of broad money 
falls on price and there is no impact on real GDP in the long term. This research intends 
to assess the overall impact of money on nominal GDP. A comparison between 
countries provides an important evaluation of the effectiveness of money on the 
economic conditions.  
 
5.4.3  Results of VARs model 
 
VAR model test with nominal variables in four countries during the period 
1960Q1-2008Q4  
A vector autoregression (VAR) is a system of ordinary least-squares regressions, in 
which each of a set of variables is regressed on lagged values of both itself and the other 
variables in the set. VAR model has been proved a convenient approach to summarise 
 140the dynamic behaviour among the variables, because the model can be used to simulate 
the response over time of any variable in the set to either an “own” disturbance (a 
disturbance to the equation for which the variable is the dependent variable) or a 
disturbance to any other variables in the system. (Bernanke, 1995)  
 
The VAR model established here includes nominal GDP, price, interest rate, and money 
aggregate.
41 The research here assumes money aggregate to be an indicator of the 
stance of monetary policy, although short-term interest rate is normally regarded as that. 
Therefore, this means that the disturbance of money aggregate in the VAR model is 
identified as shocks to monetary policy, and the response of other variables to money 
aggregate shock is interpreted as the structural responses to an unanticipated change in 
monetary policy.  
 
In the model   t t t t t G r m X  , , the variable is the nominal GDP ( ), consumer price ( t G t  ), 
the nominal short-term interest rate ( ) and broad money ( ), in that order.  Nominal 
GDP and money in VAR model appear as annual growth rate, while consumer price 
growth rate and the 3-month Treasury bill rate appear as the first difference. The VAR 
model involves four equations: nominal GDP as a function of past value of nominal 
GDP, consumer price growth, interest rate and money; consumer price growth  as a 
function of past value of nominal GDP, consumer price growth, interest rate and money; 
and similar for the interest rate and money equations. Each equation is estimated by 
ordinary least squares regression. The equations are shown below:  
t r t m
 
  
  
  
  

 





 





 





 




         
         
         
         
6
1
6
1
4 4
6
1
4
6
1
4
4
6
1
6
1
3 3
6
1
3
6
1
3
3
6
1
6
1
2 2
6
1
2
6
1
2
2
6
1
6
1
1 1
6
1
1
6
1
1
1   
jj
j t j j t j
j
j t j
j
j t j t
jj
j t j j t j
j
j t j
j
j t j t
jj
j t j j t j
j
j t j
j
j t j t
jj
j t j j t j
j
j t j
j
j t j t
m p r y m
m p r y p
m p r y r
m p r y y
    
    
    
    
            (5.1) 
 
                                                 
41 Clearly, this VAR provides a very simple description of the economy, but it contains at least the 
minimum set of variables that are crucial for any discussion of monetary policy.  
 141Generally, the number of lagged values to include in each equation can be determined 
by a number of different methods. The Akaike (AIC) or BIC information criteria are 
frequently used to select the length of lags. The results show that six is appropriate for 
the lag length in most countries after running the VAR model.  Considering that the 
VAR model in monetary transmission literature takes six lags, such as Bernanke (1992), 
this research runs the VAR model at a six-lag length. The sample period of the 
estimated country VAR model for the U.S., U.K., Germany and Japan is from 1960Q1 
to 2008Q4 except Germany. Because the nominal GDP data obtained for Germany are 
from 1970Q1, the time period starts from 1970Q1. The data are quarterly, non-
seasonally-adjusted. The results are similar when we start the estimation a few years 
earlier or later, or use different lags. 
 
The difference from the previous models in the literature is the use of nominal GDP 
instead of the real GDP, which provides us with a new angle from which to examine 
how nominal GDP responds to money aggregate shock. Nominal GDP and consumer 
price are included to represent the economic activity and price.  
 
The VARs model identified is using Cholesky decomposition, with the order being 
nominal GDP, price, the nominal interest rate, and money.  As the reduced–form errors 
are typically correlated, the Cholesky decomposition isolates the underlying structural 
errors by recursive orthogonalization, with the innovation in the first equation 
untransformed, the innovation in the second equation taken as orthogonal to the first, 
and so on. The ordering was based on the speed at which the variable responds to 
shocks. It was assumed that output was the least responsive, followed by price, short 
interest rate, and money.  
 
Given the long planning procedures involved in setting economic output and prices, 
these variables are supposed to not respond to simultaneous shocks to financial 
variables. The assumption is that the monetary authorities set the money aggregate with 
information on the contemporaneous performance of slowly-moving output and price, 
but without a complete picture of the actions of quickly-changing financial variables. 
Although this research did not test all possible alternative orderings, the results were not 
significantly different from the complete re-ordering of money, nominal interest rate, 
price, and nominal GDP.  
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5.4.3.1  The main impulse response results in the entire sample 
As an illustration, the shock is identified through a standard Cholesky-decomposition. 
The figures 5.14, 5.16, 5.17 show the dynamic accumulated impulse response of the 
nominal GDP, price and short-term interest rate to an unanticipated tightening of money 
shocks, for each country, along with 95 per cent confidence bands.  
 
The impact of money innovation on nominal GDP 
The patterns of nominal GDP response to money shock are all statistically significant 
and positive in all four countries, which were implied by the accumulated impulse 
response.  It is clear that the impact of money on nominal GDP increases in the first few 
quarters, and the maximum impact reached after the 4-quarters initial money shock, 
where 1% of money-tightening leads to around 0.3% of nominal GDP increase, then 
gradually returns to the baseline in the U.S. and Germany. The magnitude of impact of 
money on nominal GDP is largely positive in Japan, where 1% of money-tightening 
leads to around 0.7% of nominal GDP increase after 8 quarters; however, in the U.K. 
the impact is negative in the first few quarters, and then becomes positive after 4 
quarters.  Although the positive effect of money on nominal GDP in the U.K. is not 
apparent based on the  impulse response, the feature of accumulated impulse response 
suggests that money has a positive impact on nominal GDP in these four developed 
countries.  More detailed figures are displayed in Appendix F.   
 
Figure   5-13 Impulse response of Cholesky One S. D. money innovation on nominal 
GDP  
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 143Figure   5-14 Accumulated effect of Cholesky One S.D. money innovation on nominal 
GDP 
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The impulse response of money innovation on interest rate  
As the figure shows, the accumulated response of interest rate to money shock in the 
U.S., U.K., Germany and Japan is positive. In the U.S., Germany and U.K., one 
percentage point of money supply increase leads to a 0.2% interest rate increase, and the 
magnitude of impulse response of interest rate to money shock is smaller in Japan. 
Normally, the interest rates are expected to decrease if the money supply increases, so 
the results drew the liquidity puzzle in the figure. Liquidity puzzle refers to an 
expansionary monetary policy shock where interest rate increases rather than decreases.  
 
Figure   5-15 Impulse response of Cholesky One S.D. money innovation on interest rate  
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 144Figure   5-16 Accumulated effect of Cholesky One S.D. money innovation on short-term 
interest rate  
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The pattern of money innovation on price  
The accumulated response of price to broad money shock in all four countries is 
positive. Price does not immediately respond to money shock, and displays the feature 
of price stickiness. After 8 quarters of initial shock, the impact becomes apparent.  The 
impulse response table can be found in Appendix F.  
 
Figure   5-17 Accumulated effect of Cholesky One S. D. money innovation on price  
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The impact of interest rate innovation on nominal GDP  
In the figure, the accumulated effect implies that interest rate shock has a negative effect 
on nominal GDP, though the interest rate shock does not cause the immediate negative 
effect. In the each country, a shock of short-term interest rate leads to a gradual decrease 
 145in nominal GDP, and the impulse response fluctuates. The negative response is 
eventually stable after 12 quarters initial shock, which implies that the impact of interest 
rate innovation on nominal GDP is constant.  
 
The table in Appendix 5.C summarises the response of nominal GDP to short-term 
interest rate shock at half, one, two and three years of shock. In the U.S. and Germany, 
the magnitude of response is similar, where the nominal GDP growth rate fell 0.22% 
after the 100 basis-point rise of the 3-month Treasury bill rate at 5 quarters. Although 
the magnitude of response in Japan is similar to that in the U.S. and Germany, the speed 
of impulse response is much slower. It is surprising that the impulse response of 
nominal GDP to interest rate shock is positive in the first 2 years, even though it 
becomes negative after 3 years in the U.K., and the magnitude of impulse response is 
relatively small.  
 
Figure   5-18 Accumulated effect of Cholesky One S.D. interest rate innovation on 
nominal GDP  
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The impact of interest rate innovation on price  
The impulse response reaches its maximum point after increasing in the first 4 quarters, 
and then gradually decreases to the baseline. This pattern of impulse response sketches 
the price puzzle, where interest rate-tightening causes the increasing price rather than 
the decreasing price. The price puzzle was first provided by Sim (1992) and labelled by 
Eichenbaum (1992).  
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Figure   5-19 Impulse response of Cholesky One S.D. interest rate innovation on price  
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The impact of interest rate innovation on money  
The pattern of money response to interest rate shock shows a decrease across all four 
countries, which implies that, when the interest rate increases, the money supply 
decreases in all countries. One percentage point of interest rate shock leads to 0.26%-
0.55% of money supply decrease after 4 to 5 quarters initial shock. The magnitude of 
impulse response in the U.S. is the largest.  
 
Figure   5-20 Accumulated effect of Cholesky One S.D. interest rate innovation on 
money  
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In accordance with its interest in discovering how money aggregate and interest rate 
respond to nominal GDP shock, this research also provides the impulse response of 
money and interest rate to nominal GDP shock.  
 
 147The pattern of nominal GDP innovation on money  
 
Based on inspection, it seems there is no constant pattern of money response to nominal 
GDP shock. The impulse response is negative in the U.S. and Japan and positive in the 
U.K. and Germany after the initial shock. The magnitude of response is also completely 
different in each country. Thus, there is no constant pattern of money response to 
nominal GDP in the four countries.   
 
Figure   5-21 Impulse response of Cholesky One S.D. nominal GDP innovation on 
money  
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The pattern of nominal GDP innovation on interest rate  
 
Judd and Motley (1993) have suggested that, when nominal GDP growth exceeds the 
target by one percentage point, policy-makers should raise the short-term interest rate 
by 0.2 per cent, or 20 basis points. Here, the test shows the percentage of interest rate 
response to a 1% increase in GDP. The pattern of interest rate response to nominal GDP 
shock is positive across all the countries, although the magnitudes are different. The 
maximum impulse response was reached after 3 to 4 quarters in the U.S., U.K. and 
Germany, while the magnitude of impulse response in Japan is small. The interest rate 
increased by 0.4% to 0.5% in the U.S. and Germany, and increased around by 0.2% in 
the U.K., however, it increased by less than 0.1% in Japan, after a 1% increase in 
nominal GDP.  
 
 148Figure   5-22 Impulse response of Cholesky One S.D. nominal GDP innovation on 
interest rate   
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Overall we find that the impulse response of nominal GDP is positive to broad money 
shock and is negative to interest rate shock across all the countries, which implies that 
money supply has a positive effect on nominal GDP, and interest rate has a negative 
effect on nominal GDP. However, there is no constant pattern of money aggregate 
response to nominal GDP shock, which might signal only that nominal GDP could not 
be the monetary policy target. In the 4-variable VARs model, the price puzzle and 
liquidity puzzle still exist. In order to acquire more details on these variables’ 
interaction, we apply the variance decomposition.   
 
5.4.3.2  Variance decomposition in the entire sample  
In this section, we try to provide an outline of what percentage of shocks contributes to 
nominal GDP, price, money and the 3-month Treasury bill rate for the U.S., U.K., 
Germany and Japan.  
 
The table below shows that M2 and interest rate account for between 9% and 10% 
respectively of nominal GDP in the U.S., but money and the 3-month Treasury bill rate 
account for little of nominal GDP in the U.K. and Germany. In Japan, M2 contributes 
nearly 20% of nominal GDP, which implies that M2 is a very important factor for 
influencing nominal GDP, while the 3-month Treasury bill rate gives little explanation 
 149for nominal GDP in Japan. Overall, money has more explanatory power than interest 
rate for nominal GDP based on variance decomposition in four countries.  
 
Table   5-15 Variance decomposition for VAR model  
Variance Decomposition for VAR of Nominal GDP  
      U.S.  U. K   Germany Japan  
 
Period 
Nominal 
GDP              
2     96.43257  94.892  98.34189 98.28249
4     92.34622  89.45719 90.74785 94.28474
8     77.39462  82.83877 86.85351 75.22181
   CPI             
2     0.027745  4.885219 1.324961 0.120251
4     1.617766  10.15809 5.415622 0.415033
8     2.636892  16.53785 5.388302 4.450835
  
3-months 
Rate             
2     3.199173  0.021302 0.02484  0.039436
4     2.194131  0.07213  1.396041 0.054742
8     10.56956  0.209566 4.688412 0.476689
   Money             
2     0.340509  0.201477 0.308311 1.557822
4     3.841884  0.312586 2.440482 5.245481
8     9.398932  0.413811 3.069778 19.85066
 
5.4.3.3  Test of four-countries VARs model in subsamples  
The stability of parameters in estimated macroeconomic correlation has been examined 
in a quantity of recent papers. The most specific evidence was provided by Stock and 
Watson (1996). They suggested that there is widespread instability in the bivariate 
relationship among 76 macroeconomic variables. However, mixed outcomes have been 
obtained in the VAR context.
42 Given that the sample of the test covers a long period, 
and includes some monetary policy regime change periods, it is necessary to test the 
robustness of VAR results in the subsample. The sample is divided by using the same 
break date as used in the simple regression test in order to retain consistency.  
 
The study firstly focuses on the response of nominal GDP to money shock. It compares 
the impulse response for both longer and shorter sample periods. The trend of impulse 
                                                 
42 Bernanke, Gertler, and Watson (1997) find evidence of instability in a monetary VAR, while Bernanke 
and Mihov (1998) and Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (1999) reach the opposite conclusion.   
 
 150response over time is consistent, although the magnitude of impulse response is 
different. The nominal GDP positively responds to money aggregate shock in most 
periods. However, the only exception is in the later period in the U.K.  It is obvious that 
the magnitude of nominal GDP to money shock is larger in the early time period, and 
becomes smaller in the later period. This phenomenon may reflect the monetary policy 
regime change from money supply control to inflation-targeting in these countries. The 
results are robust, compared to before and after the subsample, but generally money 
aggregate shock has a positive effect on nominal GDP.  
 
Figure   5-23 The impulse response of nominal GDP to money shock before and after 
structural break, and in the entire sample in the U.S., U.K., Germany and Japan 
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 151The figures 5-24 draws the nominal GDP response to interest rate shock. From the 
figures, it is hard to find a consistent pattern of nominal GDP response to interest rate 
shock across all four countries. In the U.S. and Japan, nominal GDP negatively 
responds to interest rate shock, but in the U.K. and Germany there is no consistent 
pattern of impulse response.  
 
Figure   5-24 The impulse response of nominal GDP to interest rate shock, before and 
after structural break, in the entire sample in the U.S., U.K., Germany and Japan   
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 1525.4.3.4  Variance decomposition in subsamples  
The table5-16 explains the variance decomposition in the subsamples. It reveals that 
money aggregates account for a considerable part of nominal GDP in the early period in 
the U.S., Germany and Japan, but do not in the U.K. This might be because M4 is too 
broad to capture nominal GDP fluctuations in the early period. Money aggregates 
account for larger proportion of  nominal GDP more than short-term interest rate does 
in Germany and Japan in the early period sample. In the U.S., m2 also accounts for 
around 13% of nominal GDP in the early period. However, money aggregates only 
slightly account for nominal GDP in the later period in the U.S., Germany and Japan, 
but M4 increases the explanatory power in the U.K. in the later period. Short-term 
interest rate accounts for small part of nominal GDP in the U.K., Germany and Japan in 
the early period, and also has little power of explanation for nominal GDP in the U.S. 
Japan and Germany in the later period.   
 
As a result, the ability of money aggregates to explain nominal GDP decreases in the 
last twenty years, but the short-term interest rate has little power of explanation for 
nominal GDP over the last 30 years in Germany and Japan. Besides, more than 70% of 
nominal GDP contributed by itself in the later period, which implies that nominal GDP 
is an exogenous variable, or there are factors influencing nominal GDP that have not 
been included.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 153Table   5-16 Variance decomposition in subsamples 
 
Variance Decomposition for VAR of Nominal GDP in the early period  
      U.S.  U. K   Germany  Japan  
 
Period  Nominal GDP              
2     96.92693  93.3912  99.60571 97.15788 
4     81.75983  86.69764 71.20617 90.4912 
8     55.10798  78.4458  63.7428  73.51772 
   CPI             
2     0.581434  6.479237 0.001011 0.026085 
4     3.389923  12.83552 6.264823 1.33868 
8     4.360021  20.23704 7.615521 1.619476 
   3-months Rate             
2     0.047842  0.03991  0.016958 0.980162 
4     0.754642  0.313342 1.035181 0.843161 
8     27.29035  0.951662 3.741527 1.037623 
   Money             
2     2.443799  0.089653 0.37632  1.835875 
4     14.0956  0.1535  21.49382 7.326956 
8     13.24165  0.365496 24.90015 23.82519 
Variance Decomposition for VAR of Nominal GDP in the later period  
      U.S.  U,K   Germany  Japan  
 
Period  Nominal GDP              
2     96.31867  87.19396 95.57395 97.5895 
4     93.27536  64.6026  92.44209 88.18708 
8     90.79346  53.03749 88.11514 77.00417 
   CPI             
2     0.959263  1.136604 0.302267 0.888171 
4     4.700634  21.03883 3.33832  9.83327 
8     6.155095  22.5728  5.371977 20.13939 
   3-months Rate             
2     2.505689  10.12281 3.770507 0.479517 
4     1.810608  8.677039 3.551249 0.344386 
8     2.470227  14.99728 5.315964 0.68324 
   Money             
2     0.216376  1.54662  0.353274 1.042814 
4     0.213399  5.68153  0.668346 1.635268 
8     0.581217  9.39243  1.196914 2.1732 
 
 
 
 
 1545.5  Discussion and conclusion  
In this chapter, the study tests the possibility of using money aggregate to target 
nominal GDP by employing three approaches. The three approaches are designed to 
explore the strength and stability of predictive power of money aggregates for nominal 
GDP in the U.S., U.K., Germany and Japan. Additionally, the study intends to reveal 
the pattern of nominal GDP response to money aggregates and short-term interest rate 
shock with an attempt to provide the statistical evidence. The study firstly summarises 
the predictive power of money to nominal GDP according to the results of a simple 
regression, then outlines the Granger causality results between money aggregate and 
nominal GDP in four countries, and lastly discusses the results of VAR model with 4 
variables, which are nominal GDP, CPI annual growth rate, short-term interest rate, and 
money.  
   
The general conclusion is that money aggregate is a useful predictor of nominal GDP, 
even introducing the short-term interest rate does not decrease the predictive power for 
nominal GDP. The further Granger causality tests show that a unidirectional causality 
from money aggregate to nominal GDP exists in most of the countries in both entire 
sample and subsamples and the VAR model implies the positive response of nominal 
GDP to money aggregates shock, though the magnitude is different. The detailed 
conclusions will now be presented. 
 
The simple comparison of 
2
R  suggests that interest rate has little predictive power for 
nominal GDP comparing to money aggregate in the entire sample.  In the U.S., M2 has 
less predictive power in the later subsample, while the predictive power of the 3-month 
Treasury bill rate for nominal GDP increases in the later subsample. In the U.K., the 
predictive power of M4 for nominal GDP is stable, and the slight predictive power of 
interest rate to nominal GDP is also stable. In Germany, M3 is a sufficiently predictive 
power in both early and later subsamples, while short-term interest rate is not an 
important predictor of nominal GDP in both subsamples. In Japan, the predictive power 
of M2 for nominal GDP decreases in the later subsample and, similarly in other 
countries, interest rate does not have significant predictive power of nominal GDP. 
Overall, although money aggregate has more predictive power for nominal GDP than 
 155interest rate and price growth in all countries, the predictive link between money 
aggregate and nominal GDP is not stable in the U.S. and Japan.  
 
The simple Granger causality test shows that a unidirectional causality from money 
aggregates to nominal GDP occurs in most of the countries in the entire sample. 
Additionally, the early subsample test results suggest that money aggregate 
unidirectionally Granger causes nominal GDP in the U.K., Germany and Japan, with a 
two-way Granger causality between money and nominal GDP in the U.S. The results in 
the later subsample also show a unidirectional Granger cause from money to nominal 
GDP in the U.S., U.K. and Germany. However, there is no Granger cause link between 
M2 and nominal GDP in Japan.  A unidirectional Granger causality link indicates that 
money could provide future nominal GDP information better than conversely. Thus, 
according to the main Granger causality results in the entire sample and subsamples, it 
could be concluded that money aggregate is a possible variable to target nominal GDP.  
 
The impulse response evidence based on the simple VAR model tells us that the money 
aggregate has a positive effect on nominal GDP in the entire sample, although the 
magnitude of nominal GDP response to money aggregate shock differs. The most 
significant response is in Japan, where there is around a 0.7% increase of nominal GDP 
after 1% of money aggregate-tightening, although the impulse response is only 0.3% in 
the U.S. and Germany, and is not significant in the U.K. Comparing the impulse 
responses before and after the structural break in each country reveals that the 
magnitude of impulse response of nominal GDP to money aggregate shock is larger in 
the earlier period, and the impulse response is positive before and after the structural 
break.   
 
Nominal GDP response to interest rate shock is negative in the U.S., Germany and 
Japan, as is theoretically expected, but is positive in the U.K. for the first several 
quarters in the entire sample test. More importantly, the study finds that positive effect 
of interest rate innovation on nominal GDP after the break in each four countries. 
Therefore the pattern of nominal GDP response to interest rate shock is uncertain. In the 
subsample test, the VAR models also find no constant pattern of impulse response of 
nominal GDP to interest rate shock before and after the structural break in each country. 
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Thus, based on the impulse response, it is concluded that money aggregate might be a 
more appropriate variable to target nominal GDP than short-term interest rate.   
 
 In order to find out which factor influences nominal GDP the most, the study provides 
the variance decomposition results. The results suggest that money aggregates shock 
accounts for nominal GDP by a similar percentage as interest rate shock does in the 
U.S., U.K. and Germany, however, M2 accounts for nominal GDP more than interest 
rate does in Japan in the entire sample. In the earlier period, money aggregates 
innovation accounts for a notably larger amount of nominal GDP than interest rate does 
in Germany and Japan, but not in the U.S. and U.K. In the later period, money and 
interest rate shock all account for little nominal GDP except in the U.K., which implies 
the possibility that an unknown factor that influences nominal GDP is not included in 
the model.  The study will continue with the search for this factor in the next chapter.  
 
Generally, in line with the results of simple regression, Granger causality, and impulse 
response, money aggregate has more predictive power for nominal GDP than interest 
rate, although variance decomposition does not provide supporting evidence. On the 
other hand, variance decomposition implies that some factors that influence nominal 
GDP may not have been included. Looking to the next chapter, the research will shed 
some light on the link between GDP-circulation credit and nominal GDP.  
  158Appendix to chapter 5  
Appendix 5.A M3, nominal GDP, real GDP, CPI growth rate in the U.S.  
Figure A   5-1 U.S. Four-quarter growth of (a) M3 (red line) and nominal GDP (blue line) 
(b) M3 and real GDP, (c) M3 and CPI 1960:1- 2009:4 
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 159Figure A   5-2 U.K. Four-quarter growth of (a) M4(red line)  and nominal GDP(blue line) 
(b) M4 and real GDP, (c) M4 and CPI 1960:1- 2009:3 
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 160Appendix 5.B Chow breakpoint test  
Table B   5-1 Chow breakpoint test for structural break. (dependent variable: nominal 
GDP growth) 
Countries  Eq.  Regressor      Break  Chow Test  
           F-Statistic    P-Value 
U.S. 1  M2       12.021***  0.00 
 2  M2  PGR  R-90  1979:03  4.996***  0.00 
U.K. 1  M4        31.38534  0.00 
 2  M4  PGR  R-90  1992:04  13.28969  0.00 
Germany 1  M3        14.987  0.00 
 2  M3  PGR  R-90  1990:03  10.35286  0.00 
Japan 1 M2        22.22657  0.00 
 2  M2  PGR  R-90  1990:04  16.21684  0.00 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  161Appendix 5.C Unit root test for money aggregates 
Table C   5-1Unit Root results of money aggregates  
Countries 
Time 
period  ZA   ADF     PP    
         t-Statistic 
  
Prob.* Adj.  t-Stat 
  
Prob.* 
U.S. 
1960Q1-
2008Q4 
-4.96843 at 
1987:02 
 
-0.974 
 
0.294 -3.034  0.033 
U.K. 
1960Q1-
2008Q3 
-3.33761 at 
1986:04 -2.14736  0.2266 -2.58878 0.0972 
Germany 
1961Q1-
2008Q4 
 -5.88322 at 
1996:01 -1.84396  0.0622 -3.04215 0.0025 
Japan 
1960Q1-
2008Q4 
-3.44116 at 
1971:01 -1.7292  0.0794 -1.63519 0.0962 
 
Model C Critical values at the 1%, 5% and 10% level are -5.57,-5.08 and -4.82, respectively (Zivot and 
Andrews, 1992) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  162Appendix 5.D Cointegration test 
Table D   5-1Cointegration test in the entire sample  
Null Hypothesis: has a unit root 
nominal GDP and 
money 
Countries Fullbreak  trend  constant 
US   -3.96619 at 1993:03   -3.76942 at 1993:03   -3.57738 at 1993:03 
U.K.   -2.95812 at 2005:02  -3.22684 at 1976:02  -3.22684 at 1976:02 
Canada -2.54702  at  1987:04  -3.49091 at 1990:02  -2.61261 at 1998:03 
Germany  -3.80015 at 1967:02   -4.70272 at 1990:04   -4.27585 at 2001:04  
Japan   -2.95991 at 1989:04   -3.49252 at 2000:03   -2.95287 at 2000:02 
 
Table D   5-2Cointegration test in the subsamples  
Null Hypothesis: has a unit root   
nominal GDP and  
money 
Countries Time  period  Fullbreak  trend  constant 
US 
1960Q1-
1979Q3 
 -4.23096 at 
1976:02 
 -3.65618 at 
1973:02   -3.52 at 1969:04 
U.K. 
1960Q1-
1992Q3 
 -3.05342 at 
1979:01 
 -3.30126 at 
1979:01 
 -2.99713  at 
1978:01 
Germany 
1960Q1-
1990Q3 
 -3.10258 at 
1990:03 
 -4.68613 at 
1982:01 
 -3.10258  at 
1990:03 
Japan 
1960Q1-
1990Q4 
 -3.96081 at 
1981:04 
 -3.10317 at 
1975:04 
 -3.96081  at 
1981:04 
 
Null Hypothesis: has a unit root   
nominal GDP and 
money 
Countries Time  period  Fullbreak  trend  constant 
US 
1979Q4 -
2008Q4 
 -2.98732 at 
1993:03 
 -2.53059 at 
2002:03 
 -2.93559  at 
1993:03 
U.K. 
1992Q4-
2008Q4 
 -2.95812 at 
2005:02 
 -3.02914 at 
2003:03 
 -1.47890  at 
2006:03 
Germany 
1990Q4-
2008Q4 
 -5.41218 at 
1995:02  
 -5.02264 at 
1996:02 
 -5.03975  at 
1995:02 
Japan 
1991Q1-
2008Q4 
 -3.34158 at 
2000:02 
 -5.12623 at 
1996:04 
  - 3.35039 at 
2000:04 
Critical Values are 1% -5.47 and 5% -4.95 (fullbreak), Critical Values are 1% -5.45 and 
5% -4.99(trend) Critical Values are 1% -5.13 and 5% -4.61(constant) 
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Appendix 5.E Granger causality test  
Table E   5-1 Granger Causality Test  
Countries   Real GDP does not GC money    
money does not GC Real 
GDP    
   F-statistic  P-value  F-statistic  P-value 
U.S. 3.582688  0.0022  1.885695  0.0856 
U.K. 0.963312  0.4903  1.180904  0.299 
Germany   1.603464  0.1613  1.298269  0.2666 
Japan   1.853372  0.0552  3.133932  0.0011 
Countries   inflation does not GC  money    
  money does not GC 
inflation    
   F-statistic  P-value  F-statistic  P-value 
U.S. 2.64029  0.01783  1.08817  0.37137 
U.K. 2.01425  0.0565  2.69954  0.0114 
Germany   2.88476  0.0009  1.33232  0.1999 
Japan   1.14  0.33  3.49661  9.00E-05 
Countries 
3-month Treasury bill rate does 
not GC  money    
money does not GC 3-month 
Treasury bill rate    
   F-statistic  P-value  F-statistic  P-value 
U.S. 7.7367  2.20E-07 1.09523  0.36715 
U.K. 1.09708  0.3676  2.00764  0.0573 
Germany   0.70168  0.6486  0.323  0.9243 
Japan   2.07032  0.02  1.16564  0.3118 
 
 
 
 
 
 Appendix 5.F Impulse response results 
Table F   5-1Impulse response of nominal GDP to money shock in 4- variable VAR 
model 
 
Period U.S.  U.K.    Germany  Japan 
1 0 0  0  0 
2 0.079468  -0.095764  0.088759  0.216709 
3 0.186092  -0.14099  0.017604  0.349144 
4 0.310924  -0.011498  0.294435  0.338279 
5 0.340041  -0.024686  0.136264  0.449437 
6 0.280516  0.073412  0.093748  0.49427 
7 0.259085  0.117347  0.148035  0.61475 
8 0.18536  -0.004392  -0.02652  0.739839 
9 0.130144  0.056172  -0.011324  0.829828 
10 0.149996  0.055382  0.009148  0.844914 
11 0.093975  0.0794119  -0.084805  0.795789 
12 0.083283  0.21766  -0.0036619 0.719609 
 
 
Table F   5-2Accumulated impulse response of nominal GDP to money shock in 4- 
variable VAR model  
 
Period U.S.  U.K.  Germany  Japan 
1 0 0  0  0 
2 0.079468  -0.0932570  0.091063  0.202157 
3 0.265559  -0.229248  0.126794  0.532096 
4 0.576483  -0.237748  0.438588  0.856156 
5 0.916524  -0.261336  0.601076  1.268712 
6 1.19704  -0.179619  0.707534  1.769322 
7 1.456125  -0.058766  0.873816  2.360327 
8 1.641485  -0.060511  0.877681  3.045847000 
9 1.771628  -0.00404  0.897979  3.802835 
10 1.921624  0.039048  0.947845  4.525177 
11 2.015599  0.105677  0.893526  5.19346 
12 2.098882  0.306363  0.910857  5.781953 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  165Table F   5-3Impulse response of price to money shock in 4- variable VAR model 
 
Period U.S.  U.K.  Germany  Japan 
1 0 0 0 0 
2 0.07083  -0.3078  0.069645  0.100686 
3 0.053076  -0.181441  0.086455  -0.025573 
4 0.12764  -0.040947  0.111638  0.010333 
5  0.223451 0.068374 0.207581 -0.127497 
6  0.120196 0.203998 0.268101 -0.013404 
7 0.160012  0.13876  0.230592  0.346418 
8  0.128613 0.213982 0.152626 0.422067 
9  0.02223  0.366907 0.023628 0.637006 
10 0.121157  0.483583  -0.09196  0.641931 
11 0.059006  0.586483  -0.074035  0.3565 
12 0.0060010  0.499944  -0.036408  0.275729 
 
 
 
Table F   5-4Impulse response of nominal GDP to interest rate shock in 4- variable VAR 
model 
 
Period U.S.  U.K.  Germany  Japan 
1 0 0 0 0 
2 0.243582  0.031138  -0.025194  -0.03448 
3 0.106311  0.063921  -0.159089  -0.037839 
4 -0.089225  0.040966  -0.168317  -0.018326 
5 -0.223606  0.014266  -0.236525  -0.099505 
6 -0.355405  0.117321  -0.116225  0.086509 
7 -0.357066  0.052663  -0.167631  -0.024547 
8 -0.324032  0.036399  -0.263452  -0.137098 
9 -0.346119  0.006163  -0.275107  -0.203548 
10 -0.316635  -0.167733  -0.3556  -0.409491 
11 -0.294475  -0.173613  -0.26098  -0.436073 
12  -0.274943 -0.226462 -0.182853 -0.460405 
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Table F   5-5 Impulse response of price to interest rate shock in 4- variable VAR model  
 
Period U.S.  U.K.  Germany  Japan 
1 0 0 0 0 
2  0.224465 0.433552 0.034173 0.004747 
3  0.334564 0.652037 0.165876 0.059863 
4  0.354852 0.841704 0.195356 0.429938 
5  0.371428 0.811901 0.188725 0.291305 
6  0.176942 0.597317 0.117734 0.232877 
7 0.049598  0.514092  -0.009922  0.210668 
8 -0.02598  0.286386  -0.052549  -0.311068 
9 -0.197894  0.114561  -0.073186  -0.441189 
10  -0.236143 -0.120168 -0.036524 -0.565007 
11 -0.270249  -0.480568  0.009712  -0.773329 
12 -0.318809  -0.58018  -0.003108  -0.5322 
 
 
Table F   5-6 Impulse response of money to interest rate shock in 4- variable VAR model  
 
Period U.S.  U.K.  Germany  Japan 
1 -0.169445  0.09085  -0.216324  0.16102 
2 -0.454497  0.113599  -0.215064  0.175067 
3  -0.544479 -0.003976 -0.262418 0.085497 
4  -0.522846 -0.197946 -0.090165 -0.066083 
5 -0.37319  -0.258224  0.096708  -0.229932 
6 -0.249201  -0.142699  0.025548  -0.377394 
7  -0.277273 -0.086965 -0.001804 -0.440527 
8 -0.234002  0.024403  -0.179514  -0.437156 
9  -0.178992 -0.013739 -0.283543 -0.416066 
10  -0.067367 -0.103973 -0.223627 -0.327873 
11  0.10301  -0.036360 -0.186603 -0.232444 
12 0.144047  -0.04494  -0.049409  -0.135765 
 
 
Note: The time period is 1960Q1-2008Q4 in the U.S., U.K., and Japan, and 1970Q1-
2008Q4 in Germany  
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6  Empirical evidence on the relationship between credit and nominal GDP in the 
U.S., U.K., Germany and Japan from 1960s to 2008 
 
Abstract: Over the past twenty years a considerable amount of literature has focused on 
the interest rate or money aggregate as the monetary policy instruments.(Friedman and 
Schwartz,1963;  Friedman, 1970;  Bernanke and Blinder, 1988;  McCALLUM, 1988; 
Bernanke and Blinder, 1992; Henderson and McKibbin, 1993; Taylor, 1993, 1995,1998; 
Bernanke and Gertler, 1995; Bernanke et al., 2001; Friedman, 2000; Friedman, 2005) 
However, there is a need to explore the topic from the credit viewpoint. The central 
banks have paid much closer attention to credit variables since the 2007/08 financial 
crisis, as the crisis made the central banks realize the limitations of using interest rate as 
the monetary policy instrument.  In this chapter, the central hypothesis to be examined 
is that the GDP-circulation credit
43 could be a variable in targeting nominal GDP. The 
credit can be disaggregated to real GDP effective transactions and to financial 
speculation transactions that were first proposed by Werner (1993, 1994, 2003, and 
2005). In order to test the hypothesis, the empirical test employs the general-to-specific 
(GETS) model, the “causality” test and the VAR model. Though the results obtained 
from different econometric models are not entirely consistent, the role of credit variable 
in the effect on nominal GDP should be reconsidered, because the positive evidence of 
using GDP-circulation credit to target nominal GDP is found in the GETS model, the 
“causality” test and VAR model.  
 
6.1  Introduction  
In the last twenty years, the widely accepted argument has been that a low inflation 
level benefits economic growth and the models often simply assume that the impact on 
the economic conditions could be reflected by fluctuations in interest rate. (Svensson 
1997, 1999, 2000, 2002; Bernanke and Mishkin, 1997, Bernanke et al., 2001) Therefore, 
the central banks’ monetary policy has turned to target inflation via changes in short-
                                                 
43 Richard. A .Werner (1991, 1993, 2003, 2004, and 2005) has defined the concept of the GDP-circulation 
credit as the credit used for the real economic activities, but not for the financial speculations.   
  169term interest rates. Despite the generalised use of short-term interest rates, the 
interaction with the real economy is becoming increasingly complex, especially with the 
advent of several serious financial crises which have hit the economy since the 1990s. 
After experiencing the financial crisis of 2007/08, the central banks have realised that 
the financial market has become more and more complex, and have acknowledged the 
limitations of using the interest rate as the sole instrument in affecting the flow of credit.  
 
During the crisis of 2007/08, the fears of a lack of liquidity swamped the financial 
markets after Lehman Brothers went bankrupt in the summer of 2008; this suddenly 
caused the financial credit markets to freeze, with the central banks across the world 
reducing their short-term interest rates. Even with this stimulus, bank lending is 
continuing to fall because financial institutions are unwilling to lend to consumers or 
other institutions, and the criteria of credit standard has tightened.
44 To combat the 
situation, the central banks have had to inject billions of credit into the markets.
45 In 
fact, the policy-makers take into account a wide range of information on conditions in 
financial markets to monitor and attempt to respond to various sorts of financial 
development. The policy-makers no longer only watch the interest rate in the market, 
but also look at the credit conditions in the market. 
46 
                                                 
44 “The total dollar amount of new loans declined in three of the four months the government has reported 
this data. Just three of the 19 largest TARP (Troubled Asset Relief Program) banks increased lending 
from October to February and the total dollar amount of new loans declined in three of the four months.” 
Source: “Bank Lending Keeps Dropping” April 20, 2009 WSJ
   
Total lending by banks and building societies fell by £2.5 billion ($3.91 billion), a smaller drop than the 
£3.2 billion decline recorded the previous month, BOE  monthly report, Trends in Lending September 20  
2010. 
45 The Troubled Asset Relief Program, commonly referred to as TARP or RCP, is a program of the 
United States government to purchase assets and equity from financial institutions to strengthen its 
financial sector which was signed into law by U.S. President George W. Bush on October 3, 2008. TARP 
allows the United States Department of the Treasury to purchase or insure up to $700 Billion of "troubled 
assets", in which the $250 billion was used to purchase the assets and then either sell them or hold the 
assets and collect the ‘coupons’. The initial $250 billion can be increased to $350 billion upon the 
President’s certification to Congress that such an increase is necessary. The remaining $350 billion may 
be released to the Treasury upon a written report to Congress from the Treasury with details of its plan for 
the money. Summary of the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 United States Senate 
Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs. (Retrieved October 2, 2008) 
“To promote a stronger pace of economic recovery and to help ensure that inflation, over time, is at levels 
consistent with its mandate, the Committee decided today to expand its holdings of securities. The 
Committee will maintain its existing policy of reinvesting principal payments from its securities holdings. 
In addition, the Committee intends to purchase a further $600 billion of longer-term Treasury securities 
by the end of the second quarter of 2011, a pace of about $75 billion per month.” FOMC Statement 
November 3
rd 2010 
46 The Bank of England (BOE) started to publish the trends in lending since April 2009 and the Federal 
Reserve also took the step of publishing the monthly Report on Credit and Liquidity Programs 
and the Balance Sheet after the crisis happened in the summer of 2007  
 
  170 
Moreover, the approach of using monetary aggregates as the monetary policy 
instrument variables has not been popular in the developed countries in the last twenty 
years because of the instability of the money aggregate function and the continuing 
decline in the velocity of money aggregate. Therefore, the weakness of interest rate or 
money aggregate as the instrument variables to target the real economy stimulates the 
research to seek a new monetary policy instrument variable.  
 
In chapters 4 and 5, the research also finds that the fluctuations of short-term interest 
rate tend to follow the trend of nominal GDP rather than leading the change of nominal 
GDP, so the short-term interest rate is not an appropriate indictor for nominal GDP. 
Furthermore, the short-term interest rate has less predictive power than money 
aggregates to target nominal GDP. However, chapter 5 indicates there is a factor that 
might influence nominal GDP, but it is not included in the model. As a result, the 
interest in using credit variables to target nominal GDP is raised after discussing these 
weaknesses of traditional approaches, based on interest rates and money aggregates.  
 
According to Fry (1998), the central banks in the developing economies try to control 
domestic credit expansion to monitor economic growth. This differs from developed 
economies, where the central banks tend to use indirect ways, such as the interest rate. 
There is a long tradition of using direct controls on the supply of credit in the 
developing countries, and not only in special cases. An example would be the setting of 
credit supply targets in China. The fact that the continuing high economic growth is 
accompanied by the growth in credit supply from central banks in the rapid expansion 
stage of the economy throws up the question of whether credit has a direct effect on 
economic growth. If the answer to this question is yes, then it is necessary to ask 
whether it is possible to use the credit supply as the monetary policy intermediate target.   
 
In previous research, this issue has been addressed in theoretical terms in the credit 
channels. Two credit channels have been identified: a balance sheet channel and a bank 
lending channel. The first one has suggested that lending is linked to observable 
features of the financial health of the borrowing firms, while the second one identifies 
the lending flow as originating from within the banking system. Although the credit 
view attempts to provide a macroeconomic framework that credit affects the economy 
  171through the credit channels, the operation of credit channels also incorporates the 
interest rate to achieve the effect on the economy.  
 
A substantial part of the credit view focuses on the credit rationing argument. Stiglitz 
and Weiss (1981) have proposed the concept of credit rationing. They showed that 
credit markets will be rationed as long as information is asymmetric between borrowers 
and lenders. Because the credit rationing argument emphasises the microeconomic 
foundation, it is difficult to explain the link between credit and the macroeconomic 
condition solely through the finding in itself. As Werner (2005) argued the credit 
rationing argument does not explain why other sources of funding can not be a 
substitute for bank credit.    
 
Monetary policy analysis has a long tradition of using macroeconomic models to 
perform the quantitative analysis. Later, modern macroeconomists built up models that 
included the microeconomic assumptions concerning the consumers, firms, and policy-
makers. The DSGE (Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium) model is one of these. 
The DSGE model specifies particular assumptions, and attempts to explain the 
aggregate economic conditions, such as economic growth, the effect of monetary policy 
and fiscal policy. The general DSGE model considers the behaviour of householders, 
firms and the monetary authority, and assumes a general equilibrium between these 
parties. In the traditional DSGE model, there are no banks and no financial institutions.  
Recently, a few studies have started to focus on the role of banking in the DSGE 
model(Atta-Mensah and Dib, 2008, Gerali et al., 2008, Gerali et al.).  In addition, they 
found that credit accounts for substantial fractions of output in the short term and 
medium term.  
 
It has been the trend to emphasize the role of credit and financial intermediation for 
macroeconomic fluctuations and monetary policy transmission over the past two 
years(Goodfriend and McCallum, 2007, Cúrdia and Woodford, 2009, Mishkin, 2010). 
In particular, the development of the literature of non-price aspects of credit restriction 
has contributed to policy strategy in the economic downturns(Bernanke, 1983). After 
the financial crisis, the researchers have especially recognized that the available flow of 
credit between financial intermediates and business sectors and households could put 
extraordinary restrictions on spending. However, the core macroeconomic models used 
  172in most central banks around the world only have a constricted role for the balance sheet 
of the financial intermediation. The various studies have considered the effect of asset 
price movements, but credit supplies were not well-captured in the models (Mishkin, 
2010). It was even suggested in the literature review of monetary transmission that 
credit did not play an important role in the models that central banks used or in the 
academic research. (Kohn, 2009) 
 
“It is fair to say, however, that the core macroeconomic modelling 
framework used at the Federal Reserve and other central banks around the 
world has included, at best, only a limited role for the balance sheets of 
households and firms, credit provision, and financial intermediation. The 
features suggested by the literature on the role of credit in the transmission 
of policy have not yet become prominent ingredients in models used at 
central banks or in much academic research.” (Kohn, 2009)  
 
However, there are encouraging signs in that a large number of recent studies have 
added credit creation and banking sectors to the conventional monetary policy models 
because of a burgeoning realization that the supply constraints on credit provision 
significantly affect spending(Goodfriend and McCallum, 2007, Canzoneri et al., 2008, 
Christiano et al., 2010).  
 
Johnson (2010)  argued that the Fed was failing to seize the opportunities to reform the 
financial system, and thought the central banks had not solved the issue of  “too big to 
fail”- the notion that big banks will be bailed out if their failure represents a systemic 
risk. However, the differing opinions on the bailout of the banking sectors indicate the 
importance of the banking sectors in the economy. The importance of banking in the 
economy causes the central banks to fear allowing the banks to go bankrupt, and credit 
creation is a unique feature of the banking sectors. Thus, the financial crisis of 20007/08 
pointed out the obvious significance of the credit supply.  
 
Although there is a trend toward considering the banking sectors in the models used by 
the central banks, it is fair to say that this is only supplementary to the current economic 
models. In order to understand the prominent role of credit creation by the banking 
sectors, a more powerful model may be required in order to explain the role of credit.  
  173Werner (1992, 1997, and 2005) shows that Japanese nominal GDP growth in the 1970s, 
1980s and 1990s can be explained by a credit disaggregated model that was derived 
from the quantity equation and empirically supported by a downward reduction of a 
general model including alternative explanations (M2, interest rates). In his framework, 
the GDP-circulation credit could be the variable to target, in order to achieve a 
particular nominal GDP.  A few studies have explored the disaggregation of credit. 
Gertler and Gilchrist (1993, 1994) distinguished between loans to small and large firms; 
Kashyap and Stein (1995, 2000) considered the lending from small banks and large 
banks separately. However, their intention was to find evidence to support the credit 
channels. Werner’s GDP-circulation credit model (1997, 2005) differed from the 
previous ones in that he used a new way to disaggregate the credit, and he also used this 
new GDP-circulation credit to target nominal GDP.  
 
Our research follows the approach that Werner (2005) took in disaggregating the credit, 
and attempts to ascertain whether Werner’s empirical findings (1992, 1997, 2005), that 
GDP-circulation credit is an appropriate variable to target nominal GDP in Japan, could 
be generalised to other industrial countries. In Werner’s model, the credit flow from the 
banking system would be disaggregated to distinguish between the credit linked to real 
GDP-effective transaction and the flow to the financial market for speculation.  The 
loans to the asset market in each country, as part of the credit flow into the financial 
markets, are intended for speculation, which does not directly link to the real economy. 
However, the credit flow into the real economy does affect real GDP (Werner 1997, 
2003, 2005). Based on this theory, credit for transactions that contribute to GDP might 
be more correlated to economic growth than total credit.     
 
This empirical research enriches the studies on targeting nominal income, and intends to 
provide empirical evidence for the arguments that nominal GDP is a considerable 
targeting rule. Meanwhile, it also presents a new angle to consider the role of GDP-
circulation credit, and expands the literature on the importance of credit in economic 
activities. Nowadays in particular, the credit aggregates or GDP-circulation credit data 
are seriously examined by central banks all over the world; thus this research will be 
useful for monetary policy-making.   
 
  174Before proceeding to the literature review, it is first necessary to briefly summarise the 
trend of central banks beginning to focus on the credit data after the 2007/08 financial 
crisis.  
 
The trend towards publishing more credit information after the 2007/08 financial 
credit crisis  
As part of its mission to maintain monetary and financial stability, the Bank of England 
realised the need to understand trends and developments in credit conditions. Thus, 
Bank of England monthly publications, established by the Bank of England in late 2008, 
present the Bank's assessment of the latest trends in lending to the U.K. economy.
47 The 
trend in lending provides more timely data covering aspects of lending to the UK 
corporate and household sectors; for the purposes of analysis, the lending data are 
divided into lending to UK businesses, consumer credit and mortgage lending. 
Therefore, the lending to businesses, consumer credit and mortgage lending are 
important financial variables that the Bank of England now emphasises more than 
before.  
 
It is not a coincidence that the Federal Reserve has also begun publishing a monthly 
report on “Credit and Liquidity Programs and the Balance Sheet” since the 2008 
financial crisis. The Federal Reserve clearly pointed out that the preparation of this 
report is part of its efforts to strengthen transparency about the range of programs faced 
and tools that have been utilised in response to the financial crisis and to ensure proper 
accountability to Congress and the public. Most of the programs during the financial 
crisis are credit arrangement, 
48 thus the importance of the credit effect on economic 
conditions cannot be ignored.  
                                                 
47  The Bank of England started to publish “the trends of lending” since the later 2008.  This report 
presents the Bank's assessment of the latest trends in lending to the UK economy and draws mainly on 
long-established official data sources, such as the existing monetary and financial statistics collected by 
the Bank of England. Source: Bank of England. 
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/other/monetary/trendsinlending.htm 
48 The Federal Reserve responded aggressively to the financial crisis that emerged in the summer of 
2007. The tools described in this section can be divided into three groups. The first set of tools, which are 
closely tied to the central bank's traditional role as the lender of last resort, involve the provision of short-
term liquidity to banks and other depository institutions and other financial institutions. A second set of 
tools involve the provision of liquidity directly to borrowers and investors in key credit markets. The 
CPFF, AMLF, MMIFF, and the Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility (TALF) fall into this 
category. All of the programs are described in detail elsewhere on this website. As a third set of 
instruments, the Federal Reserve has expanded its traditional tool of open market operations to support 
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Euro area. The survey addresses issues such as credit standards for approving loans as 
well as credit terms and conditions applied to enterprises and households. It also asks 
for an assessment of the conditions affecting credit demand.  The purpose of the survey 
is to help the Governing Council of the European Central Bank (ECB) to assess 
monetary and economic developments as an input into monetary policy decisions. 
49Credit information has already become a matter of key concern to central banks, 
although it has been highlighted as much as interest rate over the past twenty years. 
However, changes have been more noticeable since the 2007/08 financial crisis, and a 
greater emphasis has been put on credit information by central banks. 
  
6.2  Literature review on the relationship between credit and economic 
conditions  
In this part, the main area of study to be reviewed concerns the link between credit and 
economy. Kohn (2009) suggested the research on the credit channel in the financial 
sector consider the role of asset price in the monetary policy transmission, because in 
neoclassical models, asset price will effect the investment and spending decisions by 
wealth effects. However, these models fail to capture the interactions among asset price, 
credit, and economic condition, which has been the important feature in the current 
economic situation. The research briefly reassesses some theories on credit, such as 
credit rationing and the DSGE model heavily used in this area. However, it starts by 
investigating the credit channels.  
 
6.2.1  The credit channel  
After the failure of monetarism, researchers began to realise that the traditional 
monetary view has some impractical assumptions and cannot completely explain the 
real economy. According to Bernanke (1993, 1995), the traditional monetary view is too 
narrow to capture all the responses of the real economy to monetary policy change.  
Additionally, the timing of the real economy does not respond very well to interest rate 
                                                                                                                                               
the functioning of credit markets through the purchase of longer-term securities for the Federal Reserve's 
portfolio. Source: The Federal Reserve's response to the crisis.  
http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/bst_crisisresponse.htm 
49 Source: Bank of European available: http://www.ecb.int/stats/money/surveys/lend/html/index.en.html  
  176shock. As a result, the credit channel provides an alternative monetary policy 
transmission channel based on the assumption of imperfect information in the financial 
markets. In the credit channel view, the monetary policy could influence not only the 
money price-interest rate, but also money volume-credit; thus, the aggregate demand of 
loans would be affected.  
 
According to Bernanke (1993), there are three merits in understanding the existence of 
the credit channel of money transmission mechanism. First, it is the channel that could 
improve the measurement of magnitude and timing of the monetary policy’s impact on 
the real economy. Second, credit could be the variable that is useful to indicate a 
monetary policy, especially in extreme financial circumstances, such as a credit crisis. 
Lastly, it could be helpful in assessing whether banks are crucial in the modern financial 
markets.  
 
The simplest empirical implication of the bank-centric credit view is to find the closely 
correlated link between bank loan and economic output. This view argues that 
constraint of real quantity on lending would affect investment and, hence, the real 
economy. Bernanke (1992) pointed out a strong correlation between loans and 
unemployment, GNP and other key macroeconomic indicators. However, empirical 
studies set out to find more complicated links between bank loan and the real economic 
output. Bernanke and Gertler (1995) and Gertler and Gilchrist (1993) proposed the 
concept of the external finance premium (EFP). The EFP acts as a difference between 
the opportunity cost of internal funds and the cost of external funds. The size of the EFP 
reflects two aspects: the asymmetric information in the credit market and a borrower’s 
net worth relative to the size of the loan. Thus, there are two forms of credit channel, 
namely the banking lending channel (the narrow credit channel) and the balance sheet 
channel (the broad credit channel).  There is also a third channel called the bank capital 
channel, which emphasises the banks’ capital. This feature of credit channel is ignored 
by the previous two channels. (Thakor 1996; Furfine 2000; Van den Heuvel 2002, 2006, 
2007; Sunirand 2003; Gambacorta and Mistrulli, 2004; Engler 2005)  
 
  1776.2.1.1  The banking lending channel 
The banking lending channel, also referred to as the narrow credit channel, relies on 
credit market frictions. The original concept of bank lending goes back to Roosa (1951) 
and became the centre of academic interest in Bernanke and Blinder’s (1988) influential 
paper. The fundamental insight to be gained from the bank lending channel is that 
monetary authorities could influence the volume of bank loans in the market through the 
requirement of reserveable demand deposits; furthermore, a decline in loan supply 
would decrease the aggregate spending. These statements have three assumptions. First, 
monetary authorities should be able to affect the bank reserve and hence the supply of 
bank loans in the financial market through open-market operations or other monetary 
instruments. Second, the banks might not easily find substitutes to replace the loss of 
deposits, and should not be able to offset the influence from monetary authorities. Third, 
there should not be perfect substitutes for bank loans for a significant subset of 
borrowers.  A considerable number of borrowers heavily rely on bank loans, and 
therefore a reduction in the bank supply would depress aggregate spending. These 
assumptions clearly depend on the regulation in markets and the structure of the 
financial systems (Fernando Barran 1996).    
 
Bernanke, Kashyap and Stein are the major contributors to the bank lending channel 
research. Their work has provided support, through empirical evidence, for the bank 
lending channel. Bernanke and Blinder (1992) have used Granger Causality tests and a 
vector autoregressions approach to find a strong correlation between real output and 
short-term interest rate. They explained this empirical evidence as support for the 
effectiveness of monetary policy and demonstrated that monetary policy is effective 
through the credit channel. McMillan (1996) also researched the credit channel in the 
U.S. for the period 1973-1994, and found results that are consistent with the Bernanke-
Blinder model.   
 
Kashyap, Stein and Wilcox (1993) found evidence for the effectiveness of credit on real 
output after proving that the tightening of monetary policy leads to a change in a firm’s 
external financing. For example, a bank loan fall would lead to a commercial paper 
issuance increase, which suggests that a contractionary policy could reduce the loan 
supply; additionally, the shift in loan supply would influence investment, even 
controlling interest rates and output. Barran, Coudert, and Mojon (1996) suggested that 
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found evidence to confirm this correlation in Sweden. Further to this, Van Ees et al. 
(1999) found that the loan supply was largely influenced when an amount restriction 
was withdrawn in the Netherlands by testing the shift of banks’ balance sheets to 
monetary policy shock for the period 1957-1991.  
 
Lown and Morgan (2000) provided a different angle to test the credit channel, which is 
to examine the change of bank lending standards to monetary policy shock. They used 
the vector autoregressions (VARs) approach to find that lending standards has 
predictive power for both loan supply and real output. This empirical evidence strongly 
supported the view that that the shock to bank lending is important; however, it could be 
concluded that the bank lending channel is a central channel of monetary policy 
transmission.    
 
Because the bank lending channel implies that effects would be different across firms or 
industries, some studies put an emphasis on whether the bank size affects the operation 
of the credit channel. Most of these studies confirm that the different size of banks or 
different bank types has a direct effect on the operation of the credit channel. Kashyap 
and Stein (1997) studied the balance sheet data from U.S. banks for the period 1976-
1993. They found that monetary policy had a more significant effect on banks which 
had a less liquid balance sheet. De Bondt (1999) used data from bank balance sheets for 
the period 1990-1998 to explore whether banks with high liquidity or low liquidity 
responded to monetary policy differently. The findings suggested that the empirical 
evidence supports the fact that banking lending channels exist across Europe, but not in 
the United Kingdom.  
 
Kishan and Opiela (2000) grouped the banks according to asset size and capital leverage 
ratio, and tested the bank loan change after monetary policy shock in the U.S. during 
1980-1995. They concluded that small banks respond to policy shock more significantly 
than the rest, but that there is not much difference over different capitalization ratios.  
 
Altunbas et al. (2002) used data on bank balance sheets to assess the response of banks 
of different asset size and capital strength to the change in monetary policy. Their 
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supports the notion that a bank lending channel is in operation.   
 
Ford et al. (2003) examined whether the response to monetary policy shock was 
different across firm size and bank size in Japan for the period 1965-1995. They found 
evidence to support the presence of a bank lending channel in Japan until the end of 
1984, but no evidence to confirm that after 1985.  
 
De Haan (2003) also found similar results on the bank lending channel in the 
Netherlands, with more significant effects for small, less capitalized and less liquid 
banks and more loan contractions to businesses than to home owners.  
 
Gambacorta and Mistrulli (2004), using data from Italian banks, established that 
capitalization does matter to the response of lending to shocks, which supports the 
existence of banking lending channels.  These findings provide the credibility of bank 
lending channels in the monetary transmission mechanism.  
 
Empirical evidence does not always support the existence of credit channels. Fuerst 
(1995) and Fisher (1996) found that real effect through credit channels is very small in 
the United States. Favero (1999) used data from balance sheets in France, Germany, 
Italy and Spain, but did not find any evidence to support the existence of credit channels 
during the episode of tightening monetary policy in 1992 for these four countries. Yuan 
and Zimmermann (1999) found an insignificant importance of monetary policy in a 
credit crunch model in Canada, but they suggested that loan regulation had important 
real effects. Kakes et al. (2001) differentiate between company loans and household 
lending in Germany, and found that banks respond to a monetary tightening by 
changing their securities holdings rather than reducing the loans portfolio, thus 
weakening the shock of monetary policy.  
 
6.2.1.2  The balance sheet channel  
The central notion of the balance sheet channel is that monetary policy affects the 
aggregate demand by influencing borrowers’ balance sheets. An increase in the interest 
rate would lead to a fall of asset prices, which decreases the value of a borrower’s 
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therefore resulting in a decrease in investment and hence a shrinkage of the real 
economy.  
 
Asset value plays an important part in the balance sheet channel. In the frictionless 
credit market, the investment decision would not be affected by the fall in value of a 
borrowers’ collateral; however, in the presence of agency costs and information 
asymmetry, deduction of collateral value would raise the external finance premium, 
which in turn shrinks investment and consumption. Thus the effect of the interest rate 
on the real economy may be exaggerated through the balance sheet channel. 
 
Gertler and Gilchrist (1993) found that monetary policy has a large effect on small firms 
which have little access to external funding, because small firms have more bankruptcy 
costs and comparatively small net worth. They also discovered that, after monetary 
policy tightening, bank lending to large firms rises, whilst lending to small firms 
declines. Bernanke and Gertler (1995) applied coverage ratio to the estimation of 
borrowers’ financial position, and showed a relatively close correlation between 
coverage ratio and federal fund rate, which pointed out the strong link between 
monetary policy and the financial position of firms.  
 
The banking lending channel and the balance sheet channel are actually the additional 
channels to the interest rates channel, because of the effect of credit through the interest 
rate in influencing the total demand. Therefore, interest rate as monetary policy should 
have a greater effect once the researchers recognize credit channels, but empirically this 
is not supported. In chapters 4 and 5, the study did not find any obvious empirical 
evidence to support the predictive power of interest rate to nominal GDP. Thus, the 
puzzle increases.  
 
In the disequilibrium economics view, the interest rate-money price, which is proposed 
as being capable of clearing the financial market in an equilibrium model, might not be 
a good indicator for output (Korliras 1975; Charemza and Quandt, 1982; Quandt, 1983; 
Van Brabant, 1990; Werner, 2005). Some economists agree that the quantity is more 
important, particularly in the credit market. The credit rationing view outlines the 
underlying importance of credit quantity.  
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6.2.2  Credit rationing  
(Jaffee and Russell, 1976) developed a model of loan markets to explain the rationing of 
credit.  Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) proposed the existence of credit rationing in financial 
markets. The interest rate cannot by itself equalize demand and supply, and credit 
rationing plays an important role in allocating loan supply. Contrary to the traditional 
view, an increase in interest rate might attract risky customers while driving away the 
banks’ more risk-averse customers; thus, even when there is an excess demand for loans, 
instead of raising the interest rate, banks will lend to those who are most likely to repay, 
while denying those who might not. The credit rationing theory is based on the micro-
level analysis. Though credit rationing theory has pointed out the importance of quantity 
of credit, it only explains the credit arrangement at the micro-level, but does not provide 
the macroeconomic framework for credit’s role in the economy (Werner, 2005)    
 
6.2.3  Discussion of macro-models - DSGE (Dynamic Stochastic General 
Equilibrium) models  
A “General equilibrium” model has the assumption that the market will be clear across 
the different sectors, and the “stochastic” indicates the unexpected shocks that hit the 
economy. “Dynamic” general equilibrium, unlike the static general model, explicitly 
captures the evolution across the steady state.  
 
In practice, several central banks have developed the DSGE models for implementation 
(Murchison and Rennison, 2006; Harrison et al. 2005; Medina and Soto 2006; Adolfson 
et al. 2007(Lees, 2009). For example, they have been implemented in the Bank of 
England, the Bank of Canada and Bank of New Zealand. In academia, the DSGE model 
is mainly implemented in the New Keynesian School and the RBC school. Firstly, RBC 
theory builds on the neoclassical growth model to examine the real shocks to the 
economy, based on the assumption of flexible price. The starting paper by Kydland and 
Prescott (1982) showed the DSGE model in RBC theory. Furthermore, the RBC school 
found that, if it added the New Keynesian School features of introducing sticky price 
and imperfect competition in the DSGE model, the explanatory power of the model 
increased; meanwhile, the New Keynesians found there were advantages in using the 
DSGE model. Goodfriend and King (1997) named this combination NNS (new 
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neo-Wicksellian   
 
The disadvantage of DSGE model 
Narayana Kocherlakota, the President of the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, has 
pointed out the DSGE models were not useful for analyzing the financial crisis of 
2007/08. Nevertheless, he argued that these models have room for improvement, and 
there is a consensus to include the financial market frictions and price stickiness in the 
DSGE model.  Atta-Mensah and Dib (2008) incorporate the financial intermediates in 
the DSGE model, and attempt to examine the role of bank lending as a transmission 
mechanism of monetary policy shocks. Their findings suggested that exogenous credit 
shocks account for substantial fractions of output, inflation, and nominal interest rates 
fluctuations in the short and medium terms. Although the trend towards considering the 
role of credit in the macroeconomic models has been popular since the financial crisis of 
2007/08, there is still insufficient research focusing on credit, especially in the banking 
sectors. Moreover, the DSGE model also has its limits as an analytical tool.  
 
Solow (2010) said, in the statement “Building a science of Economics for the Real 
World”
50, 
 “The DSGE model has nothing useful to say about anti-recession policy 
because it has built into its essentially implausible assumptions the 
“conclusion” that there is nothing for macroeconomic policy to do. I 
think we have just seen how untrue this is for an economy attached to a 
highly-leveraged, weakly-regulated financial system.” (Solow 2010)  
 
6.2.4  The use of GDP-circulation credit to target nominal GDP   
The discussion of the previous studies in relation to credit reveals that both theoretical 
and empirical research admits the important role of credit in the economy. In particular, 
since the financial crisis of 2007/08, adding the credit variable to the existing models 
has been the trend of recent researches although credit is a supplementary variable for 
interest rate rather than a predominant variable in these models. We need a framework 
                                                 
50 Prepared Statement “Building a Science of Economics for the Real World” July 20, 2010. House 
Committee on Science and Technology Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight. Robert Solow 
Professor Emeritus, MIT  
 
  183in which credit has a powerful role in the economy; therefore, Werner’s GDP-
circulation credit model will be introduced in the following part.   
 
The theory model  
Werner modifies the traditional quantity equation of money (Fisher, 1911), with the 
starting point of replacing credit with money, and then disaggregating credit. The 
following formulations attempt to explain this in more detail: 
 
Q P V M                    (6.1) 
 
According to the definition of the equation, the money supply in circulation (M) 
multiplied by the velocity (V) must be identical to the vector of prices (P) multiplied by 
the quantity of all transactions (Q). Variable (Q) stands for the output measured in 
volume that is real GDP (Y). Variable (P) refers to price level that is the GDP deflator 
and, sometimes, CPI can be used as a proxy for this. Thus, the right-hand side of the 
equation is identical to the nominal GDP. On the left-hand side of the equation, velocity 
of money multiplied by the money supply is equal to the total effective money supply.  
 
Theoretically, the disaggregated transaction data could be used in the equation. The only 
issue is whether the appropriate disaggregated data could be found to proxy the 
theoretical breakdown in empirical work. On the other hand, GDP is the sum total of all 
final consumer goods and services produced; thus, any transactions in property market, 
stock market and bond market are not included in the calculation of GDP. In short, 
financial transactions are not included. (Howells and Mariscal, 1992) used aggregate 
monthly data on inter-bank and inter-branch payments provided by the Association of 
Payments Clearing System (APACS) in the U.K. They found that the increase in 
financial transactions during the 1980s explained the apparent decline in the income 
velocity of the traditional quantity equation in the U.K. Thus, it is necessary to remove 
financial transactions from the right-hand side of the equation.  
 
Werner (1992, 1997, and 2005) has tried to disaggregate both sides: on the left hand, it 
is disaggregated into the money used for transactions that are part of GDP ( ) and  r rV M
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of transactions that are part of GDP ( = , and those that are not  :  
) f fV M
r rQ P ) Y Pr r rQ P
 
f f r r V M V M MV     (6.2) 
f f r r Q P Q P PQ     (6.3) 
 
Because  was defined as the value of all GDP-based transactions, the following 
equation would hold, where   stand for the GDP deflator and  stands for nominal 
GDP 
r rQ P
r P Y Pr
 
Y P V M r r r    (6.4) 
With  =constant   r r r M Y P V / ) (   
 
Werner (2005) provided the theory that the amount of money used for GDP effective 
transactions during any period of time ( ) must be equal to nominal GDP, with a 
stable ‘real’ velocity of money ( ). Meanwhile, the amount of money used for non-
GDP transitions will be equal to the value of the non-GDP transaction. The following 
core question concerns which variable could represent money used in transaction. If it is 
not easy, empirically, to catalogue money aggregates in GDP effective transactions and 
non-GDP transactions.  Werner (2005) claims that it makes sense to bring credit into the 
equation, as a credit variable may better capture the quantity of money used in 
transactions.  
r rV M
r V
 
Why is GDP-circulation credit?  
The growth of money supply and the growth of velocity are identical to the growth of 
nominal GDP. Using credit instead of money in the quantity equation is advantageous. 
One reason for the failure of monetarism is that money aggregates are hard to measure 
with economic activities. The central banks have tried ,   and  to capture the 
economic transactions, but all these measurements are insufficient for indicating future 
economic conditions because the money aggregate is not one to one with economic 
transactions, and the innovations in the financial market make the flow of money supply 
more complicated. It is hard to tell the difference between the amount that is flowing 
0 M 2 M M 3
  185into the real economy sectors and that which is flowing into financial speculation. On 
the other hand, the nature of credit aggregates determines the credit link to each 
economic transaction, regardless of whether it is for real economic effect transactions or 
for financial speculations. As a result, the connection between credit and economic 
performance must be clearly distinguished by the initial use of credit flow. The loan 
amount could be disaggregated between the credit used for real economic activities and 
that used for financial transactions.  
 
Werner (1997, 2002, and 2005) also proposed that banks are a special case compared to 
other financial institutions because banks can create credit out of nothing. Werner 
advised that banks act as the settlement system for all non-cash transactions; thus, banks 
can write the figures into their books and the customer’s account book. In Werner’s 
view, credit is created through bank lending, and almost every dollar circulating in the 
economy that is used for transactions is created by loans; therefore the nature of money 
is credit. These summaries were derived after exhaustive analysis of the Japanese 
economic performance. He argued that credit growth is the essential factor which leads 
to economic growth. For that reason, bank credit channels should dominate in the 
monetary policy transmission mechanism rather than other channels. The difference 
between the bank lending channel, the bank capital channel and the credit creation 
channel (Werner1997, 2003, 2005) is that the role of the bank in credit creation is 
claimed to be unique. 
 
Thus the study defines   as the credit for the real sector and  r C f C  as the credit for 
speculative lending for the financial sector in the economy.  Therefore,   could have a 
causal link with nominal GDP, as the following equation points out:  
r C
 
Nominal rr CV P Q G D P                    (6.5) 
 
On the other hand, the loan for speculative rather than productive operation is f C . As 
the previous equation used , Werner (2005) also writes the equation as:  r C
 
f ff CV PQ  f                                         (6.6) 
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The large amount of credit to financial transaction may lead to bubbles in the financial 
market and price rises in real estimates; thus,  f P  describes the inflation of the asset 
price. Based on Werner’s modified equation, it indicates that GDP-circulation credit has 
a link with the nominal GDP. Therefore, the hypothesis in the research is whether GDP-
circulation credit is a good indicator variable to nominal GDP.  
 
Growth and the disaggregated quantity equation 
The research is normally interested in dynamic situations, so economic growth rate will 
take place in the most cases. As a result, Werner (2005) modifies the equation into a 
different way, and instead of describing in the absolute value, the percentage growth 
rate was used. This step is also called logarithmic differentiation: 
 
) ( ) ( PQ MV                                            (6.7) 
 
The economic growth takes place by definition. The net changes in economic 
transactions over the observed period equal the growth of the amount of money in 
circulation. Considering that the velocity of money is constant, the equation could be 
written in:  
 
) (PQ MV                                                (6.8) 
 
This simply restates that only an increase in the amount of money used for GDP 
effective transaction could result in an increase in the value of transactions (the 
economic growth) Furthermore, it divides both the change in the value of transactions 
and the change in the amount of money used for the transactions into those that are part 
of the GDP definition ( and r M  r Q  ) and those that are not ( f M  and  )                 f Q 
f f r r V M V M MV          (6.9) 
) ( ) ( ) ( f f r r Q P Q P PQ        (6.10) 
 
At the same time, equations (9) and (10) must also hold: 
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) ( f f f f Q P V M      (6.12) 
 
We can say that the rise (fall) in the amount of money used for GDP-based transactions 
is equal to the rise (fall) in nominal GDP. Similarly, the rise (fall) in the amount of 
money used for non-GDP transactions is equal to the change in the value of non-GDP 
transactions.  
 
As it was pointed out, in the previous part, that the GDP-circulation credit is more 
empirically convenient for replacing money in the equation, so the credit nature of 
money causing growth in the loan supply will reflect the growth rate of the money 
supply, with the assumption of constant velocity of credit to real transaction. 
 
For the growth: 
 
) (PQ CV      (6.13) 
f f r r V C V C CV        (6.14) 
) ( ) ( ) ( f f r r Q P Q P PQ        
At the same time, 
(6.15) 
) ( ) ( Y P Q P V C r r r r r        (6.16) 
) ( f f f f Q P V C      (6.17) 
 
6.3  Methodology  
6.3.1  Data description and summary statistics  
Definition of credit in the U.S.  
Total credit:  The most important variables defined in this part are the GDP-circulation 
credit, financial circulation credit and total credit.  The credit data are not provided 
directly by the Federal Reserve, but can be inferred. We regard the total financial assets 
of commercial banks, saving institutions and credit unions as the total credit, which was 
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and can be downloaded from the Federal Reserve website.
51 
 
The GDP-circulation credit is defined as the sum of consumer credit, commercial and 
industrial loans from commercial banks and government lending. Consumer credit 
nominally links to individual consumption, along with the commercial and industrial 
loans from commercial banks. Government lending is mainly for business investments. 
Thus these three parts constitute GDP-circulation credit. Because the Federal Reserve 
does not supply business loans information from saving institutions and credit unions, it 
is further considered that the amount of business loans from both institutions is small 
compared to that of commercial banks. Therefore this definition is reasonable as it only 
includes commercial and industrial loans from commercial banks, although commercial 
and industrial loans from commercial banks do not cover all business loans from 
financial institutions. Consumer credit and commercial and industrial loans from 
commercial banks can be taken directly from tables G.19 and H.8 given by the Federal 
Reserve.  Government lending is identified as the sum of open-market paper, Treasury 
securities, Agency and GSE-backed Securities and Municipal Securities held by 
commercial banks, saving Institutions and Credit Unions, which is also from the flow of 
funds.  After defining the total credit and GDP-circulation credit, what remains becomes 
the financial circulation credit.   
 
t C
52= Total Financial Assets of Commercial Banks, Saving Institutions and Credit 
Unions 
 
r C  = Consumer credit + Commercial and Industrial loans from commercial banks + 
Government Lending   
 
Government lending = Open market paper + Treasury securities + Agency and GSE-
backed Securities + Municipal Securities (Commercial banks, saving Institutions and 
Credit Unions)  
 
                                                 
51 http://www.federalreserve.gov/econresdata/releases/statisticsdata.htm  
52  : Total Credit;  : Credit to real GDP effective transaction;  : Financial circulation credit   t C r C f C
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According to this definition, the available period of GDP-circulation credit rums from 
1960Q1 to 2008Q4 in the U.S. 
 
Definition of credit in the U.K. 
Credit data are obtained from the Monetary & Financial Statistics table of the Bank of 
England. The total credit in the U.K. is quarterly amounts outstanding of M4 lending 
(monetary financial institutions’ sterling net lending to private sector) in sterling, non- 
seasonally-adjusted (the code is LPQVQKQ). Monetary financial institutions under the 
ESA95
53 classification refers to those institutions in the UK financial sector (other than 
the central bank) which are principally engaged in financial intermediation, and whose 
business is both to receive deposits and, for their own account, to grant loans and/or 
make investments in all kinds of securities.  The time period of total credit is from 
1963Q1 to 2008Q4.  
 
The M4 lending is equal to lending to the household sector, private non-financial 
corporations and other financial corporations. It generally regards the lending to the 
householder sector as the lending to individual consumers, and private non-financial 
corporations as the lending to business, so the credit to real GDP-effective transaction is 
the sum of credit to the householder sector and private non-financial corporation (the 
code is LPQAVHF), and lending to financial transactions is credit to other financial 
corporations
54 (the code is LPQAVHE).   
 
t C = M4 lending (monetary financial institutions’ sterling net lending to private sector 
 
r C  = Lending to private non-financial corporations + household sector 
 
f C  = Lending to other financial corporations  
                                                 
53 UK national accounts economic sector reporting categories in conformity with the European system of 
national and  regional accounts (ESA 95)   
54 Financial corporations other than monetary financial institutions include all financial limited and unlimited 
liability partnerships resident on the UK mainland and which are engaged principally in financial activities. 
These are also known as financial quasi corporations: Insurance brokers, loan brokers & financial planning 
consultants, salvage administrators and loss adjusters.  
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The problem with credit to real transaction data in the U.K. is that credit to household 
sector consists of three parts: net secured lending to individuals, net unsecured lending 
to individuals and net lending to unincorporated businesses and non-profit institutions 
serving households. The net secured lending to individuals is most likely to be mortgage 
credit, which it would be better to include in the financial circulation credit.  However, 
the net secured lending data are only available from 1986Q1 so, if this lending involves 
financial transactions, it will influence the consistency of the data.  
 
According to this definition, the available period of GDP-circulation credit rums from 
1963Q1 to 2008Q4 in the U.K. 
 
Definition of credit in Germany 
The credit to real transaction and financial transaction is not directly provided by the 
Bundesbank, but it can be inferred. According to the credit definition (Werner 2005), 
the total credit could be estimated as the total amount of loans to domestic enterprises 
and households (PQA350). The credit to financial transaction is the credit that is not 
part of GDP, so it should include the credit to speculation, real estimate market etc. In 
Germany, it has been described as the lending to financial institutions (PQ3026), 
lending to housing enterprises (PQ3185), lending to holding companies (PQ3189), and 
mortgage loans to domestic enterprises and resident individuals (PQ3013). The credit to 
real transaction would be the total amount of credit minus the financial circulation credit.  
 
t C  = Loans to domestic enterprises and households  
 
f C  = Lending to financial institutions + Lending to housing enterprises + Lending to 
holding companies + Mortgage loans to domestic enterprises and resident individuals  
 
r C  = Total credit – Financial circulation credit  
 
This study looks at the series and found that the data on lending to housing enterprises 
and lending to holding companies began from 1980Q4, which will have caused the 
structural decrease of credit to real transaction during 1980Q4 - 1981Q3. Thus, in order 
  191to achieve a smoother growth rate, this study uses the definition of credit to financial 
transaction being equal to lending to financial institutions and mortgagee loans to 
domestic enterprises and resident individuals during the period 1980Q4 - 1981Q3, thus 
giving a smoother growth rate of GDP-circulation credit.  
 
According to this definition, the period of GDP-circulation credit in Germany is shorter 
than that in the U.S., and U.K., running from 1970Q1 to 2008Q4. 
 
Definition of credit in Japan  
Credit data have been obtained from the Bank of Japan. The study describes the total 
credit as outstanding total credit including, among others, banking accounts and trust 
accounts from domestically-licensed banks. The definition of financial circulation credit 
is the same as that of Werner (2005). “Financial and real estate transaction are the main 
type of transactions that are not part of GDP. Transactions of this kind, which are not 
due to shifts of already existing purchasing power, but based on bank borrowing (and 
therefore on a net addition in purchasing power) are mainly conducted by the real estate 
and construction sector and the non-bank financial institutions. Loans to the real estate 
sector, construction firms and non-bank financial institutions (which mainly served as 
conduit for real estate loans) as speculative credit creation is used for real estate 
transactions” (Werner, 2005). Therefore, it is obvious that the total credit minus 
financial circulation credit is GDP-circulation credit.  
 
The credit data have a structural break in 1992Q2, as the calculation of statistical 
methods changed; thus the study uses the overlap credit data to acquire a smoother 
growth rate.  
 
t C = Total credit including Others, Banking Accounts and Trust Accounts from 
Domestically Licensed Banks 
 
f C = Construction + Finance and Insurance + Real Estate, Banking Account and Trust 
Accounts from Domestically-Licensed Banks  
 
r C = Total credit – financial circulation credit   
  192According to the available data in Japan, the period of GDP-circulation credit runs from 
1970Q1 to 2008Q4.  
 
Figure   6-1     Ratio of GDP-circulation credit to total credit and ratio of financial 
circulation credit to total credit 
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In the figure, the year is on the x-axis, and the annual percentage change of GDP-
circulation credit is on the y-axis. 
55 
 
The research firstly shows the ratio of credit to real transaction to total credit and ratio 
of credit to financial speculation to total credit in each country. As the figures show, the 
                                                 
55 RATIO_REAL = GDP-circulation credit/ total credit, RATIO_FINANCE= financial circulation credit/ 
total credit  
 
  193ratio of credit to real transaction gradually decreases and the ratio of financial 
speculation to total credit steadily increases as time goes by. In the U.S. and Germany, 
the ratio of GDP-circulation credit to total credit has even fallen to below 35%, and the 
financial circulation credit shows a noticeable increase after 1990 in the U.S., U.K. and 
Germany but not in Japan. As we know, Japan has experienced a collapse in the real 
estate market since the 1990s, so the fact that the credit to financial transaction does not 
increase dramatically is reasonable. These pieces of evidence point out a trend that 
credit for financial speculation has increased more than credit for real transactions in the 
U.S., U.K. and Germany over the last twenty years.   
 
Figure   6-2    Ratio of GDP-circulation credit to nominal GDP and ratio of credit to 
financial transaction to nominal GDP 
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As the figures show, the ratio of credit to financial transaction to nominal GDP 
increased considerably after the 1990s in the U.S., U.K. and Germany. The percentage 
increase from below 50% to around 80% of nominal GDP signals that the volume of 
  194financial circulation credit in the economy expanded significantly. The ratio of credit to 
real transaction to nominal GDP is more stable, except in the U.K. 
56 
 
Figure   6-3    Growth rate of nominal GDP and GDP-circulation credit growth rate 
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Inspection reveals that the correlated movement of the nominal GDP growth rate and 
credit to real transaction is closer in the U.S. and Japan than in the U.K. and Germany. 
Furthermore, as can be seen from the figure, there are two abnormal increases or 
decreases in credit growth in Germany, namely in 1990Q2-1991Q1, and 2003Q3-
2004Q2. The researcher examined the data in detail and found that the data of lending to 
housing enterprises and lending to domestic enterprises and resident individuals both 
suddenly increased in 1990Q2, and mortgage loans to domestic enterprises and resident 
individuals rose sharply in 2003Q3. These sudden increases caused the abnormal 
increase of credit to real transaction in 1990Q2, and decrease in 2003Q3. The study has 
                                                 
56Ratio_Cr_NGDP=Cr/NGDP_moving_sum; Ratio_Cf_NGDP=Cf/NGDP_moving_sum 
  195used 1990Q3 as the structural break in the tests, thus the influence from structural break 
would be eliminated in the subsample test. However, further research needs the overlap 
data, and the results would be more accurate.  
 
6.3.2  Modelling  
 
General-to-Specific model  
`The LSE methodology
57 has been the leading approach for pursuing econometrics in 
the last three decades. One of its main contributions is the concept of general-to-specific 
modelling, which contains the correct regressors which capture the essential features of 
the underlying data set; then, the standard procedures are used to reduce insignificant 
regressors. Eventually, only the significant variables remain. An important characteristic 
of this model is that the research has less chance of choosing a particularly preferred 
variable at the beginning. This approach is an inductive method; thus, it prefers the 
determinants of structure of data rather than the researcher’s assumption.       
 
Granger Causality test 
In this part, the researcher uses two approaches to test the causality between nominal 
GDP and GDP-circulation credit. The first one is to use the VARs model to test Granger 
causality when two variables are not cointegrated, and to apply VECM model to test 
Granger causality if two variables are cointegrated. The second one is to compare the 
robustness of regression of credit on nominal GDP and nominal GDP on credit: 
whichever direction is more stable will imply the direction of causality between those 
two variables. The later causality test approach is suggested by Mizon (1995).  
 
VARs Model analysis   
The VARs is identified using Cholesky decomposition, with the order being nominal 
GDP, price, the nominal short-term interest rate, money and GDP-circulation credit. 
The first differences of variables are taken in the VARs model, and the ordering was 
chosen on the basis of the speed with which the variables respond to shocks, with output 
assumed to be the least responsive, followed by price, then short-term rates. As the 
study has mentioned, in the VARs model including monetary aggregate etc, output and 
                                                 
57 Hendry (1993), for an overview 
  196price are assumed not to react to the contemporaneous shocks. In the extended VARs, 
lending aggregates are assumed to reflect contemporaneous shocks to output and price. 
The alternative ordering does not change the results; furthermore, in particular, the 
positive effect of credit on output is found in any orderings. The lag length is six, 
enabling a comparison of the results with those in the 4-variable VARs model  
 
6.4  Empirical Results in the U.S., U.K., Germany and Japan  
6.4.1  Velocity of GDP-circulation credit  
Velocity of GDP-circulation credit in the U.S.  
According to the equation, the velocity of credit to real economic activities is defined as 
the ratio of nominal GDP and the amount of GDP-circulation credit. The basic 
assumption of the model is a constant velocity. It shows the velocity of GDP-circulation 
credit in the U.S. in the figure, and then tests whether the velocity of credit to real 
transaction is constant.  
 
VCr_U.S. = Annual nominal GDP/ Credit to real activities   
 
Figure   6-4 Velocity of GDP-circulation credit in the U.S. 
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Testing the trend of velocity of GDP-circulation credit in the U.S.:  
t t Trend V       * 
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Figure   6-5 Trend in velocity in the U.S during 1960Q1-2008Q4 
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Non-seasonally-adjusted nominal GDP data end in 2006Q3, so the study uses the 
seasonally-adjusted nominal GDP after that. The difference in growth rate between non-
seasonally and seasonally-adjusted data is small, because the logarithm difference was 
taken to make the growth rate.  A combination of non-seasonal and seasonal data would 
not significantly influence the results.   
 
The trend test based on the period 1960Q1 to 2009Q2 rejects the null hypothesis that 
there is no trend, which means that velocity of GDP-circulation credit has a trend; 
however, we can see that the trend is very flat in the figure6-5, so we apply the trend 
test for the period 1971Q1 to 2009Q2.    
 
Figure   6-6 Trend in velocity in the U.S during 1971Q1- 2009Q2 
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The null hypothesis is that there is no trend, so the hypothesis is accepted.  No trend is 
found in the velocity of GDP-circulation credit during the period 1971Q1 to 2009Q2.  
 
  198As a result, it cannot be concluded without hesitation that there is a trend in velocity of 
GDP-circulation credit. The possibility that a trend in GDP-circulation credit might be 
largely based on the time period is plausible.  
 
Stationarity test for velocity of GDP-circulation credit in the U.S.  
The study tests whether the velocity of GDP-circulation credit is stationary in the U.S., 
with the purpose of investigating the constant property of velocity as well. The null 
hypothesis is that velocity is not stationary and has a unit root.  The null hypothesis is 
rejected at the 1% significance level including intercept or intercept and trend; thus, the 
velocity of credit to real GDP effective in the U.S. is stationary.  The results are 
displayed in the Appendix B. Table B 6-2. Therefore, the velocity of GDP-circulation 
credit does not change much in the long term, and it seems to randomly fluctuate around 
a constant level in the U.S. 
 
Velocity of GDP-circulation credit in the U.K.  
The equation is velocity of GDP-circulation credit = NGDP/GDP-circulation credit. 
 
The velocity of GDP-circulation credit in the U.K. is shown in the figure below, and 
inspection reveals an obviously decreasing trend. This result runs counter to the 
assumption that velocity of credit to real transaction is constant but, as mentioned, 
GDP-circulation credit includes the credit to the household sector. The data on credit to 
the household sector obtained from Bank of England only started from 1980. The 
inclusion of the credit to household sector might cause the decreased trend of velocity in 
the U.K. after 1980. Meanwhile, the credit to household sector contains mortgage credit; 
so, if mortgage credit increased dramatically after 1986 following the prosperity of the 
real estate market, this will have resulted in the decrease of velocity of credit to real 
activities.  In order to gain an insight into credit in the U.K., the research also calculates 
the ratio of total bank assets to nominal GDP, 
58  which is shown in the figure 6-9. As 
the figure illustrates, the portion of total bank credit in the nominal GDP significantly 
increased during the last two decades,  from 1.4 times nominal GDP at the starting point 
to  2.4 times nominal GDP at the peak time. The amount of credit from banks largely 
                                                 
58 Total bank asset is monthly amounts outstanding of UK resident banks (excl, Central Bank) sterling 
assets total (in sterling millions) not seasonally adjusted. Because the BOE changed the method  to 
calculate the total bank asset at 1997 Q2, so the research only show the ratio during 1997Q3 to 2009Q4,  
in order to avoid the structural break.   
  199expanded, which may have raised the amount of credit to the household sector as well, 
but it is possible that part of the credit to the household sector was used for speculations 
in the housing market. Considering these factors, the limitations of the data might be 
part of the reason for the decline in the trend of velocity of GDP-circulation credit in the 
U.K.  
  
Figure   6-7 Velocity of GDP-circulation credit in the U.K. 1963Q1- 2008Q4 
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Testing the trend of velocity of GDP-circulation credit in the U.K.  
t t Trend V       * 
 
Figure   6-8 Trend in the velocity in the U.K during 1963Q1- 2008Q4  
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  200Figure   6-9 Ratio of total bank asset to nominal GDP during 1997M9-2009M6 
1.2
1.4
1.6
1.8
2.0
2.2
2.4
98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09
U.K
Ratio of total bank asset to nominal GDP
 
 
Velocity of GDP-circulation credit in Germany   
The velocity of GDP-circulation credit = NGDP/GDP-circulation credit, as shown in the 
figure above. The velocity in Germany seems to be constant, and the researcher will test 
the trend of velocity of GDP-circulation credit.  
 
Figure   6-10 Velocity of GDP-circulation credit in Germany during 1970Q1-2008Q4 
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Testing the trend of velocity of GDP-circulation credit in Germany  
t t Trend V       * 
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Figure   6-11 Trend in the velocity in Germany during 1970Q1- 2008Q4  
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The null hypothesis that the velocity of credit to real transaction is constant is rejected at 
the 1% significance level, which suggests that velocity of credit to real transaction in 
Germany is not constant. But it can be seen from the figure that the trend of velocity in 
Germany is not significant, and the null hypothesis could not be rejected at the 5% 
significance level. Further, there is a structural break in 1990Q2 and 2003Q3, which 
lead the decrease of velocity in 1990Q2 and increase of velocity in 2003Q3. Thus, 
strictly speaking, the velocity of credit to real transaction is constant at the 5% 
significance level  
 
Velocity of GDP-circulation credit in Japan 
The velocity of GDP-circulation credit = NGDP/GDP-circulation credit. The credit data 
contain a structural break in 1992Q2; so, if the study uses the original credit data to 
calculate the velocity of credit to real transaction, it would also have a break in 1992Q2, 
meaning that the velocity would not be smooth. 
59 In order to have smooth credit 
volume data, this study uses the growth rate of GDP-circulation credit to create a new 
series  = growth rate of credit to real *  , so the series  is the estimation based 
on the old definition.  
4  t Cr t Cr r C
 
The velocity in Japan seems to have a slightly increasing trend, as indicated by the 
figure, and the researcher tested the trend of velocity of GDP-circulation credit.  
                                                 
59  The velocity of credit to real GDP effective transaction with the structural break is shown in the 
Appendix  
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Figure   6-12 Velocity of GDP-circulation credit in Japan (modified) during 1970Q1- 
2009Q3 
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Testing the trend of velocity of GDP-circulation credit in Japan  
t t Trend V       * 
 
Figure   6-13 Trend in the velocity in Japan during 1970Q1- 2009Q3  
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The null hypothesis that the velocity of credit to real transaction is constant is rejected at 
the 5% significance level, which suggests that velocity of credit to real transaction in 
Japan is not constant.  
 
To summarise the test on the velocity of GDP-circulation credit in the four countries, 
the obvious conclusion is that the velocity of GDP-circulation credit is not constant if 
only based on the trend test results. However, if one takes account of the insignificant 
trend in the velocity of credit to real economic transactions in the U.S., Germany and 
Japan,  and on the other hand, the continuously falling trend in the velocity of money 
  203aggregates in the U.S., the U.K. (Bordo et al., 1997) and in Japan (Werner 2005), the 
velocity of credit to real economic transactions is more stable than velocity of money 
aggregates in the U.S., the U.K. and Japan. The more stable velocity of GDP-circulation 
credit makes   easier and more reliable for policy- makers to consider than money 
aggregates.   
r C
 
6.4.2  Empirical results of general-to-specific model (GETS)  
The subprime mortgage crisis in 2007 caused central banks in these four countries to 
expand the money supply, and the quantity of money supply dramatically increased.  
The Federal Reserve, Bank of England and Bank of Japan announced the adoption of 
quantitative easing after the crisis. Thus, considering the sensitivity of the general-to-
specific model, in order to avoid the special case of the 2007 financial crisis having a 
statistical effect on the modelling results, the study tests the general-to-specific model in 
the sample period end at 2007Q4.  
 
The general-to-specific model  
The parsimonious form could be applied based on the general-to-specific modelling 
strategy (Hendry 1979, 1986). Through stepwise regression, the insignificant variables 
are eliminated in each step, and only significant variables, which have more explanatory 
power for the dependent variable, are left in the parsimonious form.  This GETS model 
includes short-term interest rate, money, total credit, and GDP-circulation credit at the 
beginning, and the intention is to find which variable might best explain nominal GDP. 
Because the study uses different money aggregates in each country, it is not fair to 
compare the results across countries. However, the choice of money aggregates in each 
country depends on the monetary policy rule and the availability of data, so it would 
provide us with a better understanding of which monetary policy variable in each 
country best explains the nominal GDP. The model implied in the research is 
formulated as follows, and has general lag structure, with four lags. 
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t g : Annual growth rate of nominal GDP  
  204k t gcr   : Growth rate of GDP-circulation credit 
k t gm   : Growth rate of money  
k t i  :      Interest rate  
t  :        Error  
 
Results of general-to-specific model results in the U.S. 1960Q1-2007Q4 
Quarterly data are used in the equation and, after the single specification selection, the 
final parsimonious model is:   
 
4 2 1 0729 . 0 1448 . 0 0717 . 0 5065 . 0 3821 . 1 3955 . 0          i i gm g g g  
t-stat (3.2415)     (24.0915)    (-8.8802)         (5.0050)      (5.8110)   (-2.9907)  
 
Adj. 
2 R =0.9525, F-statistic=429.2628, DW-Statistic=2.0666  
 
Figure   6-14 Nominal GDP, actual and fitted, residual in the U.S. during 1960Q1-
2007Q4  
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
65 70 75 80 85 90 95 00 05
Residual Actual Fitted
 
The t-statistic is significant at the 1% level. The adjusted 
2 R   is fairly high, which 
suggests that the final equation could well explain the dependent variable. The green 
line gives the predictive value of the equation model, while the red line presents the 
actual values of the time series. The difference represents the residual term. The figure 
6-14 displays that the parsimonious equation well describes the dependent variable 
(nominal GDP). The money and interest rate seem to outperform the credit aggregate in 
  205predicting the changes in nominal GDP in the U.S.; however, the coefficient of interest 
rate is positive and the coefficient of nominal GDP at two lags is negative, which 
contradicts the traditional wisdom. The error correction mechanism might have caused 
this. The multicollinearity among variables may cause the signs of expected coefficient 
being opposite to those estimated and central banks’ behaviour could also result in this 
(Asteriou and Hall, 2007). This is because, when central banks overshoot or undershoot 
the intermediate target in the previous year, they will undo the target in the next year. 
More statistical results are shown in the Appendix B. 
  
The Chow test (with F-statistic 1.313136 and p-value 0.1950) showed that there is no 
break in 1979Q3 in the general-to-specific model,  but the study still tests the two 
subsamples, and finds no significant difference between  the statistical results.
60 The 
nominal GDP growth rate at current could be explained by itself in two lags, money 
growth at current or one lag behind, and interest rate at current and two lags.  
 
Results of general-to-specific model in the U.K. from 1963Q1 to 2007Q4 
 
3 4 3 1 0485 . 0 2261 . 0 2223 . 0 8775 . 0 5209 . 0          gcr g g g g 
 t-stat   (1.5298)   (15.3859)     ( 2.5669)          (-3.0394)          (2.0437)  
 
Adj. 
2 R =0.8471, F-statistic=237.8057, DW-Statistic=1.8203   
 
                                                 
60 From 1960Q1- 1979Q3:   i gm g g gt 1368 . 0 1142 . 0 5493 . 0 4204 . 1 0980 . 0 2 1         
 Adj. 
2 R =0.9622, F-statistic=497.7563, DW-Statistic=1.8205 
From 1979Q4- 2009Q2   
2 1 2 1 0946 . 0 1824 . 0 0520 . 0 5363 . 0 4076 . 1 5147 . 0           i i gm g g g   
Adj. 
2 R =0.9503, F-statistic=429.2628, DW-Statistic=2.06   
 
  206Figure   6-15 Nominal GDP, actual and fitted, residual in the U.K. 1963Q1 to 2007Q4 
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Results of general-to-specific model in the U.K. from 1963Q1 to 2007Q4 
 
After the selection in each reduced equation, the final parsimonious model in the U.K. is 
  gcr g g 0470 . 0 8967 . 0 3014 . 0 1    
t-stat (0.9210)              (27.2709)        (2.0310)      
 
Adj. 
2 R =0.8416, F-statistic=473.6958, DW-Statistic=2.02  
 
Figure   6-16 Nominal GDP, actual and fitted, residual in the U.K. 1963Q1 to 2008Q4 
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The t-statistic is significant at the 1% level. The adjusted 
2 R  is quite high and the DW-
statistic is also near 2.0. This shows that the credit to real GDP-effective transaction 
  207could give a good explanation of nominal GDP. The result of the general-to-specific 
model implies that GDP-circulation credit outperforms the M4 and interest rate to 
predict nominal GDP in the U.K. More statistical results are shown in the Appendix C.   
   
Applying the Chow-test for the final equation, the results (with F-statistic 0.726493, p-
value 0.5374) signal that there is no break at 1992Q4 in the U.K. The stability of the 
final parsimonious model shows the credibility of the power of credit to real transaction 
in predicting the nominal GDP.    
 
Results of general-to-specific model in Germany 1970Q1- 2007Q4 
After the selection in each reduced equation, the final parsimonious model in Germany 
is:  
gcr g g 09093 . 0 6741 . 0 0812 . 1 1      
t-stat (4.5254)    (11.3811)      (3.7627)        
 
Adj. 
2 R =0.7742, F-statistic=251.3322, DW-Statistic=2.0998 
 
 
Figure   6-17 Nominal GDP, actual and fitted, residual in Germany 1970Q1- 2007Q4 
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The statistics of adjusted
2 R , F-statistic and DW-statistic all indicate that the final 
equation describes the dependent variable well. Based on the final equation, GDP-
circulation credit explains the nominal GDP better than M3 and interest rate. More 
statistical results are shown in the Appendix D. The study applies the Chow-test to find 
  208whether there is a break in the final equation, and the results show that there is a break 
in 1990Q3. Therefore the study tests the general-to-specific model in the subsamples.   
  
The results of general-to-specific model in subsamples 
Time Period: 1970Q1- 1990Q3 
2 1 1 1890 . 0 1181 . 0 4444 . 0 0861 . 1        gm gcr g g  
t-stat (2.28)    (5.1203)      (3.5606)      (2.6447)       
Adj. 
2 R =0.7264, F-statistic=65.502, DW-Statistic=1.7981  
 
The GDP-circulation credit and M3 remain in the final equation, and credit is better 
than M3 for explaining the nominal GDP according to the t-statistic in the first 
subsample in Germany.   
 
Time period: 1990Q4-2007Q4 
 
3 2 1 3 1 4481 . 1 7318 . 2 6329 . 1 1029 . 0 1268 . 0 5348 . 0 1934 . 0             i i i gm gm g g   
t-stat (0.7534)    (7.0461)    (3.3875)      (2.9044)       (4.2332)     (-4.0380)     (3.7297) 
 
Adj. 
2 R =0.8083, F-statistic=48.7938, DW-Statistic=2.23  
In the later period in Germany, M3 and interest rate outperform GDP-circulation credit 
in predicting the nominal GDP. Interest rate current, 1 and 2 lags behind all remain, 
which indicates that the interest rate increases the predictive power for nominal GDP.   
 
Overall, GDP-circulation credit outperform other variables to predict nominal GDP in 
the early period and in the entire sample, but interest rate and M2 become more 
important in influencing nominal GDP after 1990Q3.   
 
Results of general-to-specific model in Japan from 1970Q1- 2007Q4 
After the selection in each reduced equation, the final parsimonious model in Japan is  
 
4 1 2420 . 0 7171 . 0 4484 . 0       gm g g  
t-stat (-2.6214)    (15.6471.)      (5.8637)      
 
  209Adj. 
2 R =0.9477, F-statistic=1316.162, DW-Statistic=1.8095  
 
The statistics of adjusted
2 R , F-statistic and DW-statistic all indicate that the final 
equation describes the dependent variable well. Based on the final equation, M2 
explains the nominal GDP better than interest rate and GDP-circulation credit. The 
study applies the Chow-test to find whether there is a break in the final equation, and 
the results show that there is no break in 1990Q4.  More statistical results are shown in 
the Appendix E. This result is different from the one Werner (2003) obtained. The 
reason might be that GDP-circulation credit used in this thesis include trust account and 
bank account, but Werner (2003) only includes credit from bank account.  
 
If the downward reduction is checked at the 10% significance level, the parsimonious 
model becomes:  
3 4 1 1282 . 0 1821 . 0 2346 . 0 6903 . 0 4128 . 0          gcr gcr gm g g  
t-stat (-2.0569)    (14.2998)      (4.5660)    (3.0768)        (- 1.7552)  
Adj. 
2 R =0.9520, F-statistic=714.0067, DW-Statistic=1.9969   
 
As we can see, the adjusted 
2 R  is near 1, and the DW-statistic is near 2, which indicate 
that the equation also describes nominal GDP growth rate well. And, when the 
structural beak test is applied, the result suggests there is no structural break at 1990Q4, 
which indicates that the equation is credible. The parsimonious model has no noticeable 
problems and appears to be a valid model of the nominal GDP growth rate. The 
following figure shows the actual and fitted curves for nominal GDP growth rate.  
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Diagnostic Tests  
Histogram and normality test of the error terms  
The basic assumption of the OLS estimator is that the errors have a normal distribution 
conditional on the regressors. If the residuals are normally distributed, the histogram 
should be bell-shaped and the Jarque-Bera statistic should not be significant. The results 
are shown in Appendix, and the null hypothesis of normally distributed errors is 
significantly rejected in the U.S. and the U.K.; although also rejected in Germany and 
Japan, the statistical results are less significant.  
 
 Breusch-Godfrey LM test for autocorrelation  
Only when the serial autocorrelation of error terms is small does the OLS estimation 
generate the efficient estimates for the standard deviations of the coefficients. Too high 
an autoregression lessens the credibility of all hypothesis tests. The null hypothesis in 
the Breusch-Godfrey LM test for autoregression is that there is no autoregression. The 
statistical results are shown in Tables B6-4, C6-3, D6-3 and E6-3.  The test is performed 
with one or two lags, and the null hypothesis is accepted with very high securities in the 
U.K., Germany and Japan.  Although the null hypothesis is accepted at 5% significance 
level in the U.S., it could be rejected at 10% significance level. These results indicate 
that the explanatory power of credit to real-GDP transaction for nominal GDP is reliable 
in the U.K., Germany, and Japan, but the explanatory power of interest rate for nominal 
GDP in the U.S. is reduced.   
 
  211Test for Heteroskedasticity 
An autocorrelation heteroskedasticity of the error terms leads to a reduction in the 
power of hypothesis tests. The phenomenon of heteroskedasticity occurs when the 
variance of the error terms is not constant for all observations. The figures 6-14, 6-15, 
6-17 and 6-18 represent a graphical assessment of residuals; in addition, the study will 
carry out more formal tests for heteroscedasticity using the Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey test. 
The Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey test is a Lagrange multiplier test of the null hypothesis of 
no heteroskedasticity. The null hypothesis that there is no heteroskedasticity is accepted 
in the U.S. and Germany, but rejected in the U.K. and Japan. The results are shown in 
the tables B6-5, C6-4, D6-4, and E6-4.  
 
Conclusions on the general-to-specific model  
The review of normality test, autocorrelation test and heteroskedasticity test for the 
error terms reveals the risk of GETS model, thereby indicating the need to employ the 
other approaches. However, the GETS model still provides some useful indications. It 
can be inferred that the credit to real transaction is a better explanatory variable of 
nominal GDP growth rate compared to interest rate, apart from in the U.S. GDP-
circulation credit is the only variable that remains at the 1% significance level to explain 
the nominal GDP growth even better than the money aggregate in the U.K. and 
Germany. In Japan, the GDP-circulation credit is also left at the 10% significance level. 
It is obvious that credit outperforms the short-term interest rate in describing the 
nominal GDP growth in most of the four countries analysed. Therefore, the quantity 
variables (money aggregates, GDP-circulation credit) outperform the price variable 
(interest rate) in the prediction of nominal GDP based on both simple regressions and 
multiple equation analysis. However, as we know, the limits of simple regression 
inspire further studies.   
 
6.4.3  Empirical results of the Granger Causality test  
To assess the causal relationship between credit and nominal GDP in the four countries, 
Granger causality tests are adopted in this section. The study estimates the causality by 
employing conventional methods involving a single country data set, which includes a 
cointegration test and the use of error correction models (ECMs)  for the Granger 
  212causality test to confirm whether the two variables could provide future information to 
each other.  
 
The results of the unit root test 
This study uses annual growth rate of GDP-circulation credit and nominal GDP. The 
period is the same length as that in the previous part. The credit data take the year-over-
year growth rate.  
 
Granger and Newbold (1974) have indicated that the Granger causality test suggested 
by Granger (1969) would lead to spurious results if the time series data set is non-
stationary. In order to be sure that the credit data set in each country is stationary, the 
study examines the stationarity of GDP-circulation credit by the use of ADF (Dickey 
and Fuller, 1981), the PP test (Phillips and Perron, 1988) and the Zivot and Andrews 
(1992) test. The results shown in the appendix reveal that credit is non-stationary in the 
first-differencing level in the U.S. and the U.K. according to the ADF and PP critical 
value, but the stationary property is found based on the Zivot and Andrews approach. 
Furthermore, in Germany and Japan, the stationary property is also found according to 
all three tests. In order to keep the property of GDP-circulation credit consistent, the 
study regards the GDP-circulation credit as stationary in the first-differencing level.  
 
The results of Cointegration test 
Engle and Granger (1987) have defined X and Y as being cointegrated if the linear 
combination of X and Y is stationary but each variable is not stationary.   Engel and 
Granger (1987) also claimed that, if two variables are non-stationary but cointegrated, 
the traditional Granger causality test will be invalid.  An error correction model (ECM) 
should be established to test the existence of a causal correlation. Conversely, the 
traditional VARs model of Granger causality test should be used when these two 
variables are not cointegrated. Therefore, the cointegration test of Gregory and Hansen 
will be applied before testing for a causal relationship between nominal GDP and GDP-
circulation credit. (Gregory and Hansen, 1996) model to test the bivariate cointegration 
between GDP-circulation credit and nominal GDP has incorporated the structural break 
compared to other popular cointegration test methods. The results are presented in 
Appendix 6.F. The study also tests the cointegration between the credit to real 
transaction and nominal GDP in the subsamples. According to the critical value 
  213provided by Gregory and Hansen, the null hypothesis, that there is no cointegration 
between the GDP-circulation credit and nominal GDP, fails to be rejected at the 5% 
significance level in the U.S., Japan and Germany, and fails to be rejected at the 10% 
significance level in U.K. in the entire sample. This implies that there is a cointegration 
between GDP-circulation credit and nominal GDP in the U.S. and U.K., Germany and 
Japan in the entire sample. The results in the subsamples point out a cointegration 
between GDP-circulation credit and nominal GDP in the U.S. and Japan, but not in 
Germany and U.K. in the earlier sample. No cointegration relationships are found across 
countries in the later period. The statistical values can be seen in the Appendix.6.F  
 
Granger causality results in the entire sample  
Because there is a cointegration between nominal GDP and GDP-circulation credit, the 
study applies a VECM model to test Granger causality in the U.S., Germany and Japan, 
and a standard Granger causality test in the U.K. The results are summarised in the table 
below. As the statistics indicate, the null hypothesis that nominal GDP does not Granger 
cause to credit to real transaction is rejected in U.S., U.K. at the 1% significance level, 
and is also rejected in Germany at the 10% significance level, but fails to be rejected in 
Japan. On the other hand, the hypothesis that GDP-circulation credit does not Granger 
cause to nominal GDP fails to be rejected in the U.K. and Germany, and is only 
accepted at the 10% significance level in Japan and the 1% significance level in the U.S. 
Compared to two directions of causality, it is more likely that nominal GDP provides 
the future credit to real credit information in the U.S., U.K. and Germany than vice 
versa, but not in the case of Japan. In Japan, there is unidirectional causality from credit 
to real transaction to nominal GDP, which is consistent with the results found by 
Werner (2005).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  214Table   6-1 Summary of Granger causality tests in the entire sample 
Countries Period 
nominal GDP  does 
not GC credit    
credit does not GC 
nominal GDP     
     F-statistic P-value  F-statistic  P-value 
U.S. 1960Q1-2008Q4  9.48989  0*** 3.456004  0.0017*** 
U.K. 1963Q1-2008Q4  3.00562  0.0083***  1.5473  0.1661 
Germany 1970Q1-2008Q4  1.901302  0.085*  1.332387  0.247 
Japan 1970Q1-2008Q4  1.722206  0.12  2.057477  0.062* 
Note: *** significant at 1% level, ** significant at 5% level, and * significant at 10% 
level.  
 
Granger causality results in subsamples  
The causality results for the two subsamples are reported in the table. During the earlier 
period, the results are similar to those in the entire sample. The statistics point out that 
the hypothesis that nominal GDP does not Granger cause to credit is rejected at the 5% 
significance level in the U.S. and Germany, and at the 10% significance level in the 
U.K., but is still accepted in Japan in the earlier period. From the causality direction 
from credit to nominal GDP, the null hypothesis that credit does not Granger cause to 
nominal GDP is rejected at the 5% significance level in the U.S. and the 10% 
significance level in Japan, but is accepted in the U.K. and Germany. Overall the results 
from the earlier period are consistent with those in the entire sample. 
 
In period 2, the results shown in the table indicate that the null hypothesis that nominal 
GDP does not Granger cause to GDP-circulation credit fails to be rejected in all four 
countries and, from the other direction, that GDP-circulation credit does not Granger 
cause to nominal GDP fails to be rejected at 5% significance level across countries as 
well. The implication is that there is no causality between nominal GDP and credit to 
real transaction in the later period, which suggests that the relationship between these 
two variables has become weaker in recent years. This may also be because structural 
change makes data less accurate in proxying .   r C
 
Considering the evidence that there is no cointegration between GDP-circulation credit 
with nominal GDP in the later period, the implication is that there is no long-run and 
short-run relationship between these two variables. Furthermore, no Granger causality 
link between the variables is found in the later period.  It can be pointed out that the link 
  215between GDP-circulation credit and nominal GDP has weakened in recent years, based 
on the cointegration tests and Granger causality test.  
 
Table   6-2 Summary of Granger causality tests in subsamples 
subsample 1 
Countries 
Time 
period 
nominal GDP  does not 
GC  credit    
credit does not GC 
nominal GDP     
      F-statistic  P-value  F-statistic  P-value 
U.S. 
1960Q1-
1979Q3  4.578274 0.0007***  2.880417 0.0155** 
U.K. 
1963Q1-
1992Q3  1.96317 0.0786*  1.02893 0.4115 
Germany 
1970Q1-
1990Q3 2.72502  0.0158**  1.61835  0.1468 
Japan 
1970Q1-
1990Q4 0.905236  0.4967  2.189998  0.0549* 
subsample 2  
Countries 
Time 
period 
nominal GDP  does not 
GC  credit    
credit does not GC 
nominal GDP     
      F-statistic  P-value  F-statistic  P-value 
U.S. 
1979Q4 -
2008Q4  0.42147 0.8329  2.02774 0.0806* 
U.K. 
1992Q4-
2008Q4 1.74765  0.1399  1.0129  0.4194 
Germany 
1990Q4-
2008Q4 1.47117  0.2121  0.37929  0.8611 
Japan 
1991Q1-
2008Q4  0.78069 0.5675  0.56232 0.7284 
Note: *** significant at 1% level, ** significant at 5% level, and * significant at 10% 
level.  
 
6.4.4  Comparison of robustness to structural break  
Hendry and Mizon (1978) suggested running two equations of y on x and x on y, and 
then testing for structural breaks. The more robust equation with regard to structural 
breaks has the superior 'causality' direction. Therefore, regressions of nominal GDP on 
credit  and of credit  on nominal GDP were tested for the behaviour of parameter 
constancy during a period when a structural break is likely to have occurred. Parameter 
constancy tests of both regressions during this period will yield strong evidence 
concerning their relative merits and, thus, the direction of causation (Werner 2005).  
r C r C
 
According to Hendry and Mizon (1978), this type of causation test delivers even 
stronger causation evidence than the traditional Granger causality test.  
 
  216The Chow Breakpoint test was employed, comparing the parameter constancy of the 
two subsample regressions. A simple regression was conducted in both directions 
(credit on GDP vs GDP on credit) in order to assess which relationship would break 
down (parameter instability) due to the regime shift. The hypotheses were as follows:  
 
Hypotheses:  : No structural break   0 H
                      : Structural break   1 H
 
As already discussed, the Chow (1996) F test statistic is given by: 
 
) 2 /( ) (
/ ) (
2 1 k n n RSS
k RSS RSS
F
ur
ur r
 

               (6.19)    k n n k F 2 , 2 1    
 
With k = number of estimated parameters  
r RSS  = restricted residual sum of squares (imposing that subsamples are not different)  
ur RSS = unrestricted residual sum of squares =   1 RSS 2 RSS  with df = ( k n n 2 2 1    ) 
2 1,n n  = size of the subsamples  
 
The results are reported in the table6-3 below. As can be seen, the null hypothesis that 
there is no structural break is rejected in both directions in the U.S. and U.K., but the 
regression of credit on nominal GDP performs worse than vice versa after comparing 
the computed F value, which indicates that GDP-circulation credit as the explanatory 
variable to nominal GDP is better than nominal GDP as the explanatory variable for 
GDP-circulation credit.  In Japan, the null hypothesis that there is no structural break is 
accepted in the regression of nominal GDP on GDP-circulation credit, but rejected in 
the regression of GDP-circulation credit on nominal GDP. This result supports the 
strong causality from GDP-circulation credit to nominal GDP in Japan. The only 
exception is in Germany where, according to the computed F statistic, the conclusion 
could be causality from nominal GDP to GDP-circulation credit. However, the study 
conducts the one-step forecast test to exam the stability, and the results show causality 
from GDP-circulation credit to nominal GDP and not vice versa in Germany.   
Then recursive estimation was conducted, namely the one-step forecast. These are 
presented in the figures6-19 below. As the figures show, the regression with credit as 
  217the explanatory variable is more stable than the regression of credit on nominal GDP.   
The parameter is more stable, which implies that credit as an explanatory variable of 
nominal GDP is better. This means the causality is more likely to occur from credit to 
nominal GDP and not inversely, particularly in Germany. 
 
Table   6-3 Comparing the robustness for structural break  
U.S. 
Y=nGDP  
X=     r C
Y=    r C
X=nGDP 
Sample period   Coeff  Coeff 
1960Q1-2007Q4 0.4471  0.6505 
Chow Breakpoint Test : 
1979Q3  F-statistic F(2,184)  5.1444 *  6.5983* 
U.K.      
Sample period   Coeff  Coeff 
1963Q1-2007Q4 
 
0.2881 
 
0.5669 
Chow Breakpoint Test: 
1992Q3 F-statistic  F(2,171) 
 
21.0827 * 
 
29.2339*  
Germany    
Sample period   Coeff   Coeff 
1970Q1-2007Q4 
 
0.3080 
 
1.8661 
Chow Breakpoint Test: 
1990Q3 F-statistic  F(2,144)  13.8185 *  0.8113 
Japan    
Sample period   Coeff  Coeff 
1970Q1-2007Q4 
 
0.7374 
 
1.0681 
Chow Breakpoint Test: 
1990Q4 F-statistic  F(2,144)  0.1237  28.8073*  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure   6-19 One-Step forecast test for parameter stability  
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Conclusion of “causality” test 
 
There is no strong consistent causality conclusion between GDP-circulation credit and 
nominal GDP based on both tests. In the Granger causality test, the causality between 
nominal GDP and GDP-circulation credit is mixed in the entire sample. GDP-
circulation credit Granger cause to nominal GDP in the U.S. and Japan, but not in the 
U.K. and Germany. Considering the structural break in the Granger causality test, the 
causality results in the early sample are the same as those in the entire sample. However, 
in the later sample, the credit to real economic transactions does not Granger cause to 
nominal GDP, and there is no causality in the direction from nominal GDP to GDP-
circulation credit either at 5% significance level. Through comparing the robustness to 
structural break, the causality direction from credit to nominal GDP is slight stronger in 
the U.S and U.K., and one way causality direction from GDP-circulation credit to 
  220nominal GDP in Japan. Considering that the comparison of robustness to structural 
break provides a stronger causality link than the Granger causality test (Mizon, 1995), it 
can be concluded that  credit to real economic transactions has slightly better causality 
to nominal GDP than vice versa.  
 
6.4.5  Results of VARs model  
Since Christopher Sim (1980) provided the simple VAR model that captures rich 
dynamics in multiple time series, the VAR model has become a credible and coherent 
approach to interpreting and forecasting time series because it places minimal 
restrictions on how monetary shocks affect the economy, which leads to a lack of 
consensus about the working of the monetary transmission channel – this is a distinct 
advantage. The choice of the VAR approach to test the effect of GDP-circulation credit 
on nominal GDP is inspired by the explicit simultaneity between monetary policy and 
macroeconomic developments; that is, the dependence of monetary policy on other 
economic variables (the policy reaction function), as well as the dependence of 
economic variables on monetary policy.  
 
It is important to apply nominal GDP as the measure of economic activity in the VAR 
model, because the effect of financial variables on nominal GDP is what this study 
intends to explore. The VAR model extends to include GDP-circulation credit which 
consists of nominal GDP, price, interest rate, money and credit to real economic 
activities. The model is expanded to be   t t t t t t G r m c X  , ; the variables are the nominal 
GDP ( ), consumer price ( t G t  ), the nominal short-term interest rate ( ), broad money 
( ), and credit to GDP-effective transaction in that order. Nominal GDP, money 
aggregates, and GDP-circulation credit in the VAR model appear as annual growth rate, 
while consumer price growth rate and 3-month Treasury bill rate appear as the first 
difference. The study assumes credit to real GDP-effective transaction to be the 
monetary policy. As a result, the disturbance of GDP-circulation credit is assumed to be 
the shock to monetary policy, and the response of other variables to GDP-circulation 
credit is explained as the structural response to an unanticipated change in monetary 
policy.  
t r
t m
 
  221The VAR involves five equations: nominal GDP as a function of the past value of 
nominal GDP, consumer price growth, interest rate, money and credit; consumer price 
growth  as a function of the past value of nominal GDP, consumer price growth, interest 
rate and money and credit; and similar for the interest rate, money and credit equations. 
Each equation is estimated by ordinary least squares regression. The equations are 
shown below:  
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   (6.20) 
 
The number of lagged values is also six, which is consistent with the lag length in the 
VAR model with four variables in chapter 5.  Because of the differing availability of 
credit data, the sample period in each country is a little different from those in the four-
variable VAR model. The time period is from 1961Q1-2008Q4 in the U.S., 1963Q1- 
2008Q4 in the U.K., 1970Q1-2008Q4 in Germany, and 1970Q1-2008Q4 in Japan. The 
data is quarterly, and non-seasonally adjusted. The results are similar when we start the 
estimation a few years earlier or later, or use different lags. 
 
Given the long planning procedures involved in setting economic output and prices, 
these variables are supposed to not respond to simultaneous shocks to financial 
variables. It is assumed that the monetary authorities set the credit data with information 
on the contemporaneous performance of slowly-moving output and price, but without a 
complete picture of the actions of quickly-changing financial variables. Though the 
research did not test all possible alternative orderings, the results were not significantly 
different from the complete re-ordering of credit, money, nominal interest rate, price 
and nominal GDP.  
 
The main impulse response results in the entire sample 
The impact of GDP-circulation credit innovation on nominal GDP  
  222The results from the 5-variables model are illustrated through the model’s impulse 
response function reported in the following figure
61. An unexpected rise in GDP-
circulation credit causes a statistically significant rise in nominal GDP, which still 
remains positive after 8-10 quarters.  The maximum magnitude of impulse response is 
normally reached at around 4-5 quarters after the initial shock. The nominal GDP 
growth rate is estimated to increase by 0.27-0.3% after a 1% rise of GDP-circulation 
credit in the U.S., Germany and Japan although, in the U.K., the nominal GDP growth 
rate rose by 0.41% after the initial shock. Turning to the accumulated impulse response 
in the following figure, the incredibly consistent positive effect of GDP-circulation 
credit on nominal GDP in each country indicates that the GDP-circulation credit is an 
appropriate variable to target nominal GDP.  
 
Table   6-4  Impulse response of nominal GDP to credit shock in 5-variable VAR model  
 
Period U.S.  U.K.  Germany  Japan 
1 0 0 0 0 
2  0.030675 0.072488 0.310994 0.106224 
3 0.107294  -0.003806  0.359346  0.267681 
4 0.225481  0.0672  0.199243  0.292517 
5  0.222875 0.412405 0.260657 0.239654 
6  0.271691 0.244138 0.177931 0.138962 
7  0.270706 0.279718 0.168939 0.207071 
8  0.178601 0.291075 0.314003 0.21026 
9 0.213279  0.012398  0.26562  0.243196 
10  0.149058 0.155396 0.254483 0.289175 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
61 Detailed results for this VAR model reported in the Appendix 6.G  
  223Figure   6-20 Accumulated effect of Cholesky One. S.D. GDP-circulation credit 
innovation on nominal GDP  
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Note: Horizontal axis indicates time period (quarterly), and vertical axis indicates the accumulated 
percentage change of nominal GDP to GDP-circulation credit innovation 
 
The impact of money aggregate innovation on nominal GDP  
The patterns of nominal GDP response to money shock in a 5-variables VAR model do 
not change much compared to those in a 4-variables VAR model. The significant 
positive impulse response of nominal GDP to money aggregate shock occurs in Japan, 
with moderate positive impulse responses in the U.S. and Germany; however, the 
impulse response became negative in the U.K. Including GDP-circulation credit in the 
VAR model eliminated a small positive effect of money innovation on nominal GDP. In 
contrast to the consistent pattern of impulse response of nominal GDP to credit 
innovation, the impulse response of nominal GDP to money aggregate shock is not 
steady across the countries, which indicates that GDP-circulation credit rather than 
money aggregate is appropriate for targeting nominal GDP based on the VAR model. 
 
  224Figure   6-21  Accumulated effect of Cholesky One. S.D. money aggregates innovation 
on nominal GDP  
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Note: Horizontal axis indicates time period (quarterly), and vertical axis indicates the accumulated 
percentage change of nominal GDP to money aggregates innovation 
 
The impact of interest rate innovation on nominal GDP  
In the figure above, the accumulated effect implies that interest rate shock has a 
negative effect on nominal GDP in Germany and Japan, but not in the U.S. and U.K. 
Moreover, a positive effect of interest rates on nominal GDP at early periods in the U.S. 
and nearly zero effect on nominal GDP in the U.K. are found; this conflicts with 
theoretical expectations. In the standard theory, real GDP and inflation rate will 
decrease when interest rates are increased; thus the nominal GDP should respond 
negatively to rising interest rates in the theory.  
 
The figures in the Appendix 6.G summarise the response of nominal GDP to interest 
rate shock. They show that the negative response decreases to around 0.2% level at 8 
quarters after the 100 basis point cut of 3-month Treasury bill rate in the U.S., Germany 
and Japan, but no effect is found in the U.K. Considering the small magnitude of 
impulse response of nominal GDP to interest rate shock also found in 4-variables VAR 
in the U.K., no interest rate variable remains in the general-to-specific model and no 
Granger causality direction is found from interest rate to nominal GDP, which raises 
doubts about the ability of interest rate to target nominal GDP in the U.K.  
 
  225Figure   6-22   Accumulated effect of Cholesky One. S.D. interest rate innovation on 
nominal GDP  
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Note: Horizontal axis indicates time period (quarterly), and vertical axis indicates the accumulated 
percentage change of nominal GDP to short-term interest rate  innovation 
 
The study amalgamates the figures of accumulated response of nominal GDP 
innovation on GDP-circulation credit and money together. Inspection reveals that there 
is no constant pattern of money or GDP-circulation credit response to nominal GDP 
shock. The impulse response of nominal GDP innovation on money aggregate is 
negative in the U.S. and Japan and positive in the U.K. and Germany after the initial 
shock. The magnitude of response is also completely different in each country. The 
nominal GDP innovation has little effect on credit to real transaction in the U.S., U.K. 
and Germany during the first 6 quarters, while there is a large significant effect in Japan.     
 
Based on the inconsistent impact of nominal GDP innovation on money and GDP-
circulation credit, no evidence is found to support the view that money supply or the 
volume of GDP-circulation credit follows the trend of nominal GDP across countries.              
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  226Figure   6-23    Accumulated effect of nominal GDP innovation on GDP-circulation 
credit 
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Note: Horizontal axis indicates time period (quarterly), and vertical axis indicates the accumulated 
percentage change of GDP-circulation credit to nominal GDP innovation  
 
 
Figure   6-24   Accumulated effect of nominal GDP innovation on money aggregates 
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Note: Horizontal axis indicates time period (quarterly), and vertical axis indicates the accumulated 
percentage change of money aggregates to nominal GDP innovation  
 
  227In contrast to the inconsistent pattern of impulse response of money and credit to 
nominal GDP shock, the pattern of impulse response of interest rate to nominal GDP 
shock is much more consistent.  The positive impulse response in the U.S., U.K. and 
Germany is shown in the figure above; moreover, the ultimate accumulated responses in 
the U.S., U.K. and Germany become very close after 10 quarters, which implies that the 
change in interest rate might endogenously follow the trend of nominal GDP. Although 
there was virtually no impulse response of interest rate to nominal GDP shock in Japan, 
as we know, this was possibly due to the failure of using interest rates as the monetary 
policy and the fact that low interest rates have been retained for a long period in Japan.  
 
Impulse responses reach their maximum after 3 to 4 quarters in the U.S.., U.K. and 
Germany, with an interest rate increase of 0.4% in Germany, and a rise of around 0.2% 
in the U.S. and U.K. after 1% of nominal GDP increase. This result is also found in the 
4-variable VAR model.  
 
Figure   6-25   Accumulated effect of nominal GDP innovation on interest rates 
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Note: Horizontal axis indicates time period (quarterly), and vertical axis indicates the accumulated 
percentage change of interest rate to nominal GDP innovation  
  228Variance Decomposition in the entire sample 
Table   6-5 Variance decomposition for VAR of nominal GDP in the U.S. U.K. Germany 
and Japan  
Variance Decomposition for VAR of Nominal GDP  
      U.S.  U, K   Germany  Japan  
 Period  Nominal GDP        
2     96.70425  95.0439  95.00074  96.32682 
4      86.84588 89.43553 84.54849 88.3422 
8      70.19269 80.94266 78.01647 63.06932 
    CPI      
2      0.753195 4.468336 0.988894 0.169777 
4      3.505323 9.811269 4.577756 0.384035 
8      7.140383 14.77569 4.493794 7.689187 
   3-months Rate       
2      2.309107 0.027199 0.015382 0.851083 
4      5.845567 0.031041 1.922576 1.511209 
8      6.178464 0.248347 5.247191 2.029597 
    Money      
2      0.075441 0.344019 0.16839  2.138514 
4      1.003187 0.616916 2.30098  4.671035 
8      8.740679 0.819461 2.395384 20.43458 
  Credit      
2    0.158005 0.116544 3.826589 0.513807 
4   2.80004  0.105241  6.650198  5.09152 
8    7.747787 3.213849 9.847167 6.777313 
 
Turning to the results of variance decomposition shown in the table below, it can be 
seen that GDP-circulation credit has more explanatory power for nominal GDP than 
money and interest rate in Germany and the U.K., and 3-month Treasury bill rate and 
money account slightly for nominal GDP in both countries.  In the case of the U.S., 3-
month Treasury bill rate, money and credit play fairly equal roles in accounting for 
nominal GDP; however, in Japan, M2 outperforms interest rate and credit to account for 
nominal GDP.  In Japan, credit still accounts more than interest rate for nominal GDP. 
Overall GDP-circulation credit does account for nominal GDP, and the performance is 
better than interest rate across countries. If we compare that with money aggregate, it is 
hard to conclude which variable is better than the other. The study also tests the 
variance decomposition in subsamples. As the results of variance decomposition in 
  229subsamples, showing what percentages of short-term interest rate, money aggregate and 
GDP-circulation credit account for nominal GDP, are not consistent when comparing 
before and after the structural break, the study provides the results in the Appendix 6.H 
for reference only.  
 
Tests in subsamples 
 
The main concern of this chapter is the effect of GDP-circulation credit innovation on 
nominal GDP, so the study only discusses the impulse response of credit innovation on 
nominal GDP and variance decomposition in subsamples. The impulse responses of 
nominal GDP to money aggregates innovation or interest rate innovation have been 
given in chapter 5, so they are not discussed here.  
 
As the figure below shows, there is no consistent pattern of impulse response of credit 
innovation on nominal GDP in each country before and after the structural break. 
Nevertheless, the impulse response of nominal GDP to GDP-circulation credit shock is 
generally larger before structural break than after besides in the U.K., which indicates 
that the GDP-circulation credit is more useful to influence the nominal GDP before the 
structural break. Most of the effects of GDP-circulation credit innovation on nominal 
GDP are positive, although in different magnitudes. Thus, the results of the subsample 
test suggest the instability of impulse response of nominal GDP to GDP-circulation 
credit innovation, although impulse response is consistently positive.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  230Figure   6-26 The Impulse response of nominal GDP to GDP-circulation credit shock 
before, after and in the entire sample in the U.S., U.K., Germany and Japan 
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Note: Horizontal axis indicates time period (quarterly), and vertical axis indicates the accumulated 
percentage change of nominal GDP to GDP-circulation credit innovation before, after and in the entire 
sample  
 
6.5  Discussion and conclusion  
Werner (1992, 1997, 2005) shows that Japanese nominal GDP growth can be explained 
by a credit disaggregated model that was derived from a downward reduction of a 
general model including alternative explanations (M2, interest rates). The tests in this 
chapter were designed to accomplish two goals. The first was to discover whether the 
empirical finding that GDP-circulation credit is an appropriate variable to target 
nominal GDP, provided by Werner (1997, 2005), could be generalised to other 
developed countries, such as the U.S., U.K. and Germany. The second goal of the 
empirical tests in this chapter was to discover the quantitative effect of GDP-circulation 
credit innovation on nominal GDP. A significant feature of the credit used in this 
  231chapter is that the researcher develops a new type of credit flow that is capable of 
distinguishing the bank credit flow to the real sector and credit to financial-sector firms 
(such as those in the real estate sectors, financial intuitions, mortgage credit). In order to 
realise the two aims, the study not only applies the general-to-specific model, but also 
extends to the use of the “causality” tests and VAR model. The general-to-specific 
model could show us which variable (interest rate, money aggregates and GDP-
circulation credit) best explains the nominal GDP, and further “causality” tests give the 
causality link between GDP-circulation credit and nominal GDP. The implementation 
of the VAR model reveals what percentage of nominal GDP responds to a 1% increase 
in GDP-circulation credit, and also shows the pattern of nominal GDP response to 
money policy variables (interest rates, money aggregates and GDP-circulation credit). 
The empirical findings obtained are displayed below.   
 
The findings can be summarised as follows: 
(a) The assumption that velocity of GDP-circulation credit is constant could not be 
proved by a strict trend test. However the stationary feature of GDP-circulation 
credit is found in the U.S., Germany and Japan. Thus it could not be concluded 
that the GDP-circulation credit is constant, but the velocity somehow fluctuates 
around one level.  
 
(b) One of the mainstream intermediary targets, bank credit growth, appears to be a 
good explanatory variable for nominal GDP according to the general-to-specific 
model. Besides the U.S., GDP-circulation credit remains after a step-by-step 
deduction of the general-to-specific model in the U.K., Germany and Japan, 
although the significance level is 10% in Japan. However, the money aggregate 
also seems to be a positive variable to explain nominal GDP. In the U.S., M2 
and short-term interest rate remain to explain nominal GDP. In Germany, M3 
and interest rate are also left in the later period. In Japan, only M2 is left if the 
significance level is 1%. Thus, overall GDP-circulation credit and money 
aggregates are both variables that could be used to target nominal GDP, if based 
only on the results of the general-to-specific model.  
 
(c) Although the two approaches of “causality” tests provide inconsistent results, 
the causality conclusion is mainly based on the comparison of robustness with 
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(d) The most important results of the VAR model show that the positive impact of 
GDP-circulation credit expansion on nominal GDP is qualitatively similar in 
four countries, which indicates that the GDP-circulation credit could be a good 
intermediate variable to target nominal GDP.  Generally, a 1% increase in GDP-
circulation credit will lead to approximately 0.2% of nominal GDP boost. This 
evidence strongly supports the notion that the GDP-circulation credit is an 
appropriate variable to influence nominal GDP. The additional findings are that 
the interest rate is more likely to follow nominal GDP stimulation, but GDP-
circulation credit and money aggregates do not, according to the inconsistent 
pattern of credit and money aggregate response to nominal GDP innovation and 
the consistent pattern of interest rate to nominal GDP innovation.  
 
The findings obtained are encouraging. GDP-circulation credit exhibits a close 
short-term correlation and causation to nominal GDP growth, though there are 
  233  234
conflicts in the empirical results. The main empirical results are strong enough to 
point out the positive correlation between the GDP-circulation credit and nominal 
GDP, and the limitations of this empirical research may have caused the conflicting 
results in the empirical tests.   
 
 
 Appendix 6.A Map of monetary policy transmission 
Figure A   6-1 Map of Monetary Policy transmission 
Monetary Policy Transmission (Kenneth N. 
Kuttner and Patricia C. Mosser 2002)
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 235Appendix 6.B Trend test, stationary test and GETS model test in the U.S.  
 
Table B   6-1 Trend Test for Velocity of GDP-circulation credit in the U.S.  
Dependent Variable: VCr_U.S.     
Method: Least Squares     
Sample: 1960Q1 2009Q2     
Included observations: 198     
  Coefficient  Std. Error  t-Statistic  Prob.   
PERIOD -0.000642  0.000116  -5.534775  0.0000 
C  2.562532  0.013313 192.4802 0.0000 
Dependent Variable: VCr_U.S.     
Method: Least Squares     
Sample: 1971Q1 2009Q2     
Included observations: 154     
  Coefficient  Std. Error  t-Statistic  Prob.   
PERIOD -0.000245  0.000175  -1.401942  0.1630 
C  2.507424  0.022647 110.7177 0.0000 
 
Table B   6-2 Stationary Test for Velocity of GDP-circulation credit in the U.S.  
Null Hypothesis: VCR_US has a unit root   
Exogenous: Constant     
Lag Length: 14 (Automatic based on SIC, MAXLAG=14) 
      t-Statistic    Prob.* 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic  -3.670547   0.0053 
Test critical values:  1% level    -3.466176   
 5%  level    -2.877186   
 10%  level    -2.575189   
Null Hypothesis: VCR_US has a unit root   
Exogenous: Constant, Linear Trend   
Lag Length: 14 (Automatic based on SIC, MAXLAG=14) 
      t-Statistic    Prob.* 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic  -4.204524   0.0054 
Test critical values:  1% level    -4.008987   
 5%  level    -3.434569   
 10%  level    -3.141237   
 
 
Table B   6-3 The Test of General-to-Specific Models in the U.S.  
Dependent Variable: NGR_SA_NSA   
Method: Least Squares     
Sample (adjusted): 1961Q1 2007Q4   
Included observations: 188 after adjustments   
  Coefficient  Std. Error  t-Statistic  Prob.   
NGR_SA_NSA(-1)  1.382122  0.057370 24.09149 0.0000 
NGR_SA_NSA(-2) -0.506545  0.057042  -8.880156  0.0000 
DTREASURY  0.144826  0.024923 5.811027 0.0000 
DTREASURY(-4) -0.072871  0.024366  -2.990656  0.0032 
DM2_NSA  0.071745  0.014335 5.004966 0.0000 
C  0.395501  0.122014 3.241452 0.0014 
R-squared  0.964060      Mean dependent var  7.016864 
 236Adjusted R-squared  0.963073      S.D. dependent var  2.330936 
S.E. of regression  0.447923      Akaike info criterion  1.263004 
Sum squared resid  36.51557      Schwarz criterion  1.366294 
Log likelihood  -112.7223      Hannan-Quinn criter.  1.304853 
F-statistic  976.4047      Durbin-Watson stat  1.774452 
Prob(F-statistic)  0.000000     
 
 
Figure B   6-1 Histogram and Normality Test of the Error Terms in the U.S.  
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Table B   6-4 Breusch-Godfrey LM Test for Autocorrelation in the U.S.  
Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test:   
F-statistic  3.523743      Prob. F(1,181)  0.0621 
Obs*R-squared  3.590127      Prob. Chi-Square(1)  0.0581 
 
 
Table B   6-5 Test for Heteroskedasticity in the U.S.  
Heteroskedasticity Test: Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey 
F-statistic  0.619463      Prob. F(5,182)  0.6851 
Obs*R-squared  3.145885      Prob. Chi-Square(5)  0.6775 
Scaled explained SS  19.73760      Prob. Chi-Square(5)  0.0014 
 
Table B   6-6 Test for Structural break in GETS model in the U.S. 
Chow Breakpoint Test: 1979Q3    
Null Hypothesis: No breaks at specified breakpoints 
Varying regressors: All equation variables   
Equation Sample: 1961Q4 2009Q2   
F-statistic 1.313136  Prob.  F(16,159)  0.1950 
Log likelihood ratio  23.70486  Prob. Chi-Square(16)  0.0962 
Wald Statistic   21.01018  Prob. Chi-Square(16)  0.1781 
 
 
Table B   6-7 The Results of GETS Model in the U.S. in the Early Subsample  
Dependent Variable: NGR_SA_NSA   
Method: Least Squares     
Sample: 1960Q1 1979Q3     
 237Included observations: 79     
  Coefficient  Std. Error  t-Statistic  Prob.   
NGR_SA_NSA(-1)  1.420452 0.090769 15.64913 0.0000 
NGR_SA_NSA(-2)  -0.549260 0.085521  -6.422530 0.0000 
DM2_NSA  0.114202 0.025543 4.470934 0.0000 
DTREASURY  0.136761 0.050294 2.719247 0.0081 
C  0.098076 0.248562 0.394572 0.6943 
R-squared  0.964165      Mean dependent var  8.004892 
Adjusted R-squared  0.962228      S.D. dependent var  2.408958 
S.E. of regression  0.468181      Akaike info criterion  1.381276 
Sum squared resid  16.22031      Schwarz criterion  1.531241 
Log likelihood  -49.56040      Hannan-Quinn criter.  1.441357 
F-statistic  497.7563      Durbin-Watson stat  1.820459 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
 
Table B   6-8 The Results of GETS Model in the U.S. in the later Subsample 
Dependent Variable: NGR_SA_NSA   
Method: Least Squares     
Sample: 1979Q4 2007Q4     
Included observations: 113     
  Coefficient  Std. Error  t-Statistic  Prob.   
NGR_SA_NSA(-1)  1.407645  0.070845 19.86950 0.0000 
NGR_SA_NSA(-2) -0.536354  0.065403  -8.200782  0.0000 
DTREASURY  0.182353  0.031557 5.778478 0.0000 
DTREASURY(-2) -0.094570  0.033167  -2.851313  0.0052 
DM2_NSA  0.052022  0.019801 2.627191 0.0099 
C  0.514730  0.167987 3.064101 0.0028 
R-squared  0.952514      Mean dependent var  6.260480 
Adjusted R-squared  0.950295      S.D. dependent var  1.987732 
S.E. of regression  0.443155      Akaike info criterion  1.261843 
Sum squared resid  21.01336      Schwarz criterion  1.406660 
Log likelihood  -65.29411      Hannan-Quinn criter.  1.320608 
F-statistic  429.2628      Durbin-Watson stat  2.066555 
Prob(F-statistic)  0.000000     
 
 
 
 238Appendix 6.C Trend test and GETS model test in the U.K. 
 
Table C   6-1 Trend Test for Velocity of Credit to Real-GDP Effective Transactions in the U.K. 
Dependent Variable: VCr_U.K.     
Method: Least Squares     
Sample (adjusted): 1963Q2 2008Q4   
Included observations: 183 after adjustments   
  Coefficient  Std. Error  t-Statistic  Prob.   
PERIOD -0.013882  0.000366  -37.90747  0.0000 
C  3.178693  0.039169 81.15401 0.0000 
 
 
Table C   6-2 The Test of General-to-Specific Models in the U.K. end in 2008Q4  
Dependent Variable: NGR_NSA_ONS   
Method: Least Squares     
Sample (adjusted): 1964Q2 2008Q4   
Included observations: 179 after adjustments   
  Coefficient  Std. Error  t-Statistic  Prob.   
NGR_NSA_ONS(-1) 0.896781  0.032884 27.27093 0.0000 
GCREDIT_REAL  0.047055  0.023168 2.030980 0.0438 
C  0.301440  0.327264 0.921092 0.3583 
R-squared  0.843332      Mean dependent var  8.577487 
Adjusted R-squared  0.841551      S.D. dependent var  4.432839 
S.E. of regression  1.764519      Akaike info criterion  3.990251 
Sum squared resid  547.9808      Schwarz criterion  4.043671 
Log likelihood  -354.1275      Hannan-Quinn criter.  4.011912 
F-statistic  473.6958      Durbin-Watson stat  2.025315 
Prob(F-statistic)  0.000000     
 
 
Figure C   6-1 Histogram and Normality Test of the Error Terms in the U.K. end in 2008Q4 
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Table C   6-3 Breusch-Godfrey LM Test for Autocorrelation in the U.K. end in 2008Q4 
Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test:   
F-statistic  0.093223      Prob. F(1,175)  0.7605 
Obs*R-squared  0.095303      Prob. Chi-Square(1)  0.7575 
 
 
Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test:   
F-statistic  0.048153      Prob. F(2,174)  0.9530 
Obs*R-squared  0.099019      Prob. Chi-Square(2)  0.9517 
 
Table C   6-4 Test for Heteroskedasticity in the U.K. end in 2008Q4 
Heteroskedasticity Test: Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey 
F-statistic  6.328942      Prob. F(2,176)  0.0022 
Obs*R-squared  12.00989      Prob. Chi-Square(2)  0.0025 
Scaled explained SS  54.82790      Prob. Chi-Square(2)  0.0000 
 
 
Table C   6-5 The Test of General-to-Specific Models in the U.K. end in 2007Q4 
Dependent Variable: NGR_NSA_ONS   
Method: Least Squares     
Sample (adjusted): 1965Q1 2007Q4   
Included observations: 172 after adjustments   
  Coefficient  Std. Error  t-Statistic  Prob.   
NGR_NSA_ONS(-1) 0.877522  0.057034 15.38591 0.0000 
NGR_NSA_ONS(-3) 0.222372  0.086630 2.566918 0.0111 
NGR_NSA_ONS(-4) -0.226132  0.074401 -3.039390  0.0028 
GCREDIT_REAL(-3)  0.048564  0.023763 2.043732 0.0426 
C  0.520916  0.340500 1.529857 0.1279 
R-squared  0.850656      Mean dependent var  8.699223 
Adjusted R-squared  0.847079      S.D. dependent var  4.445133 
S.E. of regression  1.738276      Akaike info criterion  3.972303 
Sum squared resid  504.6076      Schwarz criterion  4.063800 
Log likelihood  -336.6181      Hannan-Quinn criter.  4.009426 
F-statistic  237.8057      Durbin-Watson stat  1.820350 
Prob(F-statistic)  0.000000     
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Table C   6-6 Breusch-Godfrey LM Test for Autocorrelation in the U.K. end in 2007Q4 
Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test:   
F-statistic  2.666736      Prob. F(1,166)  0.1044 
Obs*R-squared  2.719437      Prob. Chi-Square(1)  0.0991 
 
 
Table C   6-7 Test for Heteroskedasticity in the U.K. end in 2007Q4 
Heteroskedasticity Test: Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey 
F-statistic  9.115582      Prob. F(4,167)  0.0000 
Obs*R-squared  30.82399      Prob. Chi-Square(4)  0.0000 
Scaled explained SS  84.45600      Prob. Chi-Square(4)  0.0000 
 
Table C   6-8 Test for Structural break in GETS model in the U.K. 
Chow Breakpoint Test: 1992Q4    
Null Hypothesis: No breaks at specified breakpoints 
Varying regressors: All equation variables   
Equation Sample: 1964Q2 2008Q4   
F-statistic 0.726493    Prob.  F(3,175)  0.5374 
Log likelihood ratio  2.240281    Prob. Chi-Square(3)  0.5241 
Wald Statistic   2.179478    Prob. Chi-Square(3)  0.5360 
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Table D   6-1 Trend Test for Velocity of Credit to Real-GDP Effective Transactions in Germany 
Dependent Variable: VR_Germany     
Method: Least Squares     
Sample (adjusted): 1970Q4 2008Q3   
Included observations: 152 after adjustments   
  Coefficient  Std. Error  t-Statistic  Prob.   
PERIOD -0.001142  0.000520  -2.196232  0.0296 
C  2.518276  0.060382 41.70545 0.0000 
R-squared  0.031154      Mean dependent var  2.395496 
Adjusted R-squared  0.024695      S.D. dependent var  0.284863 
S.E. of regression  0.281324      Akaike info criterion  0.314451 
Sum squared resid  11.87148      Schwarz criterion  0.354239 
Log likelihood  -21.89829      Hannan-Quinn criter.  0.330614 
F-statistic  4.823436      Durbin-Watson stat  0.033521 
Prob(F-statistic)  0.029611     
 
 
 
Table D   6-2 The Test of General-to-Specific Models in Germany 
Dependent Variable: NGR_NSA     
Method: Least Squares     
Sample (adjusted): 1971Q2 2007Q4   
Included observations: 147 after adjustments   
  Coefficient  Std. Error  t-Statistic  Prob.   
NGR_NSA(-1)  0.674134  0.059233 11.38111 0.0000 
DCREDIT_REAL  0.090932  0.024167 3.762664 0.0002 
C  1.081256  0.239005 4.523994 0.0000 
R-squared  0.777319      Mean dependent var  4.888673 
Adjusted R-squared  0.774226      S.D. dependent var  2.711265 
S.E. of regression  1.288276      Akaike info criterion  3.364684 
Sum squared resid  238.9903      Schwarz criterion  3.425713 
Log likelihood  -244.3043      Hannan-Quinn criter.  3.389481 
F-statistic  251.3322      Durbin-Watson stat  2.099773 
Prob(F-statistic)  0.000000     
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Table D   6-3 Breusch-Godfrey LM Test for Autocorrelation in Germany 
Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test:   
F-statistic  0.692692      Prob. F(1,143)  0.4066 
Obs*R-squared  0.708635      Prob. Chi-Square(1)  0.3999 
 
Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test:   
F-statistic  0.507104      Prob. F(2,142)  0.6033 
Obs*R-squared  1.042474      Prob. Chi-Square(2)  0.5938 
 
 
Table D   6-4 Test for Heteroskedasticity in Germany 
Heteroskedasticity Test: Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey 
F-statistic  0.445498      Prob. F(2,144)  0.6414 
Obs*R-squared  0.903965      Prob. Chi-Square(2)  0.6364 
Scaled explained SS  0.803403      Prob. Chi-Square(2)  0.6692 
 
 
Table D   6-5 Test for Structural break in GETS model in Germany 
Chow Breakpoint Test: 1990Q3    
Null Hypothesis: No breaks at specified breakpoints 
Varying regressors: All equation variables   
Equation Sample: 1971Q2 2007Q4   
F-statistic 3.038008    Prob.  F(3,141)  0.0312 
Log likelihood ratio  9.207386    Prob. Chi-Square(3)  0.0267 
Wald Statistic   9.114024    Prob. Chi-Square(3)  0.0278 
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Table D   6-6 The Test of General-to-Specific Models in Germany in the Early Subsample  
Dependent Variable: NGR_NSA     
Method: Least Squares     
Sample (adjusted): 1971Q2 1990Q3   
Included observations: 78 after adjustments   
  Coefficient  Std. Error  t-Statistic  Prob.   
NGR_NSA(-1)  0.444475  0.086805 5.120385 0.0000 
DCREDIT_REAL  0.118124  0.033175 3.560606 0.0007 
DM3(-2)  0.189629  0.071702 2.644681 0.0100 
C  1.086175  0.476385 2.280034 0.0255 
R-squared  0.726441      Mean dependent var  6.332384 
Adjusted R-squared  0.715350      S.D. dependent var  2.301933 
S.E. of regression  1.228141      Akaike info criterion  3.298800 
Sum squared resid  111.6164      Schwarz criterion  3.419657 
Log likelihood  -124.6532      Hannan-Quinn criter.  3.347181 
F-statistic  65.50267      Durbin-Watson stat  1.798179 
Prob(F-statistic)  0.000000     
 
 
 
Table D   6-7 Table D   6-8 The Test of General-to-Specific Models in Germany in the later 
Subsample 
Dependent Variable: NGR_NSA     
Method: Least Squares     
Sample: 1990Q4 2007Q4     
Included observations: 69     
  Coefficient  Std. Error  t-Statistic  Prob.   
NGR_NSA(-1)  0.534791  0.075899 7.046114 0.0000 
DTREASURY(-1)  1.632934  0.385745 4.233202 0.0001 
DTREASURY(-2) -2.731810  0.676525  -4.038004  0.0002 
DTREASURY(-3)  1.448110  0.388255 3.729788 0.0004 
DM3  0.126795  0.037430 3.387510 0.0012 
DM3(-3)  0.102908  0.035431 2.904416 0.0051 
C  0.193382  0.256676 0.753408 0.4541 
R-squared  0.825236      Mean dependent var  3.256652 
Adjusted R-squared  0.808323      S.D. dependent var  2.165465 
S.E. of regression  0.948061      Akaike info criterion  2.827131 
Sum squared resid  55.72682      Schwarz criterion  3.053779 
Log likelihood  -90.53601      Hannan-Quinn criter.  2.917050 
F-statistic  48.79388      Durbin-Watson stat  2.234397 
Prob(F-statistic)  0.000000     
 
 
 Appendix 6.E Trend test and GETS model test in Japan 
Trend test for velocity of GDP-circulation credit and GETS model test in Japan  
 
Table E    6-1 Trend Test for Velocity of Credit to Real-GDP Effective Transactions in Japan 
Dependent Variable: VR_Japan     
Method: Least Squares     
Sample: 1970Q1 2008Q4     
Included observations: 156     
  Coefficient  Std. Error  t-Statistic  Prob.   
PERIOD  0.003031  0.000199 15.19714 0.0000 
C  1.339536  0.023064 58.07892 0.0000 
 
 
Table E    6-2 The Test of General-to-Specific Models in Japan  
Dependent Variable: NGR_TOTAL   
Method: Least Squares     
Sample (adjusted): 1971Q1 2007Q4   
Included observations: 148 after adjustments   
  Coefficient  Std. Error  t-Statistic  Prob.   
NGR_TOTAL(-1)  0.717127  0.045831 15.64713 0.0000 
DM2_IMF_NSA(-4)  0.242033  0.041276 5.863755 0.0000 
C -0.448445  0.171074  -2.621351  0.0097 
R-squared  0.947791      Mean dependent var  5.257401 
Adjusted R-squared  0.947071      S.D. dependent var  5.227557 
S.E. of regression  1.202664      Akaike info criterion  3.227017 
Sum squared resid  209.7280      Schwarz criterion  3.287771 
Log likelihood  -235.7992      Hannan-Quinn criter.  3.251701 
F-statistic  1316.162      Durbin-Watson stat  1.809516 
Prob(F-statistic)  0.000000     
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Table E    6-3 Breusch-Godfrey LM Test for Autocorrelation in Japan  
Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test:   
F-statistic  1.518340      Prob. F(1,144)  0.2199 
Obs*R-squared  1.544234      Prob. Chi-Square(1)  0.2140 
 
 
Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test:   
F-statistic  1.938108      Prob. F(2,143)  0.1477 
Obs*R-squared  3.905875      Prob. Chi-Square(2)  0.1419 
 
 
 
Table E    6-4 Test for Heteroskedasticity in Japan 
Heteroskedasticity Test: Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey 
F-statistic  4.833178      Prob. F(2,145)  0.0093 
Obs*R-squared  9.249722      Prob. Chi-Square(2)  0.0098 
Scaled explained SS  13.06975      Prob. Chi-Square(2)  0.0015 
 
 
Table E    6-5 Test for Structural break in GETS model in Japan 
Chow Breakpoint Test: 1990Q4    
Null Hypothesis: No breaks at specified breakpoints 
Varying regressors: All equation variables   
Equation Sample: 1971Q1 2007Q4   
F-statistic 1.749498    Prob.  F(3,142)  0.1596 
Log likelihood ratio  5.371592    Prob. Chi-Square(3)  0.1465 
Wald Statistic   5.248494    Prob. Chi-Square(3)  0.1545 
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Table E    6-6 The Test of General-to-Specific Models in Japan(rejected the null hypothesis at 
10% significance level)  
 
Dependent Variable: NGR_TOTAL   
Method: Least Squares     
Sample (adjusted): 1971Q4 2007Q4   
Included observations: 145 after adjustments   
  Coefficient  Std. Error  t-Statistic  Prob.   
NGR_TOTAL(-1)  0.690270  0.048271 14.29983 0.0000 
DM2_IMF_NSA(-4)  0.234655  0.051391 4.566058 0.0000 
DCR  0.182074  0.059177 3.076755 0.0025 
DCR(-3) -0.128188  0.073035  -1.755157  0.0814 
C -0.413708  0.201124  -2.056980  0.0415 
R-squared  0.953271      Mean dependent var  5.156357 
Adjusted R-squared  0.951936      S.D. dependent var  5.231136 
S.E. of regression  1.146844      Akaike info criterion  3.145779 
Sum squared resid  184.1352      Schwarz criterion  3.248425 
Log likelihood  -223.0690      Hannan-Quinn criter.  3.187488 
F-statistic  714.0067      Durbin-Watson stat  1.996934 
Prob(F-statistic)  0.000000     
 
 247Figure E   6-2 Histogram and Normality Test of the Error Terms in Japan (reject at 10% 
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Table E    6-7 Breusch-Godfrey LM Test for Autocorrelation in Japan (reject at 10% significance 
level )  
 
Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test:   
F-statistic  0.050909      Prob. F(1,139)  0.8218 
Obs*R-squared  0.053087      Prob. Chi-Square(1)  0.8178 
 
 
Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test:   
F-statistic  0.402440      Prob. F(2,138)  0.6695 
Obs*R-squared  0.840803      Prob. Chi-Square(2)  0.6568 
 
 
Table E   6-8 Test for Heteroskedasticity in Japan (reject at 10% significance level)  
 
Heteroskedasticity Test: Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey 
F-statistic  2.172695      Prob. F(4,140)  0.0751 
Obs*R-squared  8.475059      Prob. Chi-Square(4)  0.0756 
Scaled explained SS  11.55672      Prob. Chi-Square(4)  0.0210 
 
 
 
Table E   6-9 Test for Structural break in GETS model in Japan (reject at 10% significance level)  
Chow Breakpoint Test: 1990Q4    
Null Hypothesis: No breaks at specified breakpoints 
Varying regressors: All equation variables   
Equation Sample: 1971Q4 2007Q4   
F-statistic 1.330973    Prob.  F(5,135)  0.2548 
Log likelihood ratio  6.977225    Prob. Chi-Square(5)  0.2223 
Wald Statistic   6.654866    Prob. Chi-Square(5)  0.2476 
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Appendix 6.F Unit root test and cointegration test  
 
Table F   6-1Unit Root Test for GDP-circulation credit 
 
Countries  Time period  ZA   ADF     PP    
         t-Statistic    Prob.*  Adj. t-Stat    Prob.* 
U.S.  1960Q1-2008Q4   -4.93351 at 1986:04 -2.00112  0.2863 -2.39211  0.1453 
U.K.  1964Q2-2008Q3   -4.95164 at 1990:02 -1.19497  0.2119 -1.34434  0.1653 
Germany  1961Q1-2008Q4   -3.47196 at 1989:02  -6.01284  0  -6.96016  0 
Japan  1960Q1-2008Q4   -4.75865 at 2001:03 -2.29267  0.0216 -2.23049  0.0252 
 
 
Table F   6-2Cointegration test results (nominal GDP growth rate and GDP-circulation credit)  
Full time period  
 
Countries Fullbreak  trend  constant 
US   -4.78865 at 1988:04   -5.03378 at 1988:01    -4.69140 at 1988:04 
U.K.   - 4.88809 at 1981:02   -4.70327 at 1981:01    -4.32105 at 1979:01 
Germany   -6.58379 at 1982:04   6.64335 at 1992:01   -6.64040 at 1982:04 
Japan    - 7.47630 at 1971:04 
  -5.86593 at 1972: 
01   -7.47287 at 1971:04 
 
Table F   6-3 
Countries Time  period  Fullbreak  trend  constant 
US  1960Q1-1979Q3   -5.25798 at 1970:01    -5.31053 at 1971:04   -5.36756 at 1971:04 
U.K.  1960Q1-1992Q3   -4.17596 at 1974:02   -3.68862 at 1971:01   -3.58784 at 1981:01 
Germany  1971Q1-1990Q3   3.38358 at 1982:01   -3.37604 at 1980:02    -3.37118 at 1982:01 
Japan  1960Q1-1990Q4   -6.93280 at 1975:01   -5.10957 at 1975:03   -6.11605 at 1971:04 
 
Null Hypothesis: has a unit root 
Countries Time  period  Fullbreak  trend  constant 
US  1979Q4 -2008Q4   -3.22558 at 1987:01   -3.29141 at 1987:01    - 3.20093 at 1987:01 
U.K.  1992Q4-2008Q4   -2.36741 at 1995:03   -1.99161 at 1999:02    -2.36866 at 1995:03  
Germany  1990Q4-2008Q4   -4.69252 at 1994:04   -4.56514  at 1996:01   -4.42826 at 1996:01 
Japan  1991Q1-2008Q4   -3.86534 at 20006:02  5.13367 at 2006:02   -3.83176 at 2006:02 
Critical Values are 1% -5.47 and 5% -4.95 10% -4.82 
(fullbreak) 
Critical Values are 1% -5.45 and 5% -4.99 10% -4.58(trend) 
Critical Values are 1% -5.13 and 5% -4.6110% -4.11 (constant) 
 
 
 Appendix 6.G Impulse response  
 
Figure G   6-1Impulse response of nominal GDP to GDP-circulation credit shock 
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Notes: The blue solid lines are the dynamic response of each variable while the red dotted lines are the 
95% confidence interval. The time period: 1961Q1-2008Q4 in the U.S., 1963Q1- 2008Q4 in the U.K., 
1970Q1-2008Q4 in Germany, and 1970Q1-2008Q4 in Japan 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 250Figure G   6-2 
Impulse response of nominal GDP to money aggregates shock 
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Table G   6-1Table Impulse response of nominal GDP to money shock 
Period U.S  U.K  Germany  Japan 
1 0 0 0 0 
2 0.021196  -0.124541  0.065239  0.216709 
3 0.06014  -0.186283  0.023842  0.313453 
4 0.136421  -0.084991  0.29505  0.096803 
5 0.253559  -0.14785  0.107205  0.267737 
6 0.276531  -0.040257  0.062074  0.279951 
7 0.294006  -0.001376  0.094057  0.483456 
8  0.28196  -0.147301 -0.060658 0.680929 
9  0.161444  -0.073052 -0.020728 0.736957 
10 0.156857  -0.122503  0.024272  0.723169 
 
 
Notes: The blue solid lines are the dynamic response of each variable while the red dotted lines are the 
95% confidence interval. The time period: 1961Q1-2008Q4 in the U.S., 1963Q1- 2008Q4 in the U.K., 
1970Q1-2008Q4 in Germany, and 1970Q1-2008Q4 in Japan 
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Figure G   6-3Impulse response of nominal GDP to interest rate shock 
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Figure G   6-5Impulse response of interest rate to GDP-circulation credit shock 
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Figure G   6-7Impulse response of interest rate  to nominal GDP shock 
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Notes: The blue solid lines are the dynamic response of each variable while the red dotted lines are the 
95% confidence interval. The time period: 1961Q1-2008Q4 in the U.S., 1963Q1- 2008Q4 in the U.K., 
1970Q1-2008Q4 in Germany, and 1970Q1-2008Q4 in Japan 
  Appendix 6.H variance decomposition in the subsamples  
 
Table H   6-1 Variance Decomposition for VAR of Nominal GDP in the subsamples  
 
Variance Decomposition for VAR of Nominal GDP in the early period  
      U.S.  U, K   Germany  Japan  
Period  Nominal GDP              
2      98.42248 93.79998 83.81919 72.22654 
4      86.80826 86.33032 43.81575 46.30183 
8      48.12127 77.18486 31.25319 24.7776 
    C P I       
2      0.792967 6.06336  0.352768 0.046576 
4      1.095069 13.23261 5.888523 6.23944 
8      8.458288 20.76078 9.241094 4.626551 
   3-months Rate       
2      0.28866  0.024786 0.037843 8.524778 
4      2.50022 0.16461 2.053972  5.429891 
8      24.34992 0.601472 3.761642 6.988301 
    Money      
2      0.043892 0.109335 0.017168 16.79056 
4      3.028558 0.174878 17.00374 39.84051 
8      7.328382 0.362868 18.69973 61.98011 
    credit     
2      0.451999 0.002539 15.77303 2.411544 
4      6.567892 0.097591 31.23802 2.188333 
8      11.74214 1.090014 37.04434 1.62744 
Variance Decomposition for VAR of Nominal GDP in the later period  
      U.S.  U.K   Germany  Japan  
 
Period  Nominal GDP              
2      95.5316  86.28445 95.34585 96.26964 
4      85.24496 63.35529 89.43364 85.15935 
8      77.90699 39.44692 84.70013 70.88665 
    C P I       
2      1.313585 2.542899 0.637663 1.536087 
4      5.163861 20.28788 3.573173 8.568264 
8      6.82208 26.2664 5.683849  20.66106 
   3-months Rate       
2      3.096144 6.963796 3.151502 0.001803 
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4      8.954368 5.845467 5.370745 0.997994 
8      12.62271 12.99049 6.149908 1.591988 
    Money      
2      0.011455 2.684256 0.84169  1.39015 
4      0.053828 7.680107 0.975106 4.543649 
8      0.105607 10.50185 1.704041 5.385915 
    credit     
2      0.047216 1.524601 0.023298 0.802316 
4      0.582982 2.831258 0.64734  0.730746 
8      2.542611 10.79434 1.762071 1.474388 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Chapter 7 
7  Conclusion 
 
Almost every month a considerable amount of time in financial news is spent reporting 
on the monetary policy of the Federal Reserve or other central banks’ actions across the 
world. This happens because money and banking issues are widespread, and the 
monetary policy will affect the most important aspects of daily life. The interest rate 
policy has been the main focus of attention of central banks in the last two decades. 
However, we can see that changes occurred after the financial crisis of 2007/08. Money 
and credit measures in the conduct of policy have been emphasised, since the 
limitations of interest rate policy made the policymakers in central banks start to use 
“quantitative easing” (QE) to stimulate the economy. This shift also reflected the 
realization that the monetary policy needs to respond to the considerable underlying 
development in the financial market. The creation of new instruments, changes in the 
features of current financial instruments, and the indistinct characteristics of financial 
instruments all possibly distort the effect of interest rate on the economy.  
 
There is a gap in the understanding of credit’s effect on the economy in theory and 
practice. Therefore, this study explores the relationship between credit and nominal 
GDP in detail, and further examines the link between interest rate and nominal GDP, 
and money aggregates and nominal GDP. The simple regression, the Granger causality 
test, GETS model and VAR model are applied. This study is the first to analyse the use 
of GDP-circulation credit to target nominal GDP in the U.S., U.K. and Germany, 
although this kind of work has been done by Werner (1997, 2003) in Japan; however, 
our study greatly extends the time period, broadens the range of countries and employs 
more complex econometric approaches.  
 
The study examines an essential set of issues raised in the introduction chapter, and 
proceeds to generalize conclusions regarding the use of financial variables (short-term 
interest rate, money and GDP-circulation credit) to influence nominal GDP. In chapter 4, 
the simple Granger causality test is employed to find the link between nominal GDP 
and interest rates, additionally providing the link between real GDP and interest rates 
and inflation and interest rates in the U.S., U.K., Germany and Japan.  In chapter 5, the 
 257comparison of 
2 R   in the regression reveals the strength and stability of the predictive 
power of money aggregates for nominal GDP in the U.S., U.K., Germany and Japan; 
then, the Granger causality test outlines the “causality” correlation between money 
aggregate and nominal GDP in four countries and, lastly, the VAR model with four 
variables, which are nominal GDP, CPI annual growth rate, short-term interest rate, and 
money, presents how nominal GDP responds to money aggregate shock and interest rate 
shock. In chapter 6, an important contribution of the study involves building a new type 
of GDP-circulation credit in the U.S., U.K., Germany and Japan. The GDP-circulation 
credit distinguishes the bank credit flow into the real economy sector and financial 
sector, and then the study mostly focuses on the link between GDP-circulation credit 
and nominal GDP.  The general-to-specific model is used in an attempt to discover 
which variable (interest rate, money aggregates, or GDP-circulation credit) has the most 
explanatory power for nominal GDP, and further “causality” tests give the causality link 
between GDP-circulation credit and nominal GDP. The implementation of the VAR 
model reveals what percentage of nominal GDP responds to a 1% increase in GDP-
circulation credit, and also shows the pattern of nominal GDP response to money policy 
variables (interest rates, money aggregates and GDP-circulation credit). 
 
7.1  Summary of findings   
7.1.1  Results on the link between interest rates and nominal GDP 
Regarding the link between nominal GDP and interest rates, the results of the Granger 
causality test indicate that nominal GDP does Granger cause the 3-month Treasury bill 
rate in the U.S., U.K. and Germany, but the 3-month Treasury bill does not Granger 
cause nominal GDP in the U.K., Germany and Japan. The causality from nominal GDP 
to short-term interest rates in three of the four countries indicates that nominal GDP 
could provide more future information on interest rate than vice versa. The positive 
correlation between nominal GDP and the 3-month Treasury bill rate also suggests that 
increasing interest rates tend to follow rather than lead the trend of nominal GDP.  
 
In the VAR model, nominal GDP negatively responds to interest rate shock in the U.S., 
Germany and Japan, as the theory expects, but positively responds in the U.K. for the 
first several quarters in the entire sample test. Additionally, the magnitude of impulse 
response of nominal GDP to short-term interest rate shock is substantially different, 
 258especially in the U.K. and Japan. The nominal GDP growth rate fell by around 0.22% 
after a 1% increase of 3-month Treasury bill rate in the U.S. and Germany, but only 
decreased by less than 0.1% after the initial shock in the U.K. and Japan. As a result, the 
pattern of nominal GDP response to interest rate shock is uncertain. In the subsample 
test, the VAR models also find no constant patterns of impulse response of nominal 
GDP to interest rate shock before and after the structural break in each country. Thus, 
short-term interest rate does not display a robustly stable and constant correlation with 
nominal GDP based on the results of the Granger causality test and VAR model.  
 
On the other hand, the impulse response of interest rate to nominal GDP shock is 
positive during a 2-year period. The results show that short-term interest rate increased 
by 0.4% to 0.5% in the U.S. and Germany, and increased by around 0.2% in the U.K.; 
however, it only increased by less than 0.1% in Japan, after a 1% rise in nominal GDP. 
Considering that interest rates have been kept at a low level for the last two decades, the 
result in Japan is reasonable. Judd and Motley (1993) proposed that, when nominal 
GDP growth exceeds the target by one percentage point, policymakers should raise the 
short-term interest rate by 0.2%. Hence, the results confirm the pattern that short-term 
interest rate tends to positively follow the growth of the economy.  
 
Because most studies have investigated the relationship between interest rates and real 
GDP (Goodfriend, 1991; Taylor, 1993, Woodford, 2003), so our study also provides the 
“causality” relationship between short-term interest rate and real GDP as a reference. 
Real GDP does Granger cause the 3-month Treasury bill rate in the U.S., U.K., 
Germany and Japan, but the 3-month Treasury bill rate only Granger causes real GDP in 
the U.S. and U.K., which enhances the view that the real economic conditions influence 
the determination of short-term interest rate. The current interest rate does not reflect the 
future economic conditions as much as some academics believe. 
   
The result of the Granger causality test shows the relatively close link between the 3-
month Treasury bill rate and inflation, which is closer than the link between short-term 
interest rate and real GDP, or short-term interest rate and nominal GDP. This result is 
compatible with (Lee, 1992). The 3-month Treasury bill rate does Granger cause 
inflation in the U.S., U.K., Germany and Japan; meanwhile, inflation also Granger 
causes the 3-month Treasury bill rate in the U.S., U.K. and Germany. It seems that the 
 2593-month Treasury bill rate predicts the future inflation, which supports the view that 
central banks set the short-term interest rates to target inflation; however, the short-term 
interest rate as the predictive variable to economic conditions, such as real GDP or 
nominal GDP, is not as good as the conventional theory had suggested.  
 
The study also conducted the Granger causality test on 10-year Government bond rate 
and real GDP, inflation and nominal GDP in the U.S., U.K., Germany and Japan. Firstly, 
the study finds that 10-year Government bond rate does not Granger cause nominal 
GDP in the U.K., Germany and Japan, which is consistent with the results of the 
Granger causality test for the link between 3-month Treasury bill rate and nominal GDP. 
An absence of “causality” from 10-year Government bond rate to nominal GDP in three 
of the four countries enhances the view that interest rates do not predict the future 
economic information very well. Secondly, the 10-year Government bond rate does 
Granger cause inflation in the U.S., U.K. and Germany. This result gives us two 
indications. Firstly, the short-term interest might be closely related to long-term interest 
rate. Secondly, interest rates might have predictive power for the future inflation 
information.  
 
Overall, the results of the Granger causality test point out that interest rates, be the 
short-term or long-term, do not predict future nominal GDP in  most of the countries 
very well, and causality from interest rates to inflation is found in the U.S., U.K., 
Germany and Japan.  
 
7.1.2  Results on the link between money aggregates and nominal GDP   
Regarding the link between money aggregates and nominal GDP, the conclusion based 
on the simple regression, “causality” test, and the VAR model is that money is a useful 
predictor of nominal GDP, and even introducing the short-term interest rate does not 
decrease the predictive power for nominal GDP. A unidirectional causality from money 
to nominal GDP exists in the U.S., U.K. Germany and Japan. The VAR model implies 
the positive response of nominal GDP to money shock. More detailed summaries are 
presented in the following paragraphs.  
 
 260The simple comparison of 
2
R  suggests that interest rate has little predictive power for 
nominal GDP comparing to money aggregates in the entire sample, and introducing the 
interest rate into the regression does not decrease the predictive ability of money 
aggregates to nominal GDP in the U.S., U.K., Germany and Japan. This is consistent 
with the result obtained by (Feldstein and Stock, 1994).  In the U.S., M2 has more 
predictive power in the early subsample, while the predictive power of the 3-month 
Treasury bill rate for nominal GDP is enhanced in the later subsample. In the U.K., the 
predictive power of M4 for nominal GDP is stable, with little predictive power of 
interest rate for nominal GDP. In Germany, M3 seems the most important and stable 
variable to predict nominal GDP, while 3-month market rate is not. In Japan, M2 also 
has the most predictive power for nominal GDP, although the predictive power 
decreases in the later subsample. 3-month Treasury bill rate does not have significant 
predictive power for nominal GDP. In general, money aggregates have more predictive 
power for nominal GDP than interest rate and price growth in all countries, although the 
predictive link between money aggregates and nominal GDP is not stable in the U.S. 
and Japan.  
 
The Granger causality test shows that a unidirectional causality from money aggregates 
to nominal GDP exists in the U.S., U.K., Germany and Japan in the entire sample. 
Furthermore, the test results from the early subsample suggest a unidirectional Granger 
causality from money aggregates to nominal GDP in the U.K., Germany and Japan, 
with a two-way Granger causality between money and nominal GDP in the U.S. The 
results from the later subsample present a unidirectional Granger causality to nominal 
GDP in the U.S., U.K. and Germany; however, no Granger causality exists between M2 
and nominal GDP in Japan. Taken as a whole, a stable unidirectional Granger causality 
from money aggregates to nominal GDP in three out of four countries points out that 
money could provide future nominal GDP information better than conversely. Moreover, 
after comparing the results of Granger causality, money aggregates are demonstrably 
more appropriate than interest rates to provide future nominal GDP information.  
 
Friedman and Kuttner (1992)  argued that there was no evidence to suggest that 
movements in money include any information about subsequent fluctuations in income 
or prices. Moreover, if there is no evidence to show that money and income are 
 261cointegrated, even if the money were used as the intermediate target of monetary policy, 
there would be no empirical grounds for it. However, our empirical results show that, if 
the broader cointegration test is accepted, there is strong evidence to indicate a long-run 
and short-run relationship between money and nominal GDP.  
 
The results of the VAR model present the positive effect of money aggregates shock on 
nominal GDP in the U.S., U.K., Germany and Japan,  although the magnitude of 
nominal GDP response to money shock is different. The most significant response is in 
Japan, where there is around a 0.7% increase of nominal GDP after 1% of money 
aggregate-tightening, while the impulse response rises to 0.3% in the U.S. and Germany, 
and is not significant in the U.K. The impulse response of nominal GDP to money 
aggregates shock is found to be larger in the earlier period after comparing before and 
after the structural break in each country.  
 
The variance decomposition test attempts to show which factor mostly influences 
nominal GDP, and the results suggest that money shock and interest rate shock account 
for a similar percentage of nominal GDP in the U.S., U.K. and Germany; however, in 
Japan M2 accounts for nominal GDP more than interest rate does. Money shock 
accounts for a considerably larger amount of nominal GDP than interest rate in 
Germany and Japan in the early period; however, in the later period, money shock and 
interest rate shock both account for only a small amount of nominal GDP in the U.S., 
Germany and Japan. Neither money nor interest rate greatly account for nominal GDP, 
implying the possibility that an unknown variable, which could explain nominal GDP, 
is missing.  
 
The results of comparing 
2 R  in both the simple regression and Granger causality test 
imply that money has more predictive power than interest rate for nominal GDP in the 
U.S., U.K., Germany and Japan. The impulse response of nominal GDP to money shock 
is positive; however, the magnitude of impulse response in each country is different. 
The most significant impulse response of nominal GDP is in Japan, which confirms that 
money is the most important factor to influence nominal GDP in Japan. The results of 
variance decomposition do not find the supportive evidence that interest rate and money 
 262account for a large amount of nominal GDP in each country, which suggests that some 
factors that influence nominal GDP may not have been included.  
 
7.1.3  Results on the link between GDP-circulation credit and nominal GDP 
Empirical evidence from the study reported here as well as from earlier studies (Werner, 
2003) indicates that GDP-circulation credit could be considered as an optional variable 
to target nominal GDP in the U.S., U.K., Germany and Japan.  
  
Firstly, the assumption that velocity of GDP-circulation credit is constant could not be 
proved by a trend test. On the other hand, the stationary feature of GDP-circulation 
credit is found in the U.S., Germany and Japan. As a result, the assumption that velocity 
of GDP-circulation credit is constant could not be demonstrated, but the stationary 
feature of velocity suggests that velocity of GDP-circulation credit fluctuates around a 
certain level.  
 
After a step-by-step deduction of the general-to-specific model test, GDP-circulation 
credit remains in the U.K., Germany and Japan, although the significance level is 10% 
in Japan. Thus bank credit appears to be a good explanatory variable for nominal GDP, 
apart from in the U.S., according to the general-to-specific model. On the other hand, 
money aggregates are also left in the general-to-specific model in the U.S. and Japan at 
1% significance level in the entire sample, but the interest rates are not left in the model 
in the U.K., Germany and Japan. Therefore, the quantitative variables (GDP-circulation 
credit and money) have more power than the price variable (interest rate) to explain the 
nominal GDP.   
 
The conclusion of causality between credit to real GDP effectiveness transaction and 
nominal GDP is made based on the comparison of robustness with structural break, 
because the comparison of robustness with structural break provides the stronger 
causality link than the Granger causality test. After comparing the robustness to 
structural break of regression of credit on nominal GDP and vice versa, it can be found 
that the causality direction is from credit to nominal GDP rather than the other way 
around in the U.S., U.K. and Japan. The Granger causality test in the entire sample 
based on the VAR or VECM model shows that the hypothesis that GDP-circulation 
credit does not Granger cause nominal GDP is rejected only in the U.S. and Japan. The 
 263Granger causality relationship between nominal GDP and GDP-circulation credit is not 
stable after testing it in the subsample. The results of Granger causality in the earlier 
period are the same as those in the entire sample, in which credit to real GDP-effective 
transaction does Granger cause nominal GDP in the U.S. and Japan. Furthermore, in the 
later period it seems there is no strong causality between nominal GDP and GDP-
circulation credit. Thus, at least, GDP-circulation credit does have a causality link to the 
nominal GDP in the U.S. and Japan in both tests. 
 
The most encouraging findings are that the impulse response of nominal GDP to GDP-
circulation credit shock is constantly positive in each country, and the most impressive 
finding is that the magnitude of impulse response of nominal GDP to GDP-circulation 
credit shock is qualitatively similar in the U.S., U.K., Germany and Japan. This 
evidence strongly supports the notion that the GDP-circulation credit could be an 
appropriate intermediate variable to influence nominal GDP. Generally, it was found 
that a 1% increase in GDP-circulation credit will cause a rise of approximately 0.2% of 
nominal GDP in the U.S., U.K., Germany and Japan.  
 
The other findings from the VAR model are that the interest rate is more likely to 
follow nominal GDP stimulation rather than lead the trend of nominal GDP, but GDP-
circulation credit and money aggregates do not, according to the inconsistent pattern of 
GDP-circulation credit and money aggregates, respond to nominal GDP innovation and 
the consistent pattern of interest rate to nominal GDP innovation.  
 
The findings of impulse response obtained from the VAR model suggest that GDP-
circulation credit exhibits a close short-term correlation and causation to nominal GDP 
growth, though the variance decomposition results do not give this indication. Some 
facts found in the general-to-specific model, “causality” test and VAR model support 
the positive correlation between the GDP-circulation credit and nominal GDP, and 
GDP-circulation credit could be regarded as a suitable variable to influence nominal 
GDP.  
 
After summing up the findings in the thesis, we can answer the three questions proposed 
in the abstract. Firstly, quantitative variables (money and GDP-circulation credit) could 
be considered appropriate variables to target nominal GDP, but the price variable (short-
 264term interest rate) could not. The unidirectional causality from money to nominal GDP 
suggests that money aggregates could provide future nominal GDP information, and 
constant positive impulse response of nominal GDP to GDP-circulation credit shock in 
each country also supports the view that GDP-circulation credit could be an appropriate 
variable to affect nominal GDP. The results from the VAR model do not strongly 
support the notion that money aggregates have a constant positive effect on nominal 
GDP, and the Granger causality test does not support the existence of a strong causality 
relationship from GDP-circulation credit and nominal GDP. However, the study at least 
finds some positive evidence to indicate the predictive power of quantitative variables 
(money and GDP-circulation credit) for nominal GDP. On the other hand, the study 
does not find the evidence to support the idea that interest rate is an appropriate variable 
to influence nominal GDP, as no constantly close relationship between interest rate and 
nominal GDP is found in simple regression, GETS model, “causality” test and the VAR 
model.  
 
Secondly, it seems that quantitative variables (money and GDP-circulation credit) are 
better than the price variable (short-term interest rate) to influence nominal GDP. The 
comparing of 
2 R  in the simple regression points out that the money aggregates have 
more predictive power than short-term interest rate for nominal GDP. Furthermore, the 
results from the general-to-specific model show that GDP-circulation credit remains in 
the U.K., Germany and Japan, while M2 and 3-month Treasury bill rate is left only in 
the U.S. after step-by-step deduction. Thus, it could be concluded that money 
aggregates and GDP-circulation credit have more explanatory power than short-term 
interest rate for nominal GDP.  
 
Last but not least, there is no conclusive evidence to support GDP-circulation credit is 
better than money aggregates to explain nominal GDP. In the GETS model and VAR 
model, the GDP-circulation credit displays more explanatory power to nominal GDP 
than money aggregates do. The results of impulse response show that the GDP-
circulation credit exhibit more accurate features than money aggregates to target 
nominal GDP, because the nominal GDP response to GDP-circulation credit shock is 
more constant across the four countries than that to money shock. In the meantime, 
GDP-circulation credit remains in the GETS model in the U.K., Germany and Japan, 
 265but money aggregates do not remain in these three countries. However, considering the 
results of the “causality test”, money aggregates provide the future nominal GDP 
information better than GDP-circulation credit does.  The result of Granger causality 
test shows that money aggregates do Granger cause nominal GDP and  the result is 
robust in the entire sample and subsamples test, but GDP-circulation credit does not. 
Meanwhile Granger causality test does not confirm GDP-circulation credit does 
Granger cause nominal GDP. Therefore, based on the GETS model, Granger casualty 
test, and VAR model, we cannot conclude that GDP-circulation credit does better than 
money aggregates to explain nominal GDP.  
 
7.2  Contribution  
 
Monetary policy  
This study enriches the empirical monetary policy research, and adds some knowledge 
to the understanding of a modified ‘credit view’ of the transmission of monetary policy 
in the U.S., U.K., Germany and Japan. The empirical results in these countries could be 
helpful for the monetary policymakers to gain a deeper understanding of the effect of 
financial variables (short-term interest rate, money and credit) on economic output.  
 
Although many studies have focused on the relationship between monetary policy 
variables (interest rates or money aggregates) and economic conditions, most studies 
used real GDP or industrial production to represent economic conditions because these 
studies intended to remove the price factor from the economic conditions, and only 
examine the link between monetary policy variables (short-term interest rate or money) 
and economy in real measurement. However, Orphanides (1999), McCallum and 
Nelson (1999), and other earlier researchers argued that uncertainty in real-time output 
gap and uncertain persistent inflation make the monetary policy rules that respond to 
nominal output growth perform well. On the other hand, few empirical studies have 
paid attention to the link between financial variables and nominal output; thus, it is 
obvious that our study fills this gap by providing the empirical evidence on this aspect.  
Furthermore, our empirical study enriches the empirical works on the link between 
monetary policy (short-term interest rates or money aggregates) and economic 
conditions.  
 
 266GDP-circulation credit 
Until recently, academic studies had started to rethink the importance of credit for 
economic conditions, and more researchers had begun to explore the link between GDP-
circulation credit and economy ( Fisman and Love, 2003; Büyükkarabacak and Krause, 
2009; Büyükkarabacak and Valev, 2010). Werner (1997, 2003, and 2005) provided the 
concept that credit could be divided into two parts: one for real GDP effective 
transactions, and the other one for financial speculation. Werner (2003, 2005) had 
already tested the link between this kind of GDP-circulation credit and economic output 
in Japan, but this empirical study is the first to test the empirical relationship between 
GDP-circulation credit and nominal GDP in the U.S., U.K. and Germany. Additionally, 
our study employs more econometric models to examine the relationship. This way of 
analysing the GDP-circulation credit and credit to financial speculation in the U.S., U.K. 
and Germany will be helpful for the reference of further empirical work. Meanwhile, 
the empirical results support the view that credit could be regarded as a monetary policy 
variable because a constantly positive relationship between GDP-circulation credit and 
nominal GDP in the U.S., U.K., Germany and Japan is found. These results are 
encouraging, especially since academics have started to reconsider the importance of the 
role of credit in the implementation of monetary policy after the financial crisis of 
2007/08.   
 
7.3  The weakness of empirical tests 
 
The limitations of the data  
There are several limitations of the credit data in the research. Firstly, there is the issue 
induced by the definition of discrepancy. Because the central banks in the four countries 
studied did not provide the direct credit data that flow into real GDP effective 
transactions, and because they normally only present the credit to different industries or 
from different types of banks, the author calculated the credit data according to the 
definition first given by Werner (1997). Therefore, it is hard to avoid inconsistency in 
the data across countries. Secondly, there is the question of the definition of data breaks 
over the period. As we know, the time period is more than 30 years in each country, and 
the definition of the credit component has changed; for example, in Germany the 
lending to housing enterprises and lending to holding companies started in 1980Q4, so 
 267the definition of break in the data might have influenced the results. Thirdly, although 
the study has been careful to design the GDP-circulation credit, it is still hard to 
demonstrate the accuracy of the credit used. For example, in the U.K., the credit to 
householders was regarded as part of GDP-circulation credit; however, some of the 
credit to householders has been used for speculation in the housing market in the last 10 
years, so there may have been an overemphasis on GDP-circulation credit. These 
limitations will have influenced the empirical results, so further work needs to be 
undertaken. This study only provides the first attempt to employ empirical research on 
using GDP-circulation credit to target nominal GDP. More attention to credit research 
and more credit data could be revealed by the central banks. More research on the effect 
of credit on economic conditions would help us to better understand the functioning of 
the economy.  
 
The limitation of the econometrics models: Granger causality, VAR model, 
structural break 
 
The drawback of Granger causality  
The major problem with the Granger causality test is that the right-hand variables are 
not orthogonal, which is at least one of the reasons why Sims (1980) and Litterman and 
Weiss (1985) pay attention to the VAR with orthogonal residuals: the percentage of the 
variance of the forecasted variable attributable to alternative right-hand-side variables at 
different horizons.  
 
The disadvantages of the Granger causality test lie generally in the following aspects: 
the causality tests are sensitive to the lag length selection, the particular form of test 
employed, the method of detrending non-stationary time series and the increasing 
criticism of the insufficiency of theoretical considerations. Considering these 
disadvantages of the Granger causality test, it is necessary to employ other approaches 
to explore the link between financial variables and nominal GDP. In chapters 5 and 6, 
the research will employ more econometric models and extend to examine the link 
between money aggregates or GDP-circulation credit and nominal GDP. 
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The disadvantage of the VAR model has been discussed in chapter 3. However, we still 
need to summarise the problems of the VAR model in the context of our study. Firstly, 
the order of VAR model has been chosen according to the assumption that nominal 
GDP has a contemporaneous effect on all other variables and only the lag of the GDP-
circulation credit can have any effect on other variables. Although the change of order 
does not significantly influence the results, the assumption imposes a restriction on the 
VAR model. Secondly, in contrast to the structural VAR model, the theory-free 
background of the VAR model makes the coefficients of the VAR model hard to 
explain. Thirdly, in order to remain consistent and compare the results among the 
countries, the length of lag is chosen as six in both VAR models, with four or five 
variables in each country. Thus, the choice of lag length might not be the best in the 
VAR model in each country. Fourthly, in the VAR model in the thesis, it is assumed 
that short-term interest rate, money aggregates and GDP-circulation credit as monetary 
policy indicators, and “price puzzle” and “liquidity puzzle” are still found. The choice 
of monetary policy indicator is subject to prior theories, thus enduring the Lucas 
critique as well.  
 
Structural break  
Structural break is an important issue in the empirical test of monetary transmission 
mechanism because a change of monetary policy regime or exogenous economic shocks 
such as oil or financial crises would cause the alteration of the link between financial 
variables (interest rates, money and credit) and economic conditions. Consequently, the 
structural break must be considered, otherwise the results would be distorted.  On the 
other hand, it is not easy to find the same structural break in the different econometric 
models in each country, because there is not a widely accepted method that could 
automatically choose a structural break date in the VAR model, and the structural break 
dates found in the Gregory Hansen cointegration test with break in the intercept, trend 
or both intercept and trend are different. As a result, the study decides to choose a 
subjective structural break in each country based on the change in economic conditions 
in each country. Although using a subjective structural break in each country brings 
consistency across the models in each country, the study cannot ignore the problems 
that subjective structural breaks present.  
 
 269As we know, numerous changes of monetary policy regime or financial crises have 
occurred in the last four decades in the U.S., U.K., Germany and Japan, but only one 
structural break is considered in our study. The choice of break date in each country will 
certainly have influenced the empirical results and, furthermore, the date is assumed to 
be known subject to the critique that one could manipulate data by selecting a particular 
date. Considering these factors, it is not easy to find a way to avoid both the subjective 
judgement and inconsistent structural breaks chosen by different models.  How to 
consider the structural break in the VAR model is an ongoing topic, and needs to be 
explored in future works.  
 
Lucas critique 
 
Lucas critique is summarized as follows:  
 
"Given that the structure of an econometric model consists of optimal decision 
rules of economic agents, and that optimal decision rules vary systematically 
with changes in the structure of series relevant to the decision maker, it follows 
that any change in policy will systematically alter the structure of econometric 
models." ----Lucas (1976) 
 
 
The Lucas critique indicates that the difficulty to establish macroeconomic models is 
problem of rational expectation. The parameter of the model will change after the 
market behaviour is adjusted to changing expectation of monetary policy. As a result, 
my study is subjective to Lucas critique as well, because if monetary authorities suggest 
that they will attempt to control some types of credit, the financial intuitions or 
individual investors might find alternative credit resource to avoid the regulation on the 
credit. The Lucas critique advises that it is better to take into account individual 
behaviour in macroeconomic models, when aiming to predict the effect of monetary 
policy. Therefore, further research might need to consider individual behaviour when 
modelling the importance of credit. However, my study can only discuss the general 
thoughts on this limitation, and more research is need in the future.  
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7.4  Outlook for future research  
 
Overall, the empirical findings confirm the role of credit in affecting economic 
conditions and, furthermore, give support to the implementation of nominal GDP 
targeting in practice. Regarding the previous scepticism about the use of money 
aggregates as the intermediate target, the research also finds the predictive power of 
money aggregates for nominal GDP.  The critique for quantitative variables (money 
aggregates or credit) as intermediate targets is attributed to the deregulation of financial 
markets, and now the same factor seems to cast doubts on the short-term interest rate as 
the effective intermediate target. Our study did not find supportive evidence that short-
term interest rate is an appropriate variable to target nominal GDP. 
 
One interesting field of future empirical work would be to estimate more accurate GDP-
circulation credit that is used for real GDP effective transactions and for financial 
speculation. Meanwhile, it is necessary to utilize more sophisticated econometric 
models to discover the link between quantitative variables (money aggregates or GDP-
circulation credit) and economic output. We look forward to future studies that re-
examine our conclusion with broader or improved econometric models, and even more 
GDP-circulation credit data. Our contribution has been to provide the preliminary 
support to target nominal GDP in practice through quantitative variables (money 
aggregates or GDP-circulation credit) rather than the price variable (short-term interest 
rates). The recent financial crisis across the world also highlights the importance of 
quantitative variables (money aggregates or credit) to the economic output beyond our 
previous expectations.   272Bibliography  
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